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The integrated circuit (IC) development process is becoming increasingly vulnerable to
malicious activities because untrusted parties could be involved in this IC development
flow. There are four typical problems that impact the security and trustworthiness of
ICs used in military, financial, transportation, or other critical systems: (i) Malicious
inclusions and alterations, known as hardware Trojans, can be inserted into a design by
modifying the design during GDSII development and fabrication. Hardware Trojans in
ICs may cause malfunctions, lower the reliability of ICs, leak confidential information to
adversaries or even destroy the system under specifically designed conditions. (ii) The
number of circuit-related counterfeiting incidents reported by component manufacturers
has increased significantly over the past few years with recycled ICs contributing the
largest percentage of the total reported counterfeiting incidents. Since these recycled
ICs have been used in the field before, the performance and reliability of such ICs has
been degraded by aging effects and harsh recycling process. (iii) Reverse engineering
(RE) is process of extracting a circuits gate-level netlist, and/or inferring its function-
ality. The RE causes threats to the design because attackers can steal and pirate a
design (IP piracy), identify the device technology, or facilitate other hardware attacks.
(iv) Traditional tools for uniquely identifying devices are vulnerable to non-invasive or
invasive physical attacks. Securing the ID/key is of utmost importance since leakage of
even a single device ID/key could be exploited by an adversary to hack other devices
or produce pirated devices. In this work, we have developed a series of design and test
methodologies to deal with these four challenging issues and thus enhance the security,
trustworthiness and reliability of ICs. The techniques proposed in this thesis include: a
path delay fingerprinting technique for detection of hardware Trojans, recycled ICs, and
other types counterfeit ICs including remarked, overproduced, and cloned ICs with their
unique identifiers; a Built-In Self-Authentication (BISA) technique to prevent hardware
Trojan insertions by untrusted fabrication facilities; an efficient and secure split man-
ufacturing via Obfuscated Built-In Self-Authentication (OBISA) technique to prevent
reverse engineering by untrusted fabrication facilities; and a novel bit selection approach
for obtaining the most reliable bits for SRAM-based physical unclonable function (PUF)
across environmental conditions and silicon aging effects.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the emergence of information technology and its critical role in our daily lives,
the risk of cyber attacks is larger today than ever before. Many security systems or
devices have critical assurance requirement. Their failure may endanger human life and
environment (as with military and transportation system), do serious damage to major
finanical infrastructure, endanger personal privacy, and undermine the viability of whole
business sectors (cable service). Even the perception that a system is more vulnerable
than it really is (paying with a credit card over the Internet) can significantly impede
economic development. Information security engineering focuses more on the defense
against intrusion and unauthorized use of resources with software in the past, such
as antivirus, firewall, security information management, virtualization, cryptographic
software, and security protocol. While the battle between software developers and
hackers has raged since the 1980s, the underlying hardware was generally considered
safe, though not perfectly reliable.
However, in the last decade or so, this assumption is increasingly questionable.
The battle field extends to hardware domain because more attacks on hardware are
discovered and they are shown to be more effective and efficient than traditional soft-
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2ware attacks. Additionally, the complexity of the design, fabrication, and distribution of
electronics has caused a shift throughout the industry towards a global business model.
In such a model, untrusted entities participate either directly or indirectly in all phases
in the life of an electronic device or integrated circuit (IC), which provides more poten-
tial opportunities for adversaries to perform their attacks. The use of untrusted (and
potentially malicious) third parties into the development flow also increases the secu-
rity concerns as designs and devices pass through deeper supply chains. Therefore, the
IC development supply chain is now considered susceptible to various attacks, such as
hardware Trojan attacks, IC tampering, reverse-engineering, intellectual property (IP)
piracy, counterfeiting, and so forth. The security concerns we focus on in this thesis will
be presented in the rest of this chapter.
1.1 Security Issues
1.1.1 Hardware Trojan
With semiconductor scaling to very deep submicron levels, the complexity and cost of
IC design and fabrication increase dramatically. An ASIC/SoC component typically
will go through a process as shown in Figure 1.1. This development flow comprises
of steps from design and manufacturing all the way to sale in the market. The first
step of the process is the translation of the specifications into a behavioral description,
typically in a hardware design language (HDL) such as Verilog or VHDL. Next, synthesis
is performed to transform the behavioral description into a design implementation in
terms of logic gates (i.e., netlist). After implementing the netlist as a layout design, the
3digital GDSII files are then handed to a foundry for IC fabrication. Once the foundry
produces the actual ICs, the testing step ensures their correct operations. Those ICs that
pass testing are packaged by assembly and, finally, the electronics components head to
the market for sale and eventually deployment on systems. Because of the globalization
of semiconductor industry, this current semiconductor supply chain is vulnerable to
hardware Trojans. In 2008, [1] reported that a critical failure in Syrian radar might have
been intentionally triggered through a “backdoor” hidden within a commercial off-the-
shelf microprocessor. According to a U.S. defense contractor who spoke on condition of
anonymity, a “European chip maker” recently built such microprocessors with remote
kill switches for just such purposes. In another instance, [2] reported detection of a
backdoor in a military grade FPGAs. Given the dire consequences associated with such
weaknesses, the so called “hardware Trojan” issue has received considerable attention
from both academia, industry, and government over the last decade.
Specification
RTL Design/
Behavior Level
Netlist/
Gate Level
Physical Design
Layout
Fabrication Assembly Market
IP Core EDA Tool
Fig. 1.1: An ASIC/SoC development flow.
A hardware Trojan is defined as a malicious, undesired, intentional modification
of an electronic circuit or design that results in undesired behavior when the circuit is
deployed [5]. ICs that are “infected” by a hardware Trojan may experience modifications
4to their functionality or specification, may leak sensitive information, may experience
degraded or unreliable performance, or may be more susceptible to Denial of Service
(DoS) and backdoors. Hardware Trojans can be inserted at any phase from circuit design
to fabrication. Several articles have proposed detailed hardware Trojan taxonomies.
For instance, [4] [5] separates Trojans based on five different attributes: insertion phase,
abstraction level, activation mechanism, effects, and location.
The hardware Trojan research domain has seen significant progress over the past
decade. Various types of hardware Trojans have been developed and investigated. Re-
gardless of combinational, sequential or other emerging hardware Trojans, in general,
a Trojan contains two basic parts: trigger and payload [6]. Figure 1.2 shows a basic
Trojan architecture. Trojan trigger is an optional part which monitors various signals
and/or a series of events in the circuit. The payload usually taps signals from origi-
nal (Trojan-free) circuit and the output of the trigger. Once Trojan trigger detects an
expected event or condition, the payload is activated to perform malicious behaviors.
Typically, the trigger is expected to be activated under extremely rare conditions, so
the payload remains inactive most of the time. When the payload is inactive, the IC
acts like Trojan-free circuit making it difficult to detect the Trojan. In the recent years,
researchers have explored and investigated new Trojan triggers and payloads that could
increase difficulty of activation and detection of Trojans. These triggers may utilize
don’t care states in a design [7] or silicon wear-out mechanisms [8] [9] for Trojan ac-
tivation, while payloads might generate intentional side-channel signals to leak secret
information [10] without impacting primary outputs. Since extra circuitry introduced
5by Trojan trigger and payload inevitably causes some side-effects, such as additional
area, timing, power or radiation, they could be utilized by defenders for Trojan de-
tection. Thus, to make their Trojan more stealthy and avoid being detected, Trojan
designs could be further optimized and thus minimize Trojan impact on the original
design as much as possible [11] [12].
Fig. 1.2: Trojan structure.
1.1.2 Recycled ICs
The counterfeiting of semiconductor components has been on the rise for many years as
a result of several vulnerabilities in the electronics component supply chain. According
to one estimate, the United States Department of Defense may have purchased between
$15-100M USD worth of counterfeit ICs in 2005 alone [13]. The most recent data
provided by Information Handing Service Inc. (IHS) shows that reports of counterfeit
ICs have quadrupled since 2009 [14]. If counterfeit ICs were to end up in the supply chain
for mission-critical or life-saving applications, the results of the failure of an unreliable
or insecure counterfeit part could be catastrophic.
According to the definition of counterfeit electronics in [17], a counterfeit compo-
nent (i) is an unauthorized copy; (ii) does not conform to original component manufac-
6Fig. 1.3: A taxonomy of counterfeit component types.
turer (OCM) design, model, and/or performance standards; (iii) is not produced by the
OCM or is produced by unauthorized contractors; (iv) is an off-specification, defective,
or used OCM product sold as “new” or working; or (v) has incorrect or false markings
and/or documentation. The above definition does not include all possible scenarios
where an entity in the component supply chain source electronic components that are
authentic and certified by the OCMs. Guin et al developed a comprehensive taxonomy
of counterfeit types [18–21]. They classified the counterfeit types into seven distinct
categories: recycled, remarked, overproduced, out-of-spec/defective, cloned, forged doc-
umentation, and tampered ICs, as shown in Figure 1.3. Guin et al also presented all
possible vulnerabilities from design to resign of ICs in the supply chain [22,23].
The category that has contributed the most to the rise of counterfeits is the
recycled ICs. It is estimated that these recycled ICs account for 80% of all counterfeits
being sold worldwide. A report from the Office of Technology Evaluation, part of the
U.S. Department of Commerce, also proves that the number of reported incidents of
used ICs being sold as new or remarked as higher grade is larger than other types of
counterfeits, as shown in Figure 1.4 [16,17]. In addition, electronics consumer and e-
7Fig. 1.4: Counterfeit incidents by type of problem for microcircuits from 2005 to 2008.
waste trends suggest that this recycling is only going to increase over time as more
gadgets are used for shorter periods of time [17]. These used or defective ICs enter
the market when electronic “recyclers” divert scrapped circuit boards away from their
designated place of disposal for the purposes of removing and reselling the ICs on those
boards. After carefully cleaning and remarking, those used ICs look like new and could
be re-used in critical applications. However, the used components have been deployed in
a system and experienced aging degradations comparing with new components [24,82].
Additionally, the recycling process usually involves a high temperature environment to
remove ICs from boards, so recycled ICs could fail sooner and be less reliable than new
chips. It is vital to identify and prevent recycled ICs from entering critical infrastructure,
aerospace, medical, and defense supply chains.
81.1.3 Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering (RE) is a process that attempts to gain a full understanding of
a circuit’s construction and/or functionality. Thus, it can be used to clone, pirate or
counterfeit a design, to develop an attack, or insert a hardware Trojan by adversaries.
As described in section 1.1.1, multiple untrusted parties could be involved in design, fab-
rication, assembly and distribution of today’s ICs, so this long and globally distributed
semiconductor supply chain becomes more vulnerable to RE attacks. IC RE can occur
at various development stages. However, reverse engineering a packaged chip is the
most difficult, costly and time-consuming. A chip has package material to protect the
die and each die has several metal layers, vias, interconnections, passivation, and active
layers. Different destructive and non-destructive RE techniques have been developed. A
destructive process usually produces more exact results, but the IC is no longer usable;
most nondestructive methods are less exact in determining precisely what is going on
inside the chip, but the IC is still usable afterwards [25].
• Non-destructive RE: There are two categories of non-destructive methods of re-
verse engineering: those methods which passively view the IC without interfering
in any way (external), and those which actively interface with the accepted I/O
pins to explore the inner workings of the IC (internal) [26]. Both methods have
their advantages and drawbacks; the external, passive methods only work to find
differences from a baseline and may not have the level of granularity needed, but
the more exact internal, active methods are very slow. These methods are often
known as characterizing the IC. For example, X-ray tomography is an external
9non-destructive method, which can provide layer-by-layer images of chips manu-
factured in older technology nodes and is often used for the analysis of internal
vias, traces, wire bonding, capacitors, contacts, or resistors.
• Destructive RE: The basic destructive method for exploring an IC is relatively
simple in design, but difficult to execute with the required precision. This method
physically removes micrometer thin layers of the IC, paring it down slowly and
taking pictures with an electron microscope at each layer. Using those images, it
is then possible to reconstruct the physical layout of the chip and work upwards
to the full chip design. With the right tools and techniques, this is a very accurate
and exact method even for modern process nodes; it is also destructive to the
extreme [25].
As the feature size of transistor shrinks further, RE at chip level is becoming
more difficult regardless of non-destructive and destructive REs. Therefore, RE at the
fabrication phase in foundry could be a better opportunity for attackers, because the
information for all layers are available on the masks. Attackers can easily extract its
gate-level netlist from the lithographic masks and even could infer its functionality. We
try to tackle the RE problem occurring at the fabrication stage by untrusted foundry
in this proposal. Novel approaches are needed to prevent RE with a low cost.
1.1.4 On-Chip ID/Key Generation
Traditional tools for uniquely identifying devices, such as product IDs and barcodes,
are exposed to everyone and hence can be easily duplicated. Alternatively, an intrinsic
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device identifier (ID) can be digitally stored in the non-volatile memory (NVM) or fuses.
It might be also applicable to ID or cryptographic key storage. Storing the ID/key using
these methods is not only expensive, but also vulnerable to physical attacks (such as
non-invasive, semi-invasive, or invasive) as well as software attacks (such as viruses and
API-attacks [27]). Securing the ID/key is of utmost importance since leakage of even
a single device ID/key could be exploited by an adversary to hack other devices or
produce pirated devices.
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been proposed as a more secure al-
ternative to conventional ID/key storage because of their unclonability and built-in
tamper resistance features [28]. Each PUF is able to generate a unique ID by exploiting
the inherent uncontrollable random variations in manufacturing process (e.g. threshold
voltage (Vth), channel length (L), and oxide thickness (Tox)). PUFs avoid the high cost
of building tamper-resistant NVM system, since any invasive attack may alter internal
behavior of an IC leading to incorrect outputs. An ideal PUF takes an input (challenge)
and gives a random output (response) which is unique for every device [30]. Another
advantage of PUF is that a PUF can produce a large of amount of challenge-response
pairs that are random and usually difficult to predict, which overcomes the limitation
of insufficient number of key storage. Besides regular authentication and identifica-
tion, PUFs can be also employed to detect cloned, overproduced, and remarked ICs, as
discussed in Section 1.1.2, because a new or different IC will produce a distinct PUF
output.
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1.2 Previous Works and Limitations
1.2.1 Hardware Trojan Detection
A large variety of potential hardware Trojans are man-made and designed to be stealthy
by intelligent adversaries, which is a major difference from manufacturing defects that
have been extensively researched for the last few decades. Manufacturing defects are
natural and unintentional, and the behaviors of such defects could be reflected with
stuck-at fault, delay fault, etc. models. Automatic test pattern generation (ATPG)
tools can generate structural patterns to detect certain faults. For hardware Trojans, it
is impossible to create a model that fits all types of Trojans. Additionally, manufacturing
defects are only produced during the fabrication process, while hardware Trojans could
even be injected during design stages. Hence, there may not exist an uninfected (i.e.,
Trojan-free) design to even compare newly fabricated ICs with.
Due to the limitations of traditional manufacturing tests for Trojan detection,
various hardware Trojan countermeasures have been developed, in order to address
or mitigate potential hardware Trojan threats in the vulnerable semiconductor supply
chain. Generally, they are classified into two categories, Trojan detection and design-
for-trust, as shown in Figure 1.5.
Trojan Detection
Trojan detection is the most straightforward and commonly-used way to deal with
hardware Trojans. It aims to verify the existing designs and fabricated ICs without any
supplementary circuitry. Generally, existing Trojan detection approaches are performed
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Fig. 1.5: The taxonomy of Hardware Trojan countermeasures.
either at the design stage (i.e., pre-silicon) to validate IC designs or after manufacturing
stage (i.e., post-silicon) to verify fabricated ICs.
Post-silicon detection techniques can be further divided into destructive and
nondestructive methods, as illustrated in Figure 1.5. Destructive methods typically use
destructive reverse-engineering techniques to depackage an IC and obtain images of each
layer in order to reconstruct the design for trust validation of the end product. Provided
a golden design is available, destructive reverse-engineering has the potential of giving
100% assurance that any malicious modification in the IC will be detected, but it is
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high cost and could take several weeks and months to do this for an IC of reasonable
complexity. Additionally, at the end of this invasive process, the IC cannot be used, and
we only get the information for a single IC. Hence, in general, destructive approaches
are not considered viable for Trojan detection. However, destructive reverse engineering
on a limited number of samples can be attractive in order to obtain the characteristics
of a golden batch of ICs. This information can be useful for trust validation through
side-channel analysis. [33] proposed to adapt a well-studied machine learning method,
one-class support vector machine (SVM), to identify Trojan-free ICs for the golden
model.
Nondestructive techniques try to authenticate fabricated ICs from untrusted foundry
through functional tests or side-channel signal analysis:
(1) Functional test needs to activate Trojans by applying test vectors and com-
paring the responses with the correct results, like manufacturing tests for detecting
manufacturing defects. However, hardware Trojans result in additional functionality
or modifications to the original design. Unlike manufacturing defects whose behaviors
can be predicted, conventional manufacturing tests using functional/structural/random
patterns perform poorly to reliably detect hardware Trojans [34]. Intelligent adversaries
can design Trojans that are activated under very rare conditions, so they can go un-
detected under structural and functional tests during manufacturing test process. [35]
[36] developed test pattern generation methods to trigger such rarely activated nets
and improve the possibility of observing Trojan’s effects from primary outputs. How-
ever, due to the numerous logical states in a circuit, it is impractical to enumerate all
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states of a real design. Additionally, instead of changing the functionality of the original
circuit [37], a Trojan may transmit information, e.g., with an antenna, or modify the
specification. Functional tests fail to detect this kind of Trojans.
(2) Side-channel signal analysis approaches are able to detect hardware Trojans
by measuring circuit parameters, such as delay [6] [38], power (transient [39] and leakage
power [40]), temperature [41], and radiation [42]. They take advantage of side effects
(i.e. extra path delay, power, heat or electromagnetic radiation) caused by additional
circuits and/or activity from Trojan trigger/payload activation. However, most of these
techniques assume “golden ICs” (Trojan-free ICs) are available for comparison, in order
to identify Trojan-infected ICs. In addition, while side-channel analysis methods may
succeed in detecting Trojans to some degree, the difficulty lies in achieving high coverage
of every gate or net and in extracting the tiny, abnormal side-channel signals of hardware
Trojans in the presence of process and environmental variations. As the feature size
of ICs shrinks and the number of transistors grows, the increasing levels of process
variations can easily mask the small side-channel signals induced by low-overhead and
rarely-triggered Trojans.
Pre-silicon Trojan detection techniques focus on a different attack model,
which are used to help SoC developers and design engineers to validate third party
IP (3PIP) cores and their final designs, since hardware Trojan could be added into
3PIP cores by untrusted IP vendors, into designs by untrusted EDA tools or rogue
employees, or both. Existing pre-silicon detection techniques can be broadly classified
into functional validation, code/structural analysis, and formal verification.
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(1) The principle idea of functional validation is the same as the functional tests
described above. The functional validation is conducted with simulation, while func-
tional tests have to be performed on a tester for applying input patterns and collecting
output responses. Therefore, existing techniques for functional tests are also applicable
to functional validation. Of course, function validation also inherits functional tests’
pros and cons.
(2) Designs are typically described in behavioral or structural code in hardware
design languages. Code analysis is performed on behavioral [43] or structural [44] codes
to identify redundant statements or circuits that may be a part of a Trojan. On the
other hand, structural analysis employs some quantitative metrics to mark signals or
gates with low activation probability as suspicious [45] [46]. Additionally, [47] attempts
to identify the vulnerabilities by extracting Trojan features from several existing Trojan
benchmark circuits. The limitations of code/structural analysis techniques are that they
do not guarantee Trojan detection, and manual post-processing is required to analyze
suspicious signals or gates and determine if they are a part of a Trojan.
(3) Formal verification is an algorithmic-based approach to logic verification that
exhaustively proves a pre-defined set of security properties that a design should satisfy
[43] [48]. To check if a design honors these properties, one converts the target design
into a proof checking format (e.g. Coq) [49]. However, formal verification techniques
could fail to detect additional unexpected functionality introduced by Trojans while
satisfying these properties.
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Design-for-Trust
Although functional validation techniques could potentially activate a Trojan and de-
tect it, intelligent adversaries can design Trojans that are activated under very rare
conditions, so they can go undetected under structural and functional tests during the
post-silicon validation. In addition, detecting a quiet, low-overhead hardware Trojan is
still very challenging with existing side-channel analysis techniques. A more effective
way is to plan for the Trojan issue in the design phase through design-for-trust. The
basic way of Design-for-Trust (DfT) approaches is to facilitate the existing detection
approaches discussed above:
(1) Facilitate Functional Test: Triggering a Trojan from inputs and observing
the Trojan effect from outputs are difficult due to the stealthy nature of Trojans. A
large number of low-controllable and low-observable nets in a design significantly hin-
der the possibility of activating a Trojan. [50] [51] attempt to increase controllability
and observability of nodes by inserting test points into the circuit. Another approach
proposes to multiplex two outputs of a DFF, Q and Q¯, through a 2-to-1 multiplexer
and select either of them, in order to extend the state space of the design and increase
the possibility of exciting/propagating the Trojan effects to circuit outputs and mak-
ing them detectable [35]. These approaches are beneficial not only to functional-test
based detection techniques, but also to side-channel based methods that need partial
activation of Trojan circuitry.
(2) Facilitate Side-Channel Signal Analysis: A number of design meth-
ods have been developed to increase the sensitivity of side-channel based detection ap-
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proaches. [52] propose to minimize background side-channel signals by localizing switch-
ing activities within one region while minimize it in other regions through a scan-cell
reordering technique. Additionally, some newly-developed structures or sensors are im-
plemented in the circuit to provide a higher detection sensitivity than conventional
measurements. Ring oscillators (ROs) structure [53], shadow registers [54] and delay
elements [55] on a set of selected short paths are inserted for path delay measurements.
RO sensors [56] and transient current sensors [57] [58] are able to improve sensitivity to
voltage and current fluctuations caused by Trojans, respectively. Besides, integration
of process variation sensors can calibrate the model or measurement and minimize the
noise induced by manufacturing variations [59] [60].
(3) Run-time Monitoring: As triggering all types and sizes of Trojans during
pre-silicon and post-silicon tests are very difficult, run-time monitoring of critical com-
putations can signicantly increase the level of trust with respect to hardware Trojan
attacks. These run-time monitoring approaches can utilize existing or supplemental
on-chip structures or sensors to monitor chip’s behaviors [61] [62] or operating condi-
tions, such as transient power [57] [63] and temperature [41]. They can disable the chip
upon detection of any abnormalities or bypass it to allow reliable operation, albeit with
some performance overhead. [64] presents a design of an on-chip analog neural network
which can be trained to distinguish trusted from untrusted circuit functionality based
on measurements obtained via on-chip measurement acquisition sensors.
For the DfT techniques that require circuitry added in the front-end design phase,
the potential area and performance overheads are the chief concerns to designers. As
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the size of a circuit increases, the number of quiet (low controllability/observability)
nets/gates will increase the complexity of processing and produce a large time/area
overhead. Thus, the DfT techniques for facilitating detection are still difficult to apply to
a large design that contains millions of gates. Therefore, a more effective DfT technique
with low-overhead is needed to detect or even prevent hardware Trojans in ICs.
1.2.2 Recycled IC Identification
Existing techniques for recycled IC detection are limited. Most recycled ICs are de-
tected through careful physical visual inspection, blacktop testing, scanning electron
microscopy (SEM), scanning acoustic microscopy, X-ray imaging, X-ray fluorescence,
and so forth, since the markings or parts of the package may have been damaged during
the refining process. These methods can effectively detect recycled ICs with gross de-
fects, such as defects in package, lead, bond wires, die, and etc. However, they cannot
detect recycled ICs without these physical defects. Moreover, all the ICs under physical
test cannot be verified as most of these tests are based on sampling and decapping.
DNA markings are commercially available to detect recycled ICs, but it is extremely
time-consuming and costly, which makes it impractical for recycled part detection. Al-
ternatively, electrical detection methods, such as functional tests and parameter tests,
could be applied to all ICs under test. However, the applicability and cost of these tests
to today’s complex ICs are a major concern.
Several IC design approaches have been proposed to identify recycled ICs [82]
[83]. [82] uses a light-weight on-chip sensor that avoids the data collection altogether
and applies a “self-referencing” concept to the measurement of use time. However, this
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approach cannot address detection of existing and legacy ICs that have no such sensors
embedded in them. Therefore, new electrical test techniques are needed to measure ICs’
specifications and detect recycled ICs without changing the original design, so that they
can be used on both new IC designs and legacy designs already in production or in use.
1.2.3 Anti-Reverse Engineering
The issues associated with RE include security risks to critical systems, profit loss for
intellectual property owners, and the discouragement of innovation in hardware de-
velopment. Anti-reverse engineering becomes important. Several techniques have been
proposed in the past to hinder attackers from extracting original circuit structure and/or
functionality. Logic obfuscation (or logic encryption) and camouflaging techniques are
two major methodologies to overcome RE attacks.
Logic obfuscation attempts to hide the functionality and the implementation of
a design by insertion of built-in locking mechanisms into the original design. The lock-
ing circuits become transparent and the right function appears only when a valid key
is applied. The increased complexity of identifying the genuine functionality without
knowing the right input vectors is able to dwarf the ability of inserting a targeted Tro-
jan by attackers. For combinational logic obfuscation, XOR/XNOR gates could be
introduced at certain locations in a design [65]. In sequential logic obfuscation, addi-
tional states are introduced in a finite state machine to conceal its functional states [67].
In addition, some papers proposed to insert reconfigurable logics for logic obfuscation
[69] [70] [71]. The design is functional when the reconfigurable circuits are correctly
programmed by the design house or end user.
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Camouflaging is a layout-level obfuscation technique to create indistinguishable
layouts for different gates by adding dummy contacts and faking connections between
the layers within a camouflaged logic gate [72] [73]. The camouflaging technique can
hinder attackers from extracting a correct gate-level netlist of a circuit from the lay-
out through imaging different layers, so the original design is protected from inserted
targeted Trojans. Additionally, [74] utilized the same concept of dummy contact and
developed a set of camouflaging cells using the polarity controllable SiNW FETs.
However, these techniques require additional circuit or design efforts in the design
phase (RTL or gate-level). The potential area and performance overheads are the chief
concerns to IC designers. Thus, the existing techniques are still questionable to apply to
a large design that contains millions of gates. In addition, these techniques need to insert
additional gates (logic obfuscation) or modify the original standard cells (camouflaging),
which could degrade the chip performance significantly and affect their acceptability in
high-end circuits. Therefore, a low-cost and effective technique is necessary today to
prevent RE at fabrication phase by untrusted foundry.
1.2.4 Physical Unclonable Function
Many different kinds of PUFs have been proposed and implemented over the past decade,
such as Arbiter PUF [31], RO-PUF [30], SRAM PUF [32] [119], Butterfly PUF [32],
etc. A majority of PUFs require additional dedicated circuit structures that need ab-
solute symmetry. Apart from the substantial cost in silicon area, their integration into
an SoC design needs extra effort on the placement and routing in layout design, which
limit their acceptability significantly. Therefore, a reliable PUF technique without ad-
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ditional hardware is essential. On the other hand, a separate class of relatively few
PUF implementations generates ID/key from existing on-chip structures, such PUFs
that exploit random mismatch in inner node voltages of memory elements (e.g. SRAM
or Flip-Flops). Memory based PUFs are a good choice for those SoCs that integrate
SRAMs inside. However, the power-up value is influenced by environmental variations.
Exhaustive tests across different temperatures/voltages used in prior works are expen-
sive and time-consuming. A more effective and low-cost solution is needed. In addition,
a general and reliable ID/key generation technique is important for ICs that are already
in production (including legacy designs) and have no memory. The generated on-chip
IDs can also be used to detect counterfeit ICs, including recycled ICs, remarked ICs,
cloned ICs, and overproduced ICs.
1.3 Contributions
With the above motivation, this thesis is devoted to the development of a series of low-
cost and effective techniques for secure and trustworthy integrated circuits (ICs). All
the security issues discussed above will be dealt with from three angles: pre-silicon test
methodologies, design-for-security methodologies, and security primitive enhancement
methodologies. The overview of my proposed solutions is shown in Figure 1.6.
1.3.1 Post-silicon Test Methodologies
Nowadays post-silicon test is a common practice to identify defective ICs that are caused
by uncontrollable physical imperfections during manufacturing process. The test proce-
dure is based on design specification and fault model associated with the implementation
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Fig. 1.6: The overview of the proposed solutions in this dissertation.
technology, so security issues have not been taken into account when test engineers de-
velop the test procedure. A new delay-based IC fingerprinting is proposed, based on
conventional delay tests, to detect hardware Trojans, identify recycled ICs, and gener-
ate secure and reliable on-chip IDs/keys without any area overhead, and without using
uncommon steps in the design or test processes. A clock sweeping technique will be
presented to extract intrinsic path delay information and produce IC fingerprints.
Hardware Trojan Detection
Compared to full Trojan activation and other side-channel signal techniques described
in Section 1.2.1, a delay-based technique has a unique benefit because it does not need
to activate the Trojan either partially or fully. Moreover, each path delay is relatively
independent, so it is less affected by other paths of the chip, and a Trojan can potentially
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contribute more to a path delay change than total circuit power. Existing delay-based
Trojan detection methods face the following challenges: (1) To ensure a maximum
detection coverage of Trojans that can potentially be placed and distributed on various
paths besides critical paths. (2) The measurement of paths delay at a low cost. Since
there is a huge number of paths in a design, any additional hardware for path delay
measurement will increase the area and silicon cost significantly. Taking into account
these issues, in Chapter 2, we will use a clock sweeping technique to obtain path delay
information without any additional hardware. Once the data has been collected by clock
sweeping, we generate a series of delay fingerprints for ICs, and then apply statistical
methods to analyze whether the chips under test contain Trojans. Since transitions are
easier generated on short paths as demonstrated in [50], the Trojans on the short paths
can be detected more efficiently by power-based Trojan detection techniques [39] [40].
By combining this technique with existing power based Trojan detection methods, a very
high detection coverage can be achieved. Simulation results using 90nm technology and
implementation results using Xilinx Spartan-3E FPGAs demonstrate the effectiveness
of our method under process variations, even for Trojans as small as a few gates.
Recycled IC Detection
Since the performance of recycled ICs must have been degraded by aging effects, com-
pared to fresh ICs, a path-delay based fingerprinting technique is proposed to sensitize
the aging effects and identify recycled ICs. For fresh ICs, the delay distribution of paths
will be within a certain range. The fingerprints of the fresh ICs can be generated during
manufacturing test of these ICs and stored in a secure memory for future use when iden-
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tifying recovered ICs. Due to aging effects, such as negative/positive bias temperature
instability (NBTI/PBTI) and hot carrier injection (HCI), the path delays in recycled
ICs will be larger than those in fresh ICs. For a chip under authentication (CUA), the
larger the path delays are, the higher the probability there is that the CUA has been
used and is a recovered IC. In Chapter 3, we propose a fingerprinting and authentication
ow for accurately identifying recycled ICs. Statistical data analysis is used to distinguish
the path delay changes caused by process and temperature variations from those caused
by aging. Since the path delay information is measured during the manufacturing test
process, no extra hardware circuitry is required for this technique. In addition, there is
no change required in current industrial design and test flows. Finally, this technique
presents no area overhead, no power consumption, and is resilient to attacks.
On-Chip ID Generation
We will use the proposed clock sweeping technique to uniquely identify ICs. In Chapter
4, we develop a flow to create a unique binary identifier for each IC by using the path
delay information. In addition, we will analyze our ability to accurately identify ICs
under measurement and environmental noise. Simulation results from 90nm technol-
ogy and experimental results from 90nm FPGAs demonstrate the effectiveness of our
technique.
1.3.2 Design-for-Security Methodologies
Although post-silicon test methodologies can address or mitigate some security problems
to some degree, limitations caused by existing circuit structure are also very apparent.
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In order to handle security threats better, hardware security issues are considered earlier
in the design process and thus some design-for-security methodologies have been devel-
oped. We develop a low-overhead built-in self-authentication (BISA) technique that
can effectively prevent hardware Trojan insertion and reverse engineering by untrusted
foundries.
Hardware Trojan Prevetion
Detecting hardware Trojans is very challenging because of the diversity of Trojans and
unpredictable process variations during fabrication. In Chapter 5, we will discuss how
to use BISA to make hardware Trojan insertion by untrusted GDSII developer and
untrusted foundry considerably more difficult and easier to detect. The unused spaces
in the circuit layout represent the best opportunity to insert Trojans by these entities.
BISA works by eliminating this spare space and filling it with functional filler cells, in-
stead of non-functional filler cells. A self-testing procedure generates a digital signature
that will be different if any BISA cells are changed because of hardware Trojan inser-
tion. We demonstrate that BISA can be applied to any flat or bottom-up hierarchical
design with negligible overhead in terms of area, power, and timing.
Design Obfuscation for Anti-reverse engineering
Split manufacturing has emerged as a viable approach to protect integrated circuits (ICs)
fabricated in untrusted foundries, but has high cost and/or high performance overhead.
Furthermore, split manufacturing cannot fully prevent untargeted hardware Trojan in-
sertions. In Chapter 6, we propose to insert additional functional circuitry called obfus-
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cated built-in self-authentication (OBISA) in the chip layout with split manufacturing
process, in order to prevent reverse-engineering and further prevent hardware Trojan
insertion. Self-tests are performed to authenticate the trustworthiness of the OBISA
circuitry. The OBISA circuit is connected to original design in order to increase the
strength of obfuscation, thereby allowing a higher layer split and lower overall cost.
Additional fan-outs are created in OBISA circuitry to improve obfuscation without los-
ing testability. Our proposed gating mechanism and net selection method can ensure
negligible overhead in terms of area, timing, and dynamic power. Experimental results
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed technique in several benchmark circuits.
1.3.3 Security Primitive Enhancement Methodologies
A Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) is a structure that when issued a challenge,
it produces a unique and reliable response which can be used as an identifier or a
cryptographic key. SRAM PUFs create unique responses upon power up as certain
SRAM cells output a ‘1’ or ‘0’ with high probability due to uncontrollable process
variations. A current challenge in SRAM PUFs is their sensitivity to temperature
and voltage variations as well as aging. By creating algorithms that isolate stable bits
quickly and with minimal testing, the use of SRAM PUF should become more practical.
In Chapter 7, we explore the selection of stable bits through enrollment under different
conditions (temperature, voltage, and aging). The basis of this algorithm is to identify
the most stable bits based upon the performance of their neighboring cells in a series of
enrollment tests (testing under some extreme corner conditions). The algorithm finds
the cells which consistently only output a value of ’0’ or ’1’ and then ranks their overall
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stability using a weighting algorithm. The weighting algorithm takes into account the
number of stable and unstable neighbors a cell has. We have analyzed data from SRAM
chips and demonstrated the proposed technique is able to improve the reliability of
SRAM PUF significantly.
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Chapter 2
Post-Silicon Test Methodology: Delay-based IC Fingerprinting for
Hardware Trojan Detection
The threats and challenges introduced by hardware Trojan have been described in Chap-
ter 1.1.1. Conventional delay tests have limitations to detect Trojans, which can only
identify Trojans that increase a path’s delay by more than its available slack. This is
unlikely to happen since adversary will design Trojans hard to be detected by these pat-
terns by avoiding critical paths and ensuring that the delay induced by Trojan is smaller
than slack. In this chapter, a clock sweeping technique is developed, which is able to
target Trojans on shorter paths. Then, the effectiveness of the proposed methodology
will be evaluated in simulation and FPGA implementation.
2.1 Clock Sweeping
Clock sweeping is the process of applying patterns to a path multiple times with different
frequencies to find a frequency at which the path cannot propagate its signal, often for
purposes of speed binning. By observing the frequencies at which the path can and
cannot propagate its signal, the delay of the path can be measured with some degree
of precision. Our ability to perform clock sweeping on a path is limited by the degree
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of control we have on the clock that controls the capturing memory elements (i.e., the
flip-flops), the degree to which we can excite paths in the circuit, and the lengths of
the paths in the IC. For the clock sweeping technique, the conventional transition delay
fault (TDF) or path delay fault (PDF) test patterns can be used. These fault models
are common in automatic test pattern generation (ATPG), so no extra considerations
for test pattern generation and test coverage are needed.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2.1: (a) An example circuit and (b) Clock sweeping on paths in the circuit.
Figure 2.1(a) shows a visual example of clock sweeping being performed on several
paths that can be sensitized by test patterns. The clock period is swept from f0 to f5
and the sweep step size is a fixed ∆t, as shown in Figure 2.1(b). As an example, path
B-D is able to propagate correct values at frequency f0 to f3 (pass), and will produce
wrong logic values at frequency f4 (fail). Thus, its start-to-fail clock frequency is f4,
which denotes the length of path B-D is between the frequency f3 and f4. When the
clock is swept from low frequencies to high frequencies, paths will fail sequentially, with
longer paths failing before shorter paths. Path B-C will succeed in propagating its signal
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at all six clock frequencies in this example, because it is too short to test. All of the
paths have some number of frequencies they will pass at, some they may fail at, and
some they are guaranteed to fail at. When the clock is swept from low frequencies to
high frequencies, paths will fail sequentially, with longer paths failing before shorter
paths. If the sweep range is large enough, many paths will fail during clock sweeping,
allowing their delay information to be obtained, even for hazardous patterns if the size
of the hazard is larger than the sweep step size.
The ability to perform clock sweeping on a path is limited by the availability
of sweeping clock frequencies, the degree to which we can excite paths in the circuit,
and the lengths of the paths in the IC. The range and step size of sweeping frequencies
are two critical parameters involved in the clock sweeping technique. A smaller step
size could be more sensitive to small delay changes caused by the wearout mechanism
and process variation. The range determines the range of testable paths (long paths).
Higher maximum frequency could fail more long paths during clock sweeping. However,
the maximum frequency applied to the circuit cannot go very high, because it is also
restricted by the design characteristics, path-delay distribution in the design, the max-
imum power consumption, and the on-chip or off-chip frequency generator’s limit. For
example, with the Ocelot ZFP tester, the main frequency is 400MHz and the frequency
step size is 1MHz.
Figure 2.2 shows the flow of the clock sweeping technique. The delay test patterns
are applied to ICs at different clock frequencies. By analyzing the pass and fail values
with clock sweeping, the start-to-fail frequency at each flip-flop for each pattern can
31
Fig. 2.2: Clock sweeping flow.
be obtained. As an example, Table 2.1 presents the start-to-fail frequency for each
pattern/flip-flop combination in ICs. Patterns are able to sensitize different kinds of
paths at different flip-flops: long, short or no path at all. For these flip-flops at which
short or no paths are sensitized (like the path B-C in Figure fig:csweeping(b)), they
always capture “passing” values during the clock sweeping. These invalid pattern/flip-
flop combinations need to be discarded. For example, assuming the pattern 2/flip-flop 2
(P2/FF2) is an invalid combination, the column P2/FF2 has been removed from Table
2.1. The remaining valid elements form path delay fingerprint, as is shown in Table
2.1. Each row of the table is a path delay fingerprint for an IC and each column is an
element of the delay fingerprint.
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Table 2.1: Pattern/flip-flop (Pi/FFj) combinations with start-to-fail frequencies.
P1/FF1 P1/FF2 . . . P2/FF1 P2/FF3 . . . PP1/FFm
IC 1 f6 f14 . . . f3 f20 . . . f10
IC 2 f7 f12 . . . f4 f21 . . . f9
IC 3 f5 f11 . . . f3 f19 . . . f10
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IC n f8 f14 . . . f4 f23 . . . f12
2.2 Trojan’s Impact on Path Delay
We can expect that intelligent adversaries will try to maintain the original design layout
as much as possible and insert Trojans into unused spaces of the layout to keep the
Trojan hidden. In order to simplify this problem, we consider the nodes (outputs of
gates) in the genuine IC instead of the paths for the analysis in this chapter. These
nodes might be affected by either a trigger or a payload from a Trojan [6]. Thus, we
consider three types of Trojans depending on how they are activated and their action
to the functional circuit: Trojans with only payloads (TP), Trojans with only triggers
(TT), and Trojans with triggers and payloads (TTP).
For any Trojan trying to change the function of design, a payload gate has to be
inserted at a node. An example of a TP is shown in Figure 2.3(a). The sensitized path
in the genuine design (the bold line) passes through node B. This node, originally only
containing a wire (the dashed line), is replaced by a logic gate with input and output
interconnections. The additional delay consists of the propagation delay of the payload
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Fig. 2.3: (a) An example of TP, (b) an example of TT.
and the delay from the two wires’ capacitances (l1 and l2). For any internally activated
Trojan, the triggered parts will introduce additional interconnections which will cause
unavoidable increased capacitance on the node. In Figure 2.3(b), after TT insertion,
the capacitance of node D is increased from CD to CD + CT , thereby increasing the
propagation delay of the NOR gate and increasing the delay of all sensitized paths
passing through node D. Besides TP and TT, TTP would have the cumulative effect
of TP and TT.
Table 2.2: A path delay without and with TP with short and long l1 and l2.
Short l1 and l2 Long l1 and l2
W/O Trojan 848ps 1079ps
W/T Trojan 887ps 1277ps
Increased Delay 39ps 198ps
In order to show the effect of TP and TT on paths delay, we performed simulations
in 90nm technology. We inserted two payload gates (minimum-sized NAND) at two
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positions. One is physically very close to the node (short l1 and l2 as in Figure 2.3(a))
and the other is remote from the node (longer l1 and l2). In Table 2.2, delay of path
going through node B is measured, and the results show that a TP has increased the
path delay significantly, more so for Trojans with long interconnections. That’s because
longer l1 and l2 introduce larger wire capacitance.
Next, we place a Trojan gate (minimum-sized NAND) at four different locations,
with one input connecting to the node D on the sensitized path. The first location is
very close to node D (l3 is short as in Figure 2.3(b)), with locations 2, 3, and 4 being
successively further away from node D. The delay of sensitized path is measured with
and without Trojans for the different locations. The extra delay caused by TT is shown
in the third row of Table 2.3. Although the increased delay is still relatively small at
the location 1 (shown as Loc. 1 in Table 2.3), the TT effects at locations 2 through 4
are comparable to the effects of the payload shown in Table 2.2. Thus, as long as the
standard cells in standard design style ASICs are well planned and tightly packed, the
TT effect could be very obvious.
Table 2.3: A path delay without and with TT at four different locations.
W/O Trojan Loc. 1 Loc. 2 Loc. 3 Loc. 4
Path Delay 764.5ps 794.5ps 837.7ps 890.0ps 953.8ps
Increased Delay 0ps 30ps 73.2ps 125.5ps 189.3ps
The changes of path delay introduced by hardware Trojans could be captured by
the clock sweeping technique. Suppose that a Trojan load is added to a path as shown
in Figure 2.4(a); the additional capacitive load will result in a small, extra delay on
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paths A-E and B-E, which may push the arrow to the right and even fail path A-E at f2
and path B-E at f3. In this case, the change of start-to-fail frequency could be detected
by clock sweeping. If a Trojan is activated and its payload becomes nontransparent, the
required transition cannot be generated at payload gate. This faulty function indicates
Trojan’s existence and makes it easier to detect. Trojans without triggers and payloads
would not be detected using this technique since they most likely use an antenna to
receive triggers or leak information. They can be more effectively detected by power-
based Trojan detection approaches [39] because they tend to use more gates and consume
more power than TP, TT or TTP.
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Fig. 2.4: (a) An example circuit with a Trojan and (b) clock sweeping on paths in the
circuit with a Trojan.
2.3 Trojan Detection Methodology
2.3.1 Signature Generation Procedure
The number of paths in modern circuits is exponential relative to the number of nodes,
thus, it is impractical to measure all paths to generate a signature. Additionally, mea-
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suring the delay of short paths is extremely difficult. Both the nodes on short and long
paths have been taken into considerations in our proposed procedure which is shown in
Figure 6.5. The following steps are performed to generate signatures for all ICs .
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Fig. 2.5: The proposed signature generation procedure using clock sweeping.
Test Pattern Generation: Similar to the TDF model, here we assume that
TP or TT affects a node in the circuit, making the corresponding gate slow to fall or
slow to rise. Thus, the TDF patterns can be used in our procedure. One advantage of
the TDF model is that the number of faults is linear relative to the number of nodes;
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thus, we can use a portion of paths to cover all nodes in the circuit, and the cost of
measuring paths delay could be decreased dramatically. Another advantage of using the
TDF pattern set is that it is widely used in industry; the ATPG processes are mature
and many proposed techniques can be used to increase its fault coverage [85].
Sweeping Frequencies and Step Size Selection: The range and step size
of sweeping frequencies are two critical parameters involved in clock sweeping, because
they determine the effectiveness of our Trojan detection technique. A smaller step
size could be more sensitive to the small extra delay induced by Trojans. The range
determines the range of long paths. Higher maximum frequency could fail more long
paths during clock sweeping so that higher Trojan node coverage for delay-based Trojan
detection can be achieved. The test time and data volume overhead will increase as a
larger range and smaller step are selected. Additionally, the clock sweeping range and
step size are both dependent on the testing equipment.
Nodes Selection: Once the clock sweeping frequencies are determined, the sen-
sitized path delays larger than the maximum frequency are considered as “long paths”.
Otherwise, they are called “short paths”. For example, in Figure 2.1(b), B-C is a short
path and others are long paths; f5 is the maximum application frequency. The delay of
all the long paths can be obtained from their start-to-fail frequencies. Since the nodes
on long paths can be authenticated in clock sweeping, all the patterns sensitizing these
long paths will be kept. Patterns only sensitizing short paths are still useful in generat-
ing transitions for power-based Trojan detection [39] [40]. This step divides the nodes
in a circuit into two groups- nodes are authenticated either by the clock sweeping or by
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power-based detection techniques. Moreover, removing patterns that sensitize only short
paths could save a significant amount of test time during clock sweeping. In our work,
we focus on the right branch of the procedure as shown in Figure 6.5.
Clock Sweeping: This process is similar to the conventional TDF test. The
only difference is that we need to apply each pattern that sensitizes at least one long
path at different clock frequencies. The logic values captured by the scan flip-flops under
the different clock frequencies are shifted out.
Signature Generation: By analyzing the pass and fail values, we find the
start-to-fail frequency at each flip-flop for each pattern. As an example, Figure 2.6(a)
presents the start-to-fail frequency for each pattern/flip-flop combination in ICs. Long-
path patterns are able to sensitize different kinds of paths at different flip-flops: long,
short or no path at all. For these flip-flops at which short or no path are sensitized,
they always capture “passing” value during clock sweeping. These invalid pattern/flip-
flop combinations need to be discarded from our signature. For example, assuming
the pattern 2/flip-flop 2 (P2/FF2) is an invalid combination, the column P2/FF2 has
been removed from Figure 2.6(a). Thus, the final signature length will be shorter, as is
shown in Figure 2.6(a). Each row of the table is a signature for an IC and each column
is an element of the signature. The multidimensional signature will be processed by
multidimensional scaling described in Section III.D.
2.3.2 Node Coverage Analysis
The objective of our technique is to recognize load capacitance induced by Trojans and
capture its impact on a path. The coverage analysis in our technique can be divided
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P1/FF1 P1/FF2 . . . P2/FF1 P2/FF3 . . . PP1/FFm
IC 1 f6 f14 . . . f3 f20 . . . f10
IC 2 f7 f12 . . . f4 f21 . . . f9
IC 3 f5 f11 . . . f3 f19 . . . f10
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IC n f8 f14 . . . f4 f23 . . . f12
(a)
Clock Period >1CP 0.9CP 0.7CP 0.5CP 0.2CP 0CP
Node Coverage 0% 48.59% 61.01% 78.87% 95.18% 100%
(b)
Stage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Path 1 0.5 0.5 0.13 0.00059 0.00040 0.00023
Path 2 0.5 0.29 0.28 0.063 0.012 0.0024 0.00046
Path 3 0.5 0.25 0.11 0.015 0.000296 0.000199 0.000115
(c)
Fig. 2.6: (a) Pattern/flip-flop (Pi/FFj) combinations with start-to-fail frequencies, (b)
node coverage on different clock frequencies, (c) transition probabilities on
three quiet paths.
into two parts: nodes on long paths and nodes on short paths.
Clock sweeping can guarantee that all sensitized long paths will fail at a particular
clock frequency. Hence, the node coverage on long paths is dependent on the TDF
coverage. The TDF is widely used in VLSI testing, so there have been many approaches
proposed to improve the coverage of the TDF in recent years [85]. All these techniques
can be applied in our procedure to achieve maximum coverage. In the meantime, a
Trojan’s load capacitance can slow down both rising and falling transitions. For Trojan
detection, one fault, slow-to-rise or slow-to-fall, is sufficient to indicate the existence
of Trojans on that node instead of two faults as in the TDF model. Therefore, node
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coverage will be the ratio of all detected nodes by either slow-to-rise or slow-to-fall using
TDF long-path patterns to the total number of nodes in the circuits.
Figure 2.6(b) shows the estimated node coverages at different clock frequencies
in benchmark s38417 for reference. ATPG patterns which are able to reach 99.4% TDF
coverage are used to sensitize all testable paths. The clock period in Figure 2.6(b) is
given in the form of the percentage of the longest critical path (CP) in the circuit.
Short paths, whose delay is smaller than the maximum frequency we can apply,
will never fail during clock sweeping. It is very difficult to measure short paths due to
the maximum frequency limitation of the tester and the power limit of the IC.
In general, the quietest nodes which have very few transitions are usually on the
long paths in a circuit [50]. The low transition probability of a gate is resulted from
one or more inputs with low transition probabilities. After propagating signal through
one more gate on a path, the transition probability may further decrease. Thus, a very
quiet gate is usually located on a long path since its low transition probability is caused
by previous multiple stages of gates. In order to verify this inference, we apply random
patterns to primary inputs and scan chain, and then calculate transition probability for
each gate. The gates with low transition probabilities are selected to be analyzed. We
choose three quiet paths and their transition probabilities at different stages are shown
in the Figure 2.6(c). As the number of stages of the path increases (1 through 7), the
transition probability goes down.
Trojan gates have a higher probability to switch when they connect to nodes on
short paths, which means they tend to consume more power [50]. Power-based Trojan
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detection [39] can effectively detect Trojans on short paths, so adversaries could put
Trojans on long paths to hide them. Our clock sweeping technique is able to make
up for the deficiency involved with power-based Trojan detection. Increasing the test
coverage in both power-based and delay-based approaches can improve the possibility
to identify infected chips.
2.3.3 Statistical Analysis Method
Trojan detection is extremely difficult due to process and environmental variations,
especially when the Trojan is small and has very short wire connections. In order to
detect Trojans, a statistical analysis method is used to separate Trojan-free ICs and
Trojan-inserted ICs.
Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) is a method for visualizing dissimilarity in data.
The typical goal of MDS is to create a configuration of points in one, two, or three di-
mensions, whose interpoint distances represent the original dissimilarities. In a similar
manner, [6] was first to use PCA/Convex for hardware Trojan detection. The differ-
ent forms of MDS use different criteria to quantify dissimilarity, such as metric and
nonmetric multidimensional scaling [86]. The MDS we used in our method maps the
original high dimensional space to a lower dimensional space, at the same time attempts
to preserve the pairwise distance and finally isolate the dissimilar chips which may carry
Trojans. As described in Section III.A, the signature of a chip is composed of a set of
path delays. One element in a signature is considered as a dimension. so that each
IC can be represented as an x-dimensional point (x being the total number of valid
pattern/flip-flop combinations). Their Euclidean distances in high-dimensional space
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depend on the effects of both process variations and Trojans. Since outlying points in
high dimensions contain Trojans and their corresponding points in low dimension are
still outliers, we can use outlier points in low dimensions to predict statistical likelihood
of Trojan presence. For our technique, the x-dimensional signatures for Trojan-free ICs
will be mapped to a 3-dimensional space by MDS, and then a convex hull will be con-
structed. If the signature of an IC under authentication is located outside of the convex
hull, this IC is considered suspicious and may contain Trojans.
2.4 Results and Analysis
2.4.1 Simulation Results
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed technique, the simulations
were performed on an implementation of the ISCAS‘89 benchmark s38417 using a 90
nm technology library. After synthesis, the s38417 benchmark circuit has 1564 flip-flops
and 4046 logic gates. The layout was completed with the Synopsys physical design tool
IC Compiler. The Trojan gates were inserted and routed in unused spaces in the layout
by using IC Compiler. The impact of process variations on threshold voltage (Vth), oxide
thickness (Tox) and channel length (L) have been taken into considerations as well. Both
the inter-die and intra-die process variations for each of the three previously mentioned
parameters are 5% in our simulations. 300 Monte Carlo Simulations, including 200
simulations for Trojan-free chips and 100 for Trojan-inserted chips, were performed at
a temperature of 25◦C for each Trojan using HSPICE.
For our delay-based Trojan detection technique, we do not concern ourselves
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(g) Trojan 7 (h) Trojan 8
Step Size 10ps 20ps 40ps 60ps 80ps 100ps
Trojan 2 100% 65% 55% 38% 14% 9%
Trojan 3 100% 100% 100% 100% 42% 11%
Trojan 4 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Trojan 6 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
(i) Detection rate at different step sizes.
Fig. 2.7: Outlier analysis using MDS for Trojans 1-6 using simulation ((a)-(f)) and
Trojans 7-8 on FPGAs ((g)-(h)), and step sizes analysis (i).
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with Trojan’s type or how many gates the Trojan has. Instead, we focus on how many
triggers and payloads the Trojan will bring to the original design. We have inserted a
large number of Trojans in this design among which we selected six Trojans to present
results in details. Every Trojan is composed of a few minimum-sized gates, and these
gates are placed in the nearest available unused space to keep the wire connections as
short as possible. This will make the Trojan harder to detect. These six Trojans were
constructed as follows: Trojan 1 has one payload and one trigger (TTP type). Trojan
2 has the same structure as Trojan 1, but is inserted at a different node. Trojan 3 has
two payloads with very short connections (TP type). Trojan 4 has four triggers and no
payload (TT type). Trojan 5 has three triggers and two payloads (TTP type). Trojan
6 has six triggers and four payloads (TTP type).
The maximum frequency, functional frequency and step size in our simulations are
1.5GHz, 700MHz and 10ps, respectively. By using the methodology described in Figure
6.5, 300 signatures for 200 Trojan-free ICs and 100 Trojan-inserted ICs are generated.
After MDS processing described in Section III.D, the outlying results for Trojans 1
through 6 are shown in Figures 2.7(a)-(f). The convex hull is formed using signatures
of 200 Trojan-free ICs. These points are placed much closer to each other than the rest
of hollow dots obtained from Trojan-inserted ICs. According to the distance between
outliers and convex hull, two classes of ICs are separated. While Trojan 1’s detection
rate is 64% (64 out of 100 Trojan-free ICs are detected), from Trojan 2 to Trojan 6, their
detection rates are all 100%. The Trojan 1 is the worst case for Trojan with payload
and trigger because it has one minimum sized NAND gate which is used as a payload
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and only one sensitized path passes through this payload. More triggers, payloads
and sensitized paths passing through Trojan nodes make detection from Trojan 2 to 6
easier. There might be some limitations associated with the MDS algorithm since it
treats the signatures from the ICs as linear. As a part of our future work, we might
apply different statistical classification algorithms (such as Diffusion Map and Support
Vector Machine) with the aim of further improving the detection rate. However, in our
analysis (particularly for Trojans 2 to 6), MDS seems to easily classify all the chips
shown in Figures 2.7(b)-(f). Note that we have randomly inserted Trojans on a very
large number of locations in the circuit and was able to observe similar results.
2.4.2 Trojan Size and Location Analysis
Generally, larger Trojans might have more triggers and payloads, so they bring a larger
impact to the original circuit. From Trojan 1 to Trojan 6, as the size of Trojans
increases, these triggers and payloads affect larger number of nodes in the circuit. In
other words, the larger Trojan size means that more paths, sensitized by the TDF
patterns, will be impacted by the Trojan. Although Trojans’ impacts may be masked
by process variations, a larger number of sensitized paths always lead to higher detection
possibility. Additionally, larger size Trojan most likely results in longer interconnection
for triggers and payloads due to the limited unused space nearby for Trojan insertion.
The extra delay induced by the larger Trojan will then increase. This can be seen in
Figure 2.7; as we move from (a) to (f), the points also move away from the convex
hull, i.e., the distance between Trojan-inserted ICs and Trojan-free ICs becomes larger.
Thus, as the size of the Trojan increases, it becomes easier to separate Trojan-inserted
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and Trojan-free ICs by using the proposed technique.
In addition to Trojan size, the Trojan’s location also has a significant influence
on the results. Scan flip-flops can be considered pseudo-primary inputs and outputs.
Sensitized paths spread out like a cone from scan flip-flops’ outputs and converge at
scan flip-flop’s inputs. The nodes closer to a scan flip-flop will have more of a chance
to influence these sensitized paths. Thus, these Trojans are easier to be detected. In
our simulations, although Trojans 1 and 2 have same size, Trojan 2 is closer to scan
flip-flops and Trojan 1 is farther away. In Figure 2.7, hollow dots in (b) are farther
from convex hull than that in (a), which means Trojan 2 is easier to be separated than
Trojan 1. Thus, we have obtained 100% detection rate for Trojan 2, while Trojan 1
only has a 64% detection rate.
2.4.3 Clock-Sweeping Step Size Analysis
For clock sweeping, path delay gained from simulation needs to be translated to their
nearest achievable clock frequency according to the clock step size. The range and step
size selection are described in Section III.A. From the results shown in Figure 2.7(i), we
can clearly see that the detection rate reduces as the step size increases. The impact
of step size becomes less for larger Trojans, because it has more triggers or payloads on
sensitized paths and introduces larger extra delay.
2.4.4 FPGA Implementation
The benchmark s9234 was implemented on 90nm Xilinx Spartan-3E FPGAs with 145
scan flip-flops and 571 TDF patterns. Considering the limitations of the DCM, 23 dif-
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ferent clock frequencies, sweeping from 5ns (maximum clock frequency) to 9.4ns (func-
tional clock frequency) with a step size (∆t) of 200ps, are generated by a Digital Clock
Management (DCM) in the FPGA. To reduce measurement noise, each frequency was
measured three times. Since the step size, limited by accuracy of the clock crystal and
DCM, is larger than the predicted impact of any trigger, we only focused on TPs in the
FPGA implementation.
In this experiment, two types of Trojan with payload are inserted separately in
the layout by using Xilinx FPGA Editor. The payload gate of the first Trojan (Trojan
7) was inserted close to a scan flip-flop, while the second Trojan’s payload (Trojan 8)
was inserted farther away from any scan flip-flops. 44 separate FPGA boards were
used, with 32 being Trojan-free and 12 being Trojan-inserted. We randomly chose
80 patterns from the 571 TDF patterns for analysis to reduce test and measurement
time, so the total number of pattern/flip-flop combinations is 80× 145 = 11, 600. After
removing the invalid pattern/flip-flop combinations which cannot fail any path in the
clock sweeping range as described in Section III.A, the remaining number of pattern/flip-
flop combinations is 786. These 786 pieces of delay information are used as the signature
for each chip. The entire measurement, pattern application, and clock sweeping was
automated and the data from scan chains were sent to a computer for further analysis.
Figure 2.7(g)-(h) shows the scaled signature by using MDS for Trojan detection. The
convex hull is drawn according to the signatures of the 32 Trojan-free FPGAs, and the
12 hollow dots represent the signatures from FPGAs with Trojans. While all hollow
dots are totally separated from the convex hulls, and the detection rate is 100% for both
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Trojans, we note that the first Trojan is easier to separate as the distance between the
hollow dots and convex hull is larger. The reason for this is that the payload gate closer
to the scan flip-flops influences 79 sensitized paths, while the other Trojan only affects
9 sensitized paths.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, a clock sweeping is proposed to obtain the critical and non-critical
path delay and then generate fingerprints for ICs for the purpose of detecting hard-
ware Trojans. Post data processing method has proved to be effective at identifying
Trojan-inserted ICs in the presence of process variations, as demonstrated by both our
simulation and FPGA implementation results.
Chapter 3
Post-Silicon Test Methodology: Delay-based IC Fingerprinting for
Recycled IC Detection
The counterfeiting of integrated circuits (ICs) has become a major issue for the elec-
tronics industry. Recycled ICs that find their way into the supply chains of critical
applications can have a major impact on the security and reliability of those systems.
This chapter will present a post-silicon test methodology for detection of recycled ICs.
An IC fingerprinting procedure using the clock sweeping technique is introduced. Sta-
tistical data analysis will be used to distinguish the delay changes caused by process
variations from those changes caused by silicon aging [87].
3.1 Aging Degradation on Path Delay
When a chip is used in the field, aging effects cause some of its parameters to shift over
time. This section will briefly discuss the mechanics of the two most common wear-out
mechanisms for a CMOS device: Negative Bias Temperature Instability (NBTI) and
Hot Carrier Injection (HCI). Both mechanisms deteriorate transistor performance.
• NBTI occurs when traps are accumulated on the boundary of the Si-SiO2 in-
terface, which usually happens when PMOS is reversely biased. NBTI increases
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the absolute value of the PMOS threshold voltage and results in decreasing drain
current, decreasing transconductance of a MOSFET and consequently increasing
gate propagation delay [89] [90].
• HCI is another major wear-out mechanism. Drain-source electrical field acceler-
ates the charge carriers to reach a high kinetic energy, which enables the avalanche
of secondary carriers through impact ionization. The process consequently creates
traps at the gate dielectric/silicon substrate interface, as well as dielectric bulk
traps, and therefore degrades device characteristics including voltage threshold
[91] [92]. While the HCI was considered less dominant than the NBTI in the past,
continued semiconductor scaling has increased its impact significantly.
Since recycled ICs have experienced the above silicon aging in the field, the path
delay of recycled ICs will be different from those of fresh ICs. In order to demonstrate
the impact of aging on path delay in ICs, in a simple manner, different gate chains were
simulated using 45nm technology [93] as shown in Figure 3.1(a). The simulation was
conducted by HSPICE MOSRA with the built-in aging model and combined NBTI and
HCI aging effects at a temperature of 25◦C. Standard threshold voltage (SVT) INVX1,
INVX32, NAND, NOR, and XOR gate chains of different lengths were simulated for
up to 2 years of usage. Figure 3.1(a) shows that all chains are experiencing stress from
a 500MHz clock. Any other stress (e.g., DC stress which is a constant “0” or “1”, or
AC stress with different duty ratios) and usage time could be used in this simulation.
Figure 3.1(b) presents the delay degradation caused by 2 years (24 months) of aging.
From the figure, we can see that different gate chains age at slightly different rates,
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which depends on the structure of the gates. The XOR gate chain has the fastest aging
rate amongst these chains. Comparing the delay degradation rates of the INVX1 and
INVX32 chains, we can conclude that larger gates will age at a lower rate than smaller
gates under the same stress. In addition, the workload (input value and the switching
frequency of each gate) also has a significant impact on the aging rate. ICs may be
recycled from different used boards from different users who may have applied different
workloads to the IC at different times. Therefore, it is practically impossible to know
the exact input vectors applied by the user. The impact of workload on a chips path
delay degradation will be discussed in detail in Section 3.2.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3.1: (a) An illustrative circuit with NAND-gate, NOR-gate, XOR-gate, and in-
verter chains and (b) Delay degradation of the chains.
Figure 3.2(a) shows the delay of a randomly selected critical path Pi (this path
includes 22 gates) from the ISCAS’89 benchmark s38417 with stress from a random
workload (functional patterns) applied to the primary inputs. The path was aged for
4 years with NBTI and HCI effects at room temperature 25◦C. The simulation results
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indicate that the degradation of path Pi after 1 year is around 10% while if the circuit
is used for 4 years, the degradation is about 17%, indicating that most aging occurs at
the early usage phase of the design. Therefore, if there are no environmental or process
variations, such degradation should provide great a opportunity to identify recycled
ICs by measuring one path delay from the circuit. However, these variations have a
significant impact on the path delay. On the other hand, different paths age at different
rates as demonstrated earlier in this section. Figure 3.2(b) shows the delay of path Pi
under different temperatures at different aging times. In the figure, AT denotes aging
time, M represents months, and Y denotes years. From Figure 3.2(b), we can see that
the delay of path Pi increases as the temperature goes up and paths age with a faster
speed at a higher temperature.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3.2: (a) Delay degradation of path Pi and (b) Pi delay increases with increased
temperature.
In theory, the specifications and functionality of different ICs of the same design
should be identical. In practice, this is not the case due to uncontrollable manufacturing
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variations that limit our ability to accurately create IC structures at smaller technology
nodes. Thus, values such as the threshold voltage of a transistor (Vth), the gate length of
the transistor (L), and the oxide thickness of the transistor (Tox) can only be guaranteed
to be within some ranges. Variations on these and other parameters are important to
take into consideration because these parameters directly affect device performance. For
example, the delay of a traditional CMOS inverter can be expressed in two equations
(3.1) and (3.2) [94], where the high-to-low and low-to-high propagation delays tPHL and
tPLH are affected by variation in the three previously mentioned parameters, as shown
in (3.3) and (3.4).
tpHL = ln(2)ReqnCL (3.1)
tpLH = ln(2)ReqpCL (3.2)
with
Req =
1
VDD/2
VDD∫
VDD/2
V
IDSAT (1 + λV )
dV ≈ 3
4
VDD
IDSAT
(1− 7
9
λVDD) (3.3)
and
IDSAT = k
′W
L
((VDD − Vth)VDSAT − V 2DSAT ) (3.4)
To analyze the impact of process variations on a path Pi’s delay, Monte Carlo
simulations were performed using HSPICE on s38417. 300 Monte Carlo simulation
results of Pi at 25
◦C are shown in Figure 3.3(a), with 3-sigma 2% Tox, 5%Vth, and 5%
L inter-die and 1% Tox, 5%Vth, and 5% L intra-die process variations. It shows that
Pi’s delay varies around 12% due to process variations. In addition, process variations
also have a significant impact on the aging rate of the path delay, as shown in Figure
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3.3: (a) Delay degradation of path Pi and (b) Pi delay increases with increased
temperature.
3.3(b). Pi’s delay degradation in the 300 ICs varied around 8% (4%∼12%) for 1 year of
aging. These variations evidently make the detection difficult, thus, the path delay shifts
caused by aging effects in recycled ICs must be separated from those caused by process
variations in fresh ICs.
3.2 Path Delay Fingerprinting Considering Aging
The clock sweeping technique has been described in Section 2.1. Figure 3.4 shows the
flow for identifying recycled ICs using path delay fingerprints and statistical analysis.
The flow is divided into three major steps. First, paths are simulated and selected
according to their aging rate. Next, the delay information of these paths is measured
by a clock sweeping technique in fresh ICs (either during manufacturing test on all ICs
or during authentication on a sample of fresh ICs) and in any chip under authentication
(CUA). Finally, statistical analysis is used to decide whether the CUAs are recycled ICs
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or not.
Fig. 3.4: Recycled IC identification flow.
3.2.1 Path Selection
Due to the large number of critical and long paths in a circuit, the first step is to
select paths which age at faster rates by analyzing the gate types in different paths
and simulating the circuit with different workloads. Paths with higher rates of aging
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are preferred for delay fingerprint generation, since the differences in the delay of those
paths between recycled ICs and fresh ICs will be much larger than the differences in
paths, which degrade more slowly. Delay fingerprints generated by fast-aging paths
could help identify recycled ICs used for a shorter time. However, there are several
parameters impacting the aging rate of a path, including the type of gates composing
the path and the workload (as discussed previously in Section 3.1). Based on these
parameters and the observations made from the simulation shown in Figure 3.2, the
following rules are developed to select the paths that age at the fastest rates: (i) paths
with more fast-aging gates, such as NOR or XOR gates, will be selected, and (ii) paths
that experience more zeroes and more switching activity will be selected. More zeroes in
the path will increase the effect of NBTI on the PMOS transistors, and a high switching
frequency will increase the HCI effects on gates, increasing the path delay degradation
more significantly.
Paths with more fast-aging gates would be identified by analyzing the type of gates
composing the paths. However, it is very difficult to identify paths that experience more
zeroes and more switching activity without knowing the specific workload. Therefore, in
this work, different random workloads (input combinations) are applied to ICs primary
inputs during logic simulation. For each gate on a critical path, the average switching
activity and the zeroes it has experienced are calculated. Paths with more switching
activity and zeroes are then selected using our flow. These paths, along with those
composed of the more fast-aging gates, are used to generate path delay fingerprints to
identify recycled ICs. The number of selected paths could be adjusted according to the
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design, its testing procedure, and the desired detection confidence. In our simulations
(see Section 3.4.1), the top 50 paths with fast-aging gates are selected and the top 50
paths experiencing more switching activity and zeroes in the benchmark circuit.
3.2.2 Silicon Measurement
The second step in Figure 3.4 is to collect the selected paths delay from the ICs. Note
that the signature generation can be done during a manufacturing test of a large sample
of ICs before shipping them to the market or on a number of fresh ICs from each pro-
duction kept by the design house for the purpose of authentication or recycled ICs iden-
tification. The larger the size of the sample is, the wider the range of process variations
that will be included in the signature, reducing the probability of wrongly identifying
fresh ICs with large process variations as recycled ICs. Path delay information from
the fresh ICs is measured by performing test procedures on the ICs. Traditionally, test
patterns are generated by ATPG before fabrication to detect path and transition delay
faults. These patterns will be applied to all fresh ICs using clock sweeping techniques,
as described in Section 2.1. A path delay fingerprint will be generated for each IC as
shown in Table 2.1.
3.2.3 Identification
Once the path delay in all sample chips is measured, statistical data analysis will be used
to generate a signature for fresh ICs. The more the sample chips are, the more process
variations will be covered, reducing the probability that fresh ICs with large process
variations will be identified as recycled ICs. For a circuit under authentication (CUA)
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taken from the market, the same test patterns will be applied in a controlled environment
(near-identical to that used for the fresh chips). The path delay information of the CUA
will be processed by the same statistical data analysis methods. In a simple analysis,
if the signature of the CUA is outside of the range of the fresh ICs’ signature, there is
a high probability that the CUA is a recycled IC. Otherwise, the CUA is likely a fresh
IC. The longer the CUA has been used, the more aging effects it will have experienced,
making it easier to identify.
Without extra hardware circuitry embedded into the ICs, our recycled IC identi-
fication technique imposes no area or power overheads. It provides a negligible test time
overhead during manufacturing test on a sample of ICs, since only a few patterns must
be applied several times at different frequencies. Also, there is no change in the current
IC design and test flow since there is no additional circuitry in the IC used for detection.
In addition, this method is resilient to tampering attacks. It is inherently difficult for
recyclers to mask the impact of aging on the recycled ICs’ path-delay signatures during
the recycling process. The only limitations of this technique are that the design must
be known to get the path delay information and signatures from fresh chips are required
to compare with the CUAs for classification.
3.3 Statistical Data Analysis
Two statistical data analysis methods are used in this paper: simple outlier analysis
(SOA) and principal component analysis (PCA) [95]. When performing SOA, the flow
randomly selects a single path from the selected path set, and uses its delay range in
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fresh ICs to generate a signature. The process variations of the CUA may or may
not be the same as those within the sample ICs. The selected path delay of the CUA
and sample ICs will follow the same distribution, which makes SOA effective in certain
conditions. However, a single-path based analysis will not be very effective, due to the
limited aging information collected. In general, this method is expected to be effective
in distinguishing recycled ICs used for a long time from fresh ICs with small process
variations, as demonstrated by our results in Section 3.4. This basic approach is limited
by the path that has been selected. One way we could improve this would be to use
SOA independently on multiple paths and then make a final decision (recycled or fresh)
according to a majority vote.
PCA is a dimensionality reduction technique that transforms the data into a
reduced number of dimensions that captures most of the variations in the data and the
PCA has been effective for detection of hardware Trojans in prior work [6] [38]. The
PCA is applied to this problem as follows: The path delay information of all selected
paths, which have been measured by clock sweeping, will be processed by PCA. In
the simulations, the top 100 paths with faster aging rates were selected to generate
signatures. The delay of each path is one of the variables for PCA to use. Therefore,
with N ICs, the dimension of the data set for PCA to generate signature is N × 100.
We apply PCA and then plot the first 3 principal components (the three that capture
the most variance). A convex hull is created around this data to represent the signature
for fresh chips. The path delay information of the CUA was also analyzed by the same
process and plotted in the same figure. If the CUA is outside of the convex created by
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the fresh ICs, there is a high probability that the CUA is a recycled IC.
3.4 Experiment Results and Analysis
In order to verify the effectiveness of the recycled IC identification flow and data analysis
methods, they were implemented on several benchmarks in 45nm technology. HSPICE
MOSRA was used to simulate the effects of aging on the path delay of different bench-
marks. The supply voltage of the 45nm technology is 1.1 Volts. Random workloads
(random functional input patterns) were applied to several ISCAS’89 benchmarks. The
path delay fingerprint was generated using clock sweeping at different aging times. Dif-
ferent process and temperature variations were also simulated to analyze their impact
on the effectiveness of our recycled IC identification methods.
3.4.1 Process and Temperature Variations Analysis
Table 3.1 shows the three process variations rates that were used in simulations. Moving
from PV0 to PV2, both inter-die and intra-die variations become larger. PV1 represents
a realistic rate of process variations that a foundry might have. Four sets of Monte Carlo
simulation (MCS) were run using different levels of variations, as shown in Table 3.2.
For each set of MCS, 300 Monte Carlo simulations were run to generate 300 chips.
During the simulations, the aging effects of NBTI and HCI were simulated with random
stress for the benchmark s38417. From the top 500 paths, the paths P1, P2,..., P50 with
fast-aging gates and the paths P51,P52,...,P100 with more zeros and higher switching
activities were selected to generate path delay fingerprint as described in Section 2.1.
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Table 3.1: Process variation rates.
Inter-die (3σ) Inter-die (3σ)
Vth L Tox Vth L Tox
PV0 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 1%
PV1 5% 5% 2% 5% 5% 1%
PV2 8% 8% 2% 7% 7% 2%
Table 3.2: Simulation setup.
Experiments Process Variations Temperature
MCS1 PV0 25◦C
MCS2 PV1 25◦C
MCS3 PV2 25◦C
MCS4 PV1 25◦C±10◦C
Analysis using Simple Outlier Analysis (SOA): First, 300 Monte Carlo
simulations were run in MCS1. The maximum aging time is 2 years. Here, SOA was
used to process the delay fingerprint. Three paths (P1, P2, and P51) were selected to
show the results of SOA. Figures 3.5(a), (b), and (c) show the path delay distribution
of the three paths from 300 ICs used for different aging times. Similar results were
obtained for the other 97 paths as well. For each path, the range of the path delay
at AT=‘0’ is the signature of the fresh ICs. Note that M and Y denote months and
years of aging respectively. If the path delay of the CUA is out of the range specified
at AT=‘0’, there is a high probability that IC is a recycled one. Note the 300 different
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Monte Carlo simulations are used for recycled ICs from those used as sample fresh ICs.
Figure 3.5 shows that the delay distribution of each path in recycled ICs shifts to the
right, relative to the distribution of delays in fresh ICs. This is because the path delay in
recycled ICs increases due to aging. The longer the ICs have been used, the more path
delay degradation they will have experienced. In addition, Figure 3.5 also demonstrates
that the path delay variation increases as the aging time increases. The reason for this
is that ICs with different process variations age at different speeds, and the path delay
variations become larger as the aging time increases.
Figure 3.5(a) shows the distribution of path P1’s delay. In the figure, the smallest
delay of P1 in recycled ICs used for one month is smaller than the largest delay in fresh
ICs. Therefore, the detection rate of recycled ICs used for 1 month is less than 100%
(98.3%) when the signature generated by SOA from path P1 is used. However, the de-
tection rate of recycled ICs used for three months or longer is 100%, which demonstrates
that it is easier to detect recycled ICs that have been used for longer amounts of time.
If the path P2 is chosen to detect recycled ICs, the detection rate of ICs used for one
month (95.7%) is slightly less than when using path P1. However, if path P51 is used,
which has the fastest aging rate among the 100 paths, the detection rate is 100% even
if the ICs are only used for one month. P51 is the most effective path for identifying
recycled ICs in this benchmark. From the above analysis, a conclusion is that different
paths generate different signatures due to their different aging speeds, which makes SOA
slightly less effective.
Figures 3.6(a) and (b) show the delay distribution of path P51 across 300 Monte
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(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 3.5: Path delay distribution in ICs with PV0 in MCS1 at different aging times (a)
Path P1, (b) Path P2, and (c) Path P51.
Carlo simulations in MCS2 and MCS3. Overall, Figures 3.5(c), 3.6(a), and 3.6(b)
present the delay distribution of the same path (P51) in ICs with different process
variations. By comparing these figures, it clearly shows that the larger the process
variations are, the larger the path delay variations in fresh ICs will be, which makes
it more difficult to detect recycled ICs. Even when using the most effective path P51,
the detection rates of ICs used for one month with PV1 and PV2 drop from 100% with
PV0 to 78.0% and 50.7%, respectively. A 100% detection rate could be achieved if the
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(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 3.6: Path P51 delay distribution in ICs at different aging times (a) in MCS2, (b)
in MCS3, and (c) in MCS4.
ICs were used for one year or longer with PV1, or longer than 2 years with PV2.
300 Monte Carlo simulations were also run with ±10◦C temperature variation
during the aging process in MCS4 as shown in Figure 3.6(c). The measurement tem-
perature is 25◦C. It shows the delay distribution of path P51 and the detection rate of
ICs used for 1 month using it is 67.7%. Comparing Figure 3.6(a) and (c), the result
presents that the larger the temperature variation is, the larger the path delay variation
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is, which makes it even more difficult to detect recycled ICs.
Analysis using Principal Component Analysis (PCA): A similar analysis
is done using PCA for different MCSs. Figure 3.7(a) shows the PCA results of the 100
paths in s38417 with 300 chips in MCS1. FC denotes the first component from PCA,
SC represents the second component, “TC” is the third component, and DR denotes the
detection rate. The convex hull boundary is built up from fresh IC data, and represents
the signature for fresh ICs. The red asterisks represent chips used for one month. In
the figure, the 300 used ICs were completely separated from the signature of the fresh
ICs. Thus, the detection rate using timing signatures generated by PCA is 100% for
recycled ICs used for one month. For recycled ICs used for a longer time, the detection
rate will obviously be 100% as well.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3.7: PCA results of ICs under 25◦C (a) used for one month with PV0 in MCS1,
(b) used for one month with PV1 in MCS2, and (c) used for three months
with PV1 in MCS2.
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The path delay information from the remaining three sets of MCSs was also
analyzed by PCA. Figure 3.7(b) shows the analysis results of fresh chips and recycled
ICs used for 1 month in MCS2. The 3-dimensional figure shows that some of the recycled
ICs are close to the fresh ICs signature. The detection rate is 96.3%, which is much
higher than using SOA. Comparing Figure 3.7(b) and (a), it shows that (i) the convex
hull built up from fresh ICs in MCS2 is much larger than that in MCS1 (note that the
convex hull in MCS1 looks larger than MCS2 due to its small scale of axes), and (ii)
the recycled ICs in MCS2 are closer to fresh ICs than those in MCS1, which makes
the detection rate in MCS2 less than that in MCS1. The path delay information of
300 ICs used for 3 months in MCS2 were also processed, and the results are shown in
Figure 3.7(c). Comparing Figures 3.7(b) and (c), it shows that the longer the chips have
been used, the farther they will be from the fresh ICs signature. The detection rate of
recycled ICs used for 3 months or longer with PV1 at 25◦C is 100%.
Figure 3.8 are the PCA results of ICs in MCS3. The detection rate of recycled
ICs used for 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, and 1 year are 72.7%, 89.3%, 99.3%, and
100%, respectively. The figures of PCA results of recycled ICs used for 1 month and 3
months are not shown here since the detection rates are so far from 100%. Figures 3.8(a)
and (b) show the fresh ICs’ signatures and the recycled ICs used for 6 months and 1
year, respectively. The recycled ICs used for longer times are easier to detect, as seen by
comparing Figures 3.8(a) and (b). The detection rates in these simulations prove that it
is more difficult to detect recycled ICs that have higher levels of process variations. The
99.3% detection rate of ICs used for 6 months and the 100% detection rate of ICs used
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for 1 year in MCS3 shows the effectiveness of the detection technique. In addition, PV2
is an extremely high variation compared to what is expected in practice (e.g., PV1).
(a) (b)
Fig. 3.8: PCA results of ICs with PV2 under 25◦C in MCS3 used for (a) six months
and (b) one year.
With the same measurement temperature 25◦C, ±10◦C temperature variation is
used in MCS4 during the aging process. The detection rate of ICs used for 1 month, 3
months, and 6 months in MCS4 are 90.6%, 100%, and 100%, respectively. The fresh ICs’
signature and the detected recycled ICs used for 3 months and 6 months are shown in
Figure 3.9. Comparing Figure 3.9(a) with Figure 3.7(c), it clear shows that the recycled
ICs used for 3 months in MCS4 are closer to the signature than recycled ICs used for
3 months in MCS2. This phenomenon demonstrates that temperature variations could
increase the path delay variations in fresh ICs and make it more difficult to detect
recycled ICs. However, the 100% detection rates of ICs used for 6 months in MCS4
demonstrates the effectiveness of our method with process and temperature variations.
Comparison between SOA and PCA: Figures 3.5 through 3.9 present some
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3.9: PCA results of ICs with PV1 and ±10circC temperature variations in MCS4
used for (a) three months and (b) six months.
detailed results relating to using this technique on s38417 with SOA and PCA. Table 3.3,
however, tabulates these results in addition to some other results obtained using both
statistical analysis approaches. These results clearly show that PCA is more effective
than SOA when it comes to identifying ICs used for shorter periods of time.
Table 3.3: Recycled IC detection rates for s38417.
SOA PCA
1M 3M 6M 1Y 1M 3M 6M 1Y
MCS1 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
MCS2 78% 96.7% 99.7% 100% 96.3% 100% 100% 100%
MCS3 50.7% 76.3% 85.3% 95.6% 72.7% 89.3% 99.3% 100%
MCS4 67.7% 93.3% 98% 100% 90.6% 100% 100% 100%
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3.4.2 Benchmark Analysis
In addition to s38417, the ISCAS’89 benchmarks s9234 and s13027 were also simulated
to demonstrate the efficiency of this technique on different designs. The process variation
and temperature variation rates used in MCS4 were applied to these two benchmarks.
The aging stress causing NBTI and HCI degradation in these benchmarks comes from
random workloads. 300 MCS were run for each benchmark for a maximum 2 years of
aging. The path selection method was also applied to these benchmarks, and 100 paths
from each benchmark were used to run statistical data analysis using PCA.
Table 3.4 shows the recycled IC detection rate for all three benchmarks under
MCS4 for up to a year of aging. The detection rate for ICs used for 3 months in the
benchmarks s9234 and s13207 is 100%, which matches the results obtained from s38417.
Table 3.4: Recycled IC detection rates - Benchmark comparison under MCS4 using
PCA.
Benckmark 1M 3M 6M 1Y
s9234 88% 100% 100% 100%
s13207 89.6% 100% 100% 100%
s38417 90.6% 100% 100% 100%
The results shown in this section clearly demonstrate that the recycled IC detec-
tion method using CTS with PCA is very effective, even in designs with large process
and temperature variations.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present a recycled IC identification method using path delay fin-
gerprinting. Paths with fast aging speed were selected to generate a fingerprint for
the chip under authentication. The path delay signature from a recycled IC is beyond
those from new ICs due to aging. With no additional hardware circuitry required, this
method introduces no overhead on area and power consumption. The simulation results
of different benchmarks with different process and temperature variations demonstrate
the effectiveness of this method.
Chapter 4
Post-Silicon Test Methodology: Delay-based IC Fingerprinting for
On-Chip ID Generation
This chapter will introduce a post-silicon test methodology to generate identifiers for
fabricated ICs through path delay analysis. This technique has no overhead in terms of
area, timing, or power, since it can extracts the intrinsic path delay variation information
of the IC. An ID creation approach is proposed in this chapter. In addition, several
optimization techniques are developed to improve the stability of IDs.
4.1 Process Variation on Path Delay
In theory, the specifications and functionality of different ICs of the same design should
be identical. In practice, this is not the case. This happens because of our inability to
accurately create IC structures at smaller technology nodes, due to process variations.
Thus, values such as the threshold voltage of a transistor (Vth), the length of the gate of
the transistor (L), or the oxide thickness of the transistor (Tox) can only be guaranteed
to be within some range of values. Variation on these and other parameters is important
to take into consideration, because these parameters directly affect device performance.
For example, the delay of a traditional CMOS inverter can be expressed in two equations,
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where the high-to-low and low-to-high propagation delays tPHL and tPLH are effected
by variation on the three previously mentioned parameters.
(a) Scatter plot (b) Distribution plot
Fig. 4.1: Path delays for 1,024 simulations of the most critical path in s38417.
Figures 4.1(a) and (b) show how process variations can affect the delay of a path
in a set of ICs. We measured the delay of the most critical path in the ISCAS’89
benchmark s38417 1,024 times at 25 degree Celsius using HSPICE. Differing levels of
process variations between the Monte Carlo simulations resulted in the path having a
different propagation delay in each simulation. Figure 4.1(a) shows the path delay for
each simulation, and Figure 4.1(b) shows the distribution of these path delays. These
delays are centered around an average value because process variation results in small
changes to the parameters which control the path delay.
4.2 Methodology
A methodology to create a unique binary identity (ID) for each IC using IC fingerprinting
will be introduced in this section. The unique IDs are generated from intrinsic timing
73
characteristics and are difficult to pirate and clone, so they can be used to address other
counterfeit types that introduce new ICs, such as cloned, overproduced, and remarked.
The procedure for uniquely identifying ICs with IDs can be broken down into two mains
parts: IC enrollment and IC identification.
4.2.1 IC Enrollment
When the clock sweeping tests presented in Chapter 2.1 have been applied in the man-
ufacturing test stage, IC fingerprint is obtained and can be utilized to generate a binary
ID for each IC. Three steps are performed to enroll every manufactured IC:
1. Stability checking: a path selection procedure that selects the most stable mea-
sured paths from each IC.
2. ID generation: a path delay comparison procedure which generates an unopti-
mized ID for each IC.
3. ID optimization: an analysis and optimization procedure which increases the
randomness and decreases the size of the IDs. The optimized ID will be stored in
database for later access and authentication.
More details concerning the above steps are discussed in the forthcoming subsections.
ID Generation and Optimization
We are using path delay information to generate IDs. Path delay measurements using
clock sweeping do have the potential to be affected by measurement and environmental
noise. To reduce the effect of this issue, we will attempt to discard unstable paths early
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Fig. 4.2: Test generation and authentication flow.
on. Measuring an IC multiple times gives us multiple measurements of each path in
that IC. Analysis of multiple measurements of a path can uncover whether that path
is stable-it reported the same delay during each measurement- or unstable-it reported
different delays on different occasions. To select stable paths, we will measure some
subset of the IC set multiple times and select the m most stable paths to be used for
further analysis on all n ICs.
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ID Generation
Once the m most stable paths have been selected, we begin to generate IDs for each IC.
To generate an ID, we will perform comparisons between the delays of different paths
from the ICs. The goal is to perform a comparison that is somewhat uncertain, so that
the result the comparison generates is random. We obtain a list of similar paths by
sorting a list of m paths from an IC in ascending or descending order. We will call this
sorting the golden ranking, and apply this ordering to the m paths of all n ICs. Once
the golden ranking has been obtained, the path delay data for every IC is sorted by this
ordering. For each IC, we will traverse this ordered list of delays one element at a time.
Whenever a delay in the list is greater than the next delay in the list, we will append
a ‘1’ onto the ID for that IC. Whenever a delay in the list is less than the next delay,
we will append a ‘0’ onto the ID for that IC. If m paths have been analyzed for each of
the n chips, we will end up with n IDs of m − 1 bits each. The first/golden IC, which
was used to determine the ordering, will have an ID of all ones or zeros, depending on
whether the sort was ascending or descending.
ID Optimization
There are several optimization techniques we can use on these ICs. Some paths that
we are comparing in the ID Generation step may produce the same value for all ICs
because the path delays are very different. This will reduce the average Hamming
distance between IDs as this bit will be the same in all ICs. If enough paths have been
measured, it may be possible for an IC designer to pick and choose which comparisons
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they are going to perform to create their IDs. The comparisons can be chosen by
analyzing each bit of the m-1 bit “unoptimized IDs”, and deciding which bits have
the least bias across all IDs. A bit should be included in the “optimized ID” if the
number of zeros in that bit position is close to 50% of the number of IDs-if the number
of zeros in that bit position is in the range of n2 ± ε, where ε is some small constant.
This process selects the most unpredictable comparisons across the IC data set. By
performing this optimization technique, we obtain with shorter, more random IDs, at
the cost of discarding some of the data obtained during the measurement process.
4.2.2 IC Identification
This process will be run on every IC when they are first manufactured and going through
manufacturing tests. These tests will produce an ID for every manufactured IC, will
will be stored in a database for later access. Parts of this process will be run again
later when we wish to identify an IC. Figure 4.2 shows these two scenarios. In order
to identify an IC from the market, referred to as an IC under authentication (IUA) in
Figure 4.2, we will need: (1) the ID that the IC is presenting, and (2) the database of
IDs from when the ICs were manufactured. Once we have the ID for the IUA, we can
check to see if it is in the database using Hamming distance analysis. Hamming distance
analysis is done by comparing the ID from the IUA to every ID in the database. If the
ID from the IUA is an exact match to one of the IDs in the database, then we have
identified the CUT.
Noise in the measurement process might make it so that there are a small number
of bits in the ID which are different between the IC’s ID in the database and its ID in
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the field. We addressed this issue through the stability checking technique described in
Section ??, but differences may still be present. Therefore, we define a Hamming dis-
tance threshold, based on analysis of the IDs during manufacturing tests. This threshold
could be based off the minimum Hamming distance between two different ICs in the
manufactured set. The threshold could also be based off of the maximum Hamming
distance between IDs from the same IC, which would be created during the stability
checking process. Exact thresholds would be derived from analysis of the ID set and
measurement noise rates.
4.2.3 Overhead Analysis
This IC identification procedure incurs no area, power, or timing overhead. However,
there is an overhead in testing time and computational time. Each IC must undergo
an additional k rounds of TDF testing at k different frequencies. If there are n ICs
with Pf1 TDF patterns and Nsff flip-flops that will be tested at k frequencies, the
worst case increase in testing time would be n · (k − 1) · Pf1 ·Nsff +Nsff clock cycles.
This is a worst-case scenario as not all Pf1 TDF patterns will need to be tested at all
k frequencies, as shown in Figure 3(a). The stability checking procedure requires test
engineers to measure a subset of nr  n ICs j times each, so there is a testing overhead
of nr · j · (k − 1) · Pf1 · Nsff + Nsff clock cycles in the worst-case scenario. Judging
the relative stabilities of each path in the ICs requires test engineers to individually
analyze each of the m paths that were measured j times each in nr ICs, resulting in a
complexity of O(nrmj) time; however, nr is much less than n, and j is going to be on
the order of dozens to hundreds. The ID generation procedure requires test engineers
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to individually analyze each of the m paths in each of the n ICs, resulting in an O(nm)
runtime. The ID optimization technique analyzes each of the m1 bits across all of the
n IDs for a general runtime of O(nm) as well. In general, m will be much smaller than
n or nr.
4.3 Results and Analysis
4.3.1 Simulation Results
To evaluate this methodology, a series of simulations in HSPICE were performed on an
implementation of the ISCAS’89 benchmark s38417. This circuit was simulated at the
90nm technology node. To measure the path delay, we identified the 256 top critical
paths from the circuit. and performed 128 Monte Carlo simulations. This provides us
with 128 simulated ICs worth of data, with 256 data points for each IC. During the
Monte Carlo simulations, the threshold voltage Vth had at most 5% inter-die variation
and 5% intra-die variation, the oxide thickness Tox had at most 2% inter-die variation
and 1% intra-die variation, and the transistor gate length L had at most 5% inter-die
variation and 5% intra-die variation, with these values representing 3-sigma deviations
from specified values. All paths for all ICs were simulated over a range of temperatures
from 23◦C to 27◦C to represent small deviations from room temperature.
Using the ID generation methodology described in Figure 4.2, 128 255-bit IDs
were created from the simulation data. Figure 4.3(a) shows the results of Hamming
distance analysis on these unoptimized IDs. The 255-bit IDs have, on average, a 99-bit
or 39% inter-Hamming difference. The fact that this average is less than 50% means
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that some bit-positions in the IDs have a bias towards zero or one. By optimizating the
IDs to remove these bits, using the optimization procedure described in Section ??, we
improve the average Hamming distance of the ID set and reduce the size of the IDs, as
shown in Figure 4.3(b). The optimization process reduced the size of the IDs from 255
bits to 114 bits, and increased the average inter-Hamming distance from 39% to 50%.
(a) Unoptimized IDs (b) Optimized IDs with noise
Fig. 4.3: Hamming distance analysis on 128 simulated s38417 circuits.
Figure 4.3(b) also shows the noise rates of the simulated IDs. Each IC was
simulated at temperatures from 23◦C to 27◦C at 1◦C increments to represent small
variations around room temperature. Hamming distance analysis was performed on
each set of IDs coming from the same IC to see how many bits of the ID would change
over the ID range. The average number of bits changing as a result of temperature was
13 bits, or about 11%.
The Hamming distance distribution and noise rate distribution are both roughly
normal distributions. By treating them both as normal distributions with their own
averages and standard deviations, we can come up with probability density function
(PDF) for each set. We can use these two PDFs to find the Hamming distance at which
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it is equally likely that the two IDs are from different ICs or from the same IC. In the
sets shown in Figure 4.3(b), this Hamming distance is 27 bits. If two IDs are compared
and have less than 27 different bits between them, they are most likely from the same
IC. If two IDs are compared and have more than 27 different bits between them, they
are most likely from different ICs.
4.3.2 FPGA Implementation Results
This methodology was also evaluated on 44 90nm Xilinx Spartan-3E FPGAs. The
ISCAS’89 benchmark s9234 was implemented on our FPGAs, along with RAM for TDF
pattern storage and structures for clock control. The IDs were sent from the FPGA
boards to a computer for analysis by using an additional microcontroller. The paths in
the FPGA were swept at the frequencies f1−16, with f1 = 16.4ns and f16 =
1
3.4ns . The
frequency step size was 200ps. To obtain noise information, four of the implementations
were measured eight times each. After selecting stable paths, the unoptimized IDs were
145-bit strings, with a Hamming distance distribution as shown in Figure 4.4(a). The
average inter-Hamming distance was 30 bits, or about 21%. This is lower than in the
simulation example. The optimization process reduces the size of the ID from 145 to 33
bits long, and the distribution of the inter-Hamming distances between these 33-bit IDs
are shown in Figure 4.4(b). By optimizing the IDs, the average inter-Hamming distance
is changed from 30 out of 145 bits to 15 out of 33 bits, or about 45%. In practice, a
33-bit ID would be short, but creating IDs of a greater size only requires measuring
more paths.
Figure 4.4(b) also shows the noise rates for these IDs. Four different implementa-
81
(a) Unoptimized IDs (b) Optimized IDs with noise
Fig. 4.4: Hamming distance analysis on 44 FPGA Implementations of s9234 circuit.
tions of s9234 were measured 8 times each and the IDs from each implementation were
compared to each other. On average, there was a 2 out of 33 bit difference between IDs
from the same implementation, or about a 6% difference.
Again, we can perform further analysis to compare the noise and inter-Hamming
rates. At a difference of 5.75 bits, it is equally likely that any two IDs being compared
are from the same IC or from different ICs. IDs with a difference of less than 5.75 bits
are probably from the same IC and IDs with a difference of more than 5.75 bits are
probably from different ICs.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present a technique that allows us to uniquely identify ICs without
any area, power, or timing overhead. In both the simulation and implementation results,
we were able to create unique IDs with no collisions for a set of different implementations
of the same circuit. In both cases, the average Hamming distance between the IDs was
nearly 50%, and the levels of noise were sufficiently low that we could distinguish between
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IDs from the same IC and IDs from different ICs. These results would improve with
a larger data set, a more accurate clock with a smaller frequency step size, and larger
levels of process variations.
Chapter 5
Design-for-Security Methodology: Built-In Self-Authentication to
Prevent Hardware Trojan Insertion by Untrusted Foundry
The post-silicon test techniques can address some hardware security problems, but their
coverage are limited by circuit structures. Sometimes, design-for-security methodology
might be a better solution to deal with security issues. Typically, design-for-security
methods need additional circuitry, so area overhead is a big concern. In this chap-
ter, we propose a built-in self-authentication (BISA) and an obfuscated built-in self-
authentication (OBISA) technique which introduce no area overhead and can be applied
to conventional ASIC/SoC layout design flow. The BISA is able to prevent hardware
Trojan insertion by untrusted foundry (Chapter 5), while OBISA can further obfuscate
design and consequently protect the original design from reverse engineering through
split manufacturing process (Chapter 6).
Chapter 2 presents a side-channel approach to detect hardware Trojans. In gen-
eral, side-channel analysis methods do succeed in detecting Trojans to some degree, but
the difficulty lies in achieving high coverage of every gate or net and in extracting the
tiny, abnormal side-channel signals of hardware Trojans from the large background sig-
nals, especially in the presence of process and environmental variations. As the feature
83
84
size of ICs shrinks, the increasing levels of process variations can easily mask the small
side-channel signals induced by low-overhead and rarely-triggered Trojans. In order to
enhance controllability and observability of nets, some design-for-trust techniques have
been developed. [35] [50] attempt to increase controllability or observability of nets in
circuit and generate patterns that can create switchings on those hard-to-activate nets.
Proposed design-for-trust techniques [50] [52] require an alteration to the original design
and the addition of more circuitry during the front-end design phase. As the size of a
circuit increases, the number of quiet (low controllability/observability) nets/gates will
increase the complexity of processing and produce a large time/area overhead. Thus,
such techniques are still difficult to apply to a large design that contains millions of
gates. Finally, all these techniques require a golden IC or a golden model that charac-
terizes the correct behavior of the IC under test. However, obtaining a golden IC would
be extremely challenging if not impossible in many scenarios. In this chapter, we take
an alternative approach that focuses on the hindering hardware Trojan gate insertion
by untrusted GDSII developers and untrusted foundry. Note that parametric Trojans
[97] do not need any additional circuitry and thus is out of scope of our work.
This chapter will propose a technique that prevents the insertion of additional
Trojan gates in circuit layout and mask. The principal idea is to fill all unused spaces
with functional standard cells, instead of non-functional filler cells, during layout design
[75–77]. The inserted standard cells are then connected to form a circuitry called built-
in self-authentication (BISA) circuit, which is independent of the original circuit. The
BISA structure can be used to test the functionality of its inserted cells. If any of the
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inserted cells are replaced or otherwise modified, the BISA test procedure will be able
to detect it. The main advantage of BISA is that it has no golden chip requirement.
In contrast, most detection approaches need golden chips either fabricated by a trusted
foundry or verified to be Trojan-free through reverse-engineering, both of which are
prohibitively expensive. Since BISA relies on logic testing, process variation is not a
factor either, as compared to Trojan detection techniques based on side-channel analysis.
As an additional advantage, BISA has a negligible impact on original design in terms
of area and power. To demonstrate the feasibility of BISA, we have implemented it on
several benchmarks (large and small).
5.1 Built-In Self-Authentication
Placement tools are typically conservative, aiming to limit density and spread cells
evenly to assure routability. This often leaves small gaps between cells, and it is impos-
sible for EDA tools to fill 100% of the area with regular standard cells in VLSI designs.
In practice, after completing placement and routing, all unused spaces will be filled with
filler cells or decoupling capacitor (decap) cells; these cells do not have any functional-
ity. For intelligent attackers, the most covert way to insert Trojans in a circuit layout is
by replacing filler cells because removing these non-functional filler cells does have the
smallest impact on electrical parameters. If attackers redesign the original layout for
Trojan insertion, moving gates’ locations and altering wire interconnections will result
in significant changes of the electrical parameters, such as power and path delay. These
can be detected much more easily by delay-based and power-based techniques [5,39,40].
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The principal idea of BISA is to fill all unused spaces with functional standard
cells, called BISA cells, instead of conventional non-functional filler cells. BISA cells
are connected to each other to construct a combinational circuit that is independent
from the original circuit. This combinational circuit can have an arbitrary function. By
testing the function of the BISA circuit, test engineers are able to check whether these
cells have been altered after fabrication. If the adversary inserts a Trojan by changing,
removing or modifying any cell in a BISA circuit, the designer can easily detect it using
structural test. To cover all BISA cells, we try to construct a combinational BISA circuit
without redundant gates; in other words, all gates in the BISA circuit are testable by
test patterns that target stuck-at faults. For a design with BISA, Trojan cell insertion
will become practically impossible without tampering with the BISA cells. Furthermore,
BISA cells are of the same type of standard cells as in the original circuit, so identifying
these cells will be extremely challenging if not impossible.
The BISA structure is intended to detect any abnormal alteration on BISA by
producing a different signature than expected. As to how to test the BISA circuit
with low overhead, our inspiration came from the logic built-in self-testing (BIST) for
VLSI circuits. The BIST was developed to apply random test sequences to determine
the correctness of a circuit by examining a signature obtained from the test responses
[98] [99]. Basically, BISA consists of three parts: the BISA circuit under test, the
test pattern generator (TPG), and the output response analyzer (ORA), as shown in
Figure 5.1(a). The BISA circuit under test is composed of all BISA cells that have been
inserted into unused spaces during layout design. In order to increase its stuck-at fault
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Fig. 5.1: The Structure of (a) BISA, (b) a 4-stage LFSR, and (c) a 4-stage MISR.
test coverage, the BISA circuit is divided into a number of smaller combinational logic
blocks, called BISA blocks shown in Figure 5.1(a). Each BISA block can be considered
as an independent combinational logic block. The TPG generates test vectors that are
shared by all BISA blocks. The ORA will process the outputs of all BISA blocks and
generate a signature. In this chapter, we use a LFSR as TPG and MISR as ORA.
Examples of 4-stage LFSR and 4-stage MISR are shown in Figure 5.1(b) and (c). They
are used to generate random vectors and compress responses to a signature. SFF in the
figure represents scan flip flop. Other types of TPG and ORA can also be applied [99].
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There are two operating modes associated with the chip, as shown in Table 5.1.
In functional mode, the original circuit is working normally, but the BISA is in idle
mode by disabling LFSR and MISR. BISA stays quiet and does not affect the original
circuits, but can fulfill the role of decap cells (see Section 5.3.2). Authentication mode
consists of two phases. During the test phase, the LFSR generates N-bit test patterns
at every clock cycle and the N-bit test patterns are shared by all BISA blocks. At the
same time, each BISA block outputs one bit so that the MISR receives a total of M bits
from M blocks (see Figure 5.1(a)). The test phase ends until a sufficient number of test
patterns have been applied. The number of test patterns is decided in simulation at the
BISA design phase, according to a target test coverage. At this time, the value in the
MISR is the signature generated from the responses of BISA blocks and it can be shifted
out through scan chain. We refer to this as the shift phase. Comparing the obtained
signature on a fabricated chip with the correct signature from previous simulations, we
would then know whether the BISA structure has been tampered with. Since all the
registers in LFSR/MISR and other registers in circuit are connected in a chain, in the
shift phase, the signature in MISR can be shifted out while, at the same time, the new
seed for LFSR is shifted in if more patterns need to be applied.
In BISA, two control signals are needed to manage the system and trigger the
authentication stage. An authentication mode selection (AMS) signal from the primary
is required to choose between functional mode and authentication mode (as depicted in
Table 5.1). Therefore, one extra input pin for this signal is required. In the authenti-
cation mode, the system needs to switch between shift and test phase. The test mode
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selection (TMS) signal generated in design-for-test for controlling scan chain can be
used here as well, so no additional pin is added. Note that an external clock is applied
in all modes. A particular clock will be generated by a tester or other external clock
generators for every mode of BISA. Typically, shift clock and authentication clock are
much slower than functional clock [99]. The authentication clock frequency is related to
the number of gates in a BISA block and the gate types. As the gate number goes up,
the depth of the tree structure circuit increases. After BISA design, the depth of every
tree structure circuit is determined and known. The timing constraint can be obtained
using static timing analysis tool to find the longest path. In the authentication mode,
a very slow test clock can be used to ensure no timing violation occurs in BISA circuit.
For example, suppose a tree-structure BISA circuit has a logic depth of 10 and up to 55
gates. If the propagation delay of each stage is 500ps, the total delay is 5ns (200MHz).
A test clock slower than 20MHz could be used for the authentication step. With such
slow speed, the authentication would still finish in few milliseconds.
Table 5.1: Operation modes in a design with BISA.
Functional
Authentication mode
mode Shift phase Test phase
Original circuit Working Idle Idle
BISA circuit Idle Shift seed/signature Test BISA
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5.2 BISA Design Flow
The BISA technique is developed to address insertion of Trojans by untrusted GDSII
developers and foundries. We assume that the design has passed all necessary verifica-
tions at design phase, so it is genuine before being shipped to GDSII developer. Figure
5.2 shows the proposed BISA design flow and where it fits within the conventional ASIC
design flow. The white rectangles in the figure are steps taken in a conventional ASIC
design flow, and the grey ones are the additional steps for inserting BISA circuitry. We
will describe them in detail in the following subsections.
5.2.1 Preprocessing
First, some information of standard cells in the technology library needs to be known
and stored for later steps. Dimension of each standard cell, such as length and width,
is needed for identifying and analyzing unused spaces. Once the placement direction
and location of a particular cell are given, the coordinates of its four corners can be
calculated by the cell’s length and width. Additionally, the number of input pins and
the name of a cell are saved for later usage. After obtaining the necessary information
for all standard cells, BISA cells will be selected from them and marked according to
the following criteria:
1. BISA cells must be the minimum-size cell for every logic, so they are resistant to
a resizing attack by the adversary (see Section 5.3.3).
2. The amount of decoupling capacitance the cells can provide and the input count
should be considered as well. The normalized input count represents the number
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Fig. 5.2: BISA design flow.
of inputs of a standard cell if the same cell has the same area of the minimum-size
cell (e.g., INVx0 in Table 5.2). Fewer inputs help to improve test coverage, which
will be explained in Section 5.2.4.
3. The smallest cell in the library must also be included in order to ensure that no
cell can be inserted in any remaining unused space.
Table 5.2 gives an example generated with Synopsys 90nm library. The columns labeled
area and input show each cell’s area and input count. The normalized input count is
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listed in the fourth column. Once a cell is selected, it will be marked in the last column
of the table. A cell with fewer inputs and a larger decoupling capacitance has higher
priority to be a BISA cell. Note that cell INVx0, NAND2x0, and NOR2x0 are three
smallest cells in this library. Since two inverters could potentially connect in serial to
form a buffer and the buffer is redundant logic, INVx0 would not be chosen as a BISA
cell. On the other hand, the NAND2x0 cell and the NOR2x0 cell would be selected to
ensure BISA circuit contains the smallest cell.
Table 5.2: Cell information collected at preprocessing step.
Name Area Input cnt Normalized Input BISA
INVx0 1920 1 1 No
NAND2x0 1920 2 2 Yes
NOR2x0 1920 2 2 Yes
INVx1 2240 1 0.86 No
AND2x1 2560 2 1.5 Yes
NAND3x0 2560 3 2.25 Yes
OR2x1 2560 2 1.5 Yes
AND3x1 2880 3 2 Yes
NOR3x0 2880 3 2 Yes
NAND4x0 2880 4 2.67 Yes
NAND2x2 3200 2 1.2 No
... ... ... ... ...
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A program has been developed to acquire all the above-mentioned information
from the LEF file in technology library and output an in-house Standard Cell (SC) file
format. This SC file must be ready before starting BISA design flow. Figure 5.2 also
shows different input files needed and output files generated when going through the
BISA insertion process. Other files (DEF, UNSP, P&R Script) are described in the
following subsections.
(a) Original placement (c) Available BISA cells
…
21:  size 14 x1 96   x2 110 y1 300 y2 364
22:  size 6   x1 234 x2 240 y1 300 y2 364
23:  size 32 x1 270 x2 302 y1 300 y2 364
...
(b) Unused spaces file (.unsp) (d) Placement after BISA insertion
Fig. 5.3: BISA cell insertion and placement
5.2.2 Unused Space Identification
In the BISA design flow shown in Figure 5.2, IC designers perform floorplanning, place-
ment, and clock tree synthesis just as they do in conventional layout design. After
finishing clock tree synthesis, the original circuit has been placed in the layout, so the
flow starts to search for and locate all unused spaces of the layout. We utilize a matrix,
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which is similar to bitmap in computer graphics, to record the state of each point in
the layout. The initial state ‘0’ represents “empty”. If one cell occupies this point in
the layout, the state is switched to ‘1’. Therefore, every standard cell placed in the
layout will be processed one by one and eventually the bitmap reveals the location and
size of unused spaces. To obtain the location of every placed cell, layout design tools
such as Synopsys IC Compiler (used in this work) can write a DEF file (.def) that
contains coordinates of all placed standard cells. By analyzing coordinate (.def) and its
corresponding size (.sc) of every placed cell, unused spaces in layout can be identified.
A Perl script has been developed to read the DEF and SC file, locate used spaces and
output an Unused Spaces file (.unsp). The format of the UNSP file is shown in Figure
5.3(b). The required information, such as the size and coordinates of the four corners,
are listed in the UNSP file.
5.2.3 BISA Cell Placement
After unused space identification, the flow completely fills the unused space with BISA
cells selected at the preprocessing step. A dynamic programming algorithm is employed
to find an optimal solution (see Section 5.2.5 for details). The algorithm is implemented
in a program which simulates the cell insertion process and produces a Tcl command
script for EDA tools. Available BISA cells and the layout after applying BISA is shown
in Figure 5.3(c) and (d). Note that once BISA has been applied, there may still be some
spare spaces left between cells, but not even the smallest cell (green) can be inserted.
Therefore, attackers cannot insert any extra cells either.
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Fig. 5.4: Routing a BISA block.
5.2.4 BISA Cell Routing
Unlike regular filler cells which are placed without functionality, all placed BISA cells
need to be connected in order to construct a number of combinational BISA circuits
(referred to as BISA blocks). The test coverage of the BISA circuit is a key point
we focus on when we are connecting BISA cells. A higher test coverage enhances the
confidence level of results from BISA, since more BISA cells have been tested. Several
approaches are employed to enhance stuck-at fault test coverage:
• First, we try to create as many BISA blocks as possible to make each BISA
block with fewer gates so that higher test coverage is easier to achieve. Since the
output of every BISA block will connect to MISR, the number of BISA blocks is
determined by the size of MISR. If M is the size of MISR, all placed BISA cells
are divided into M groups (BISA blocks).
• Second, redundant gates could deteriorate controllability and observability of the
circuit and lower the test coverage significantly, so a tree-structure circuit is pro-
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posed to eliminate redundant gates, as shown in Figure 5.4. If every input is
independent of other inputs in a tree-structure circuit, every net is controllable
and observable, so the theoretical test coverage of stuck-at fault is 100%. Here,
we construct a tree-structure BISA block according to the sequence of cells in a
block set.
Figure 5.4 shows that two different sequences lead to two different tree-structure circuits.
The first gate becomes the root of the tree-structure circuitry, i.e., it is on the top (first)
level of tree. The outputs of the next x cells (x being the number of inputs of the
root cell) are connected to its inputs as its children cells, on the second level. On the
third level, we do the same to connect new cells to cells on the second level. Cells are
sequentially connected to cells on upper levels until all of them are processed, as shown
in Figure 5.4 (a) and (b). After complete routing in each block, all inputs of each block
should connect to LFSR sequentially to avoid sharing inputs. In the end, the M bits
output from M BISA blocks connect to a MISR with size of M.
Testability of Tree-Structure BISA Block
Once a number of BISA cells are assigned to one BISA block, the input count of the BISA
block is fixed and can be calculated, regardless of how the BISA cells are connected.
Suppose there are n BISA cells in one BISA block, and the k-th BISA cell has Ik inputs.
The BISA block’s total number of inputs S can thus be calculated:
S =
n∑
k=1
Ik − n+ 1 (5.1)
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Consider the circuit in Figure 5.4 as an example. The total number of inputs is S =
18(sum of cells’ inputs)-8(cell number)+1 = 11. Although Figure 5.4(a) and (b) show
two different tree-structures, their input counts are same. As more cells are added to
one block, the number of inputs will increase consistently. If the number of inputs of one
block is greater than what LFSR can provide, some inputs have to share LFSR outputs
in a broadcasting fashion (i.e., using fanout). The correlation among these shared
inputs could potentially result in redundant gates in BISA blocks, thereby affecting test
coverage. Let us take the BISA block in Figure 5.4 (b) as an example. This BISA block
has 11 input pins, but the size of LFSR is 10, which is 1 bit less than the BISA block.
Thus, one input pin has to share with another input pin in this BISA block. In Figure
5.4 (a) and (b), all nets with correlation due to the shared input are highlighted in red.
The input correlation can impact controllability or observability of the dark gates in the
figure. One straightforward way of eliminating redundant gates is to change the tree
structure to reconstruct the BISA block by adjusting the cell order, since the stuck-at
fault test coverage is highly related to the circuit structure, If one slightly changes the
sequence, the structure of BISA block will completely change and thus the test coverage
will vary significantly. After trying different sequences in one BISA block, the sequence
that has the highest test coverage is kept.
BISA Design Strategies
Two BISA design methods, static and dynamic, are developed in the chapter. In the
case of static BISA insertion, LFSR and MISR are included in the original design.
After inserting BISA cells, the BISA circuits are connected to the pre-designed LFSR
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and MISR. However, static BISA design offers a couple of potential challenges. First, if
the original design does not include LFSR and MISR (i.e. does not use built-in self-test
(BIST)), BISA cannot be established. Additionally, if the BISA circuit is larger than the
testing capabilities of pre-designed LFSR and MISR, sharing fanout in a BISA block
will lower the test coverage and further decrease the reliability of BISA. In order to
address this problem effectively, a dynamic BISA design algorithm is proposed to insert
both BISA cells and LFSR/MISR into unused space and adjust their composition to
ensure LFSR and MISR can fully test the BISA circuitry. The detailed algorithm will be
described in Section 5.2.5. In general, the dynamic BISA design method is generally very
effective for designs with many large unused spaces, like SOC design. Its shortcoming is
that it may not be as effective for very compact designs (those with little unused space
available), which will be discussed in Section 5.4.5.
Routability
Additional connections will be introduced by BISA circuits and will take some routing
resources from the routing of the original circuit. In order to ensure routability of the
original circuit and reduce the routing resources taken by the additional BISA circuit,
we usually put the nearest cells in one BISA block to shorten their interconnections.
Additionally, BISA can save more routing resources by sacrificing its own speed. The
minimum size for metal wire and high metal layers could be used for BISA routing so
that more room can be created for routings of the original design. Correspondingly, a
slow test clock is used for BISA in authentication mode. This allows us to ignore BISA’s
timing constraints and focus on obtaining maximum coverage with limited routing re-
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sources.
At this step, our program can generate a routing script for Synopsys IC Compiler
to create nets and connect them logically, as shown in Figure 5.2. The whole design,
including BISA, will be physically routed at routing/optimization step. Once the timing
and sign-off of the design are successful, the last step involves the generation of a
GDSII/OASIS format of the design for final tape-out.
5.2.5 Place & Route Algorithms
Dynamic Programming Algorithm
During BISA placement, a method is needed to completely fill each unused space using
BISA cells with the fewest total input count. Minimizing the total input count can not
only curtail the routings required in BISA circuitry, but also lower the requirements
for a LFSR and MISR. In this chapter, we take a dynamic programming approach
for BISA placement. Dynamic programming is one of the classic heuristic algorithms,
where a complex problem is solved by breaking it down into smaller sub-problems [100].
The optimal solution of the current problem is based on the optimal solution of its
sub-problems. When applicable, this method takes far less time than heuristic search
methods that do not take advantage of the sub-problem overlap (like depth-first search).
For the problem of filling each unused space, all potential solutions can be derived from
adding a BISA cell to a corresponding smaller space that has been solved. Comparing
all the possible solutions, we will choose the filling solution with the fewest inputs.
A simple example is illustrated in Figure 5.5. We are trying to fill an unused space
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with the size of L. Assume the optimal solution for any unused space smaller than L
(≤ L) has already been solved. Suppose that a total number of four BISA cells (Bi,
i = 1, 2, 3, 4) are available, their sizes are d1, d2, d3, and d4, and their input count are k1,
k2, k3, and k4 respectively, as shown in the brackets in the figure. The optimal solution
(S(L)) for filling the unused space (L) must therefore be from the solutions of a BISA
cell Bi plus a sub-solution S(Ui) of the corresponding unused space Ui (i = 1, 2, 3, 4,
Ui = L − di). Definitely, unused spaces U1, U2, U3, and U4 are smaller than L and
are L’s sub-problems, so the optimal solutions to fill them are already obtained. From
these four potential solutions, the one with the fewest inputs will be selected. In the
example, the solution of the BISA cell B4 plus the U4 is selected for the space of size
L because its input count (9, S(U4) + d4) is smaller than others’ (12, 11, 12). Next, a
larger unused space will be explored until the maximum area of the unused space has
been investigated. Our dynamic programming algorithm can be presented visually as
S(n) = Min[S(n− dm) + km,m ∈ BISA cells] (5.2)
where n is area of current space and 0 ≤ n ≤ L).
The dynamic programming approach seeks to solve each sub-problem only once,
thus reducing the number of computations: once the solution to a given subproblem has
been computed, it is saved for later usage. The method can save significant computation
time during the placement process because there are usually many unused spaces having
the same size. Additionally, a dynamic programming algorithm will examine all possible
solutions to the problem and will pick the best one, so it guarantees finding the optimal
solution. Alternatives, such as the greedy algorithm used in [75], cannot guarantee the
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optimality of the solution.
U4, S(U4)=6 B4 (3)
U3, S(U3)=8
U2, S(U2)=8
U1, S(U1)=10
B3 (4)
B2 (3)
B1
(2) 10+2
8+3
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6+3
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L
d4
d3
d2
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Selector
Fig. 5.5: An example using dynamic programming.
Dynamic BISA Design Algorithm
The previous static BISA design algorithm [75] is not suitable for a design without
pre-designed LFSR or MISR or a design with many large unused spaces, as discussed in
Section 5.2.4. Thus, a dynamic BISA design method is necessary, in order to ensure high
test coverage. Therefore, all BISA cells, scan flip-flops and XORs for LFSR/MISR will
be inserted into unused spaces during the dynamic BISA design. Since unused spaces
in layout are fixed, the key point is balancing the number of BISA cells for BISA circuit
and the number of scan flip-flops inserted for LFSR and MISR in certain unused spaces.
If most of the unused spaces are filled with BISA cells and the size of LFSR/MISR
is small, such an LFSR/MISR cannot provide or receive long-enough vectors and thus
test coverage will not be very high. If LFSR and MISR are much larger than the
corresponding inserted BISA cells, the excessive scan flip-flops could result in a huge
power consumption during BISA testing because of switchings in a large number of scan
flip-flops at every clock cycle. Thus, the size of LFSR/MISR and BISA circuit should
be balanced, in order to achieve 100% test coverage with smallest size of LFSR/MISR.
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The dynamic BISA design algorithm, depicted in Algorithm 1, has been developed to
address this problem. From line 1 to line 3, required information produced at previous
steps–like BISA cell size, unused space area, and polynomial primitives of LFSR/MISR
[99], etc.–is imported. The dynamic programming algorithm described in Section 5.2.5
finds solutions for all unused spaces smaller and equal to the maximum unused space
(line 4). On the line 5, unused spaces are filled with scan flip-flops only as much as
possible. Then, the corresponding number of XORs (in the polynomial primitive file)
needs to insert. Remaining spaces are then filled with BISA cells, as described in line
7. Next, the number of BISA cells and their inputs is obtained (line 8). Once the BISA
cell count, input count, and the size of LFSR and MISR are known, one can determine
if current LFSR and MISR are able to fully test BISA circuits. We define a test index
to represent the testability of current BISA circuits, which can be calculated using the
Equation (3).
TestIndex = (SumOfCellInputs)− (SumOfCells)− (MISRSize) ∗ ((LFSRSize)− 1)
(5.3)
A positive integer of the test index means that current LFSR and MISR can fully
test the BISA circuits, so the process can move ahead to shorten LFSR/MISR and place
more BISA cells. The following loop tries to clear the unused space that has the most
scan flip-flops and refill it with BISA cells (line 11-15). If the new test index is still
greater than a threshold, the action will be approved (line 16). All the BISA placement
information is updated, and then the process moves forward to try the next unused space
with the most flip-flops (line 17-20). If the test index is smaller than the threshold, this
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Algorithm 1 The dynamic BISA design procedure.
1: Read SC and UNSP files
2: Read polynomial primitive [99] for LFSR and MISR
3: Read dynamic programming filling results
4: Insert scan flip-flops to fill all unused spaces
5: Insert appropriate XOR gates, remove scan flip-flops if necessary
6: Insert BISA cells to fill remaining unused spaces
7: Count current BISA cell input # and BISA cell #
8: Calculate Test Index
9: while (Test Index > threshold) do
10: Search an uninvestigated unused space with most flip-flops
11: Clear the unused space (remove scan flip-flops, XORs and BISA cells in the
unused space)
12: Insert BISA cells to fill remaining unused spaces
13: Count current BISA cell input # and BISA cell #
14: Update Test Index
15: if (Test Index > threshold) then
16: Update inserted BISA cells
17: Update scan flip-flops and XORs
18: Update LFSR and MISR
19: Update Test Index
20: end if
21: end while
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action is unsuccessful. The reason is most likely that the size of LFSR/MISR decreases
too much, because excessive scan flip-flops for LFSR and MISR are removed. Therefore,
a new loop goes back to line 11 and begins to explore the unused space with the second
greatest number of flip-flops. The process will be repeated until all unused spaces with
flip-flops have been investigated. Finally, the test index will be a value greater than but
very closed to the threshold. It means LFSR can offer more inputs than input count of
every BISA block, so there is no redundant gate in the BISA circuitry.
5.2.6 BISA Design in System-on-Chips (SOCs)
In this section, we extend the BISA framework to System-on-Chips (SOCs). SOC
is typically a bottom-up hierarchical design, and the top module includes other pre-
designed sub-modules, or what are known as intellectual property (IP) cores. We assume
that each IP core in the SOC has been implemented with BISA already by the flow
described in Section 5.2. In this case, each IP core can be simply treated like a standard
cell, so BISA design in the top module of a SOC is nearly the same as that in a single-
module design. The main difference is that IP cores are much larger than standard
cells and cannot be placed in a row. In addition, we also have to determine how to
organize the LFSR/MISR. For an SOC design, therefore, we just need to make some
small changes on the step of unused spaces identification, and other steps are exactly
same.
Since BISA will be applied to all modules in a hierarchical design, three topo-
logical structures (distributed, centralized, and hybrid) to organize LFSR/MISR are
illustrated in Figure 5.6. “Distributed structure” means each IP core and top module
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has its own LFSR/MISR, as shown in Figure 5.6(a). Two additional pins are reserved
in each sub-module for shifting data in shift mode. Although distributed structure
has simple wire interconnections and requires fewer pins, having these independent LF-
SRs/MISRs in every module could result in the larger area overhead. In “centralized
structure”, only one centralized LFSR and one centralized MISR (in the top module or
one of sub-modules) are used to generate test patterns and compress responses for BISA
blocks in both the top module and other IP cores. Centralized structure can potentially
increase the complexity of BISA cells routing, requires more pins than others and could
potentially increase area. Each module will use N+M pins to receive N-bits test vectors
and output M-bits responses. “Hybrid structure” is, as the name suggests, an amalgam
of the two above structures. If some sub-modules have dedicated LFSR/MISR and some
do not have due to limited IP core resources, “Hybrid structure” is more flexible.
(a) Distributed (b) Centralized (c) Hybrid 
LFSR/MISR
Fig. 5.6: Three possible structures used to organize LFSRs/MISRs in a SOC design.
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5.3 Feasibility and Reliability of BISA
5.3.1 ECO
In chip design, Engineering Change Order (ECO) [101] [102] is the process of making
some small changes in the processed design. Before the chip masks are made, ECOs are
usually done to save time by avoiding the need for full ASIC logic synthesis, technology
mapping, layout design, layout extraction, and timing verification. After masks have
been developed, ECOs could be performed to save money. If a change can be imple-
mented by modifying only a few of the layers of a design, then the cost is much less
than it would be if the design was rebuilt from scratch. Our proposed BISA technique
does not impact either pre-mask or post-mask ECOs. All inserted BISA cells can be
used as spare logic gates. When a BISA cell is selected for ECO, the BISA cell needs
to disconnect from its BISA circuits. Then another two wire connection changes are re-
quired to skip the selected BISA cell and reroute the original BISA circuits. Since BISA
circuits do not have timing constraints, these two routing changes can be implemented
using limited space. Moreover, our BISA design algorithm will fill unused spaces with
different types of gates and ensure the variety of BISA cells.
5.3.2 Filler Cell and Decoupling Capacitor Cell
In conventional layout design, after placement and routing, unused spaces will be filled
with filler cells or decoupling capacitor (decap) cells in order to reduce the design rule
check (DRC) violations created by the base layers and to ensure power rail connection
[103]. Moreover, filler cells and decap cells are able to provide power and ground ca-
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pacitances, which can effectively minimize power supply noise. However, filler cells and
decap cells do not have functionality, so they cannot be tested and can be easily iden-
tified and removed by attacker. Although no space is left for decap cells after applying
BISA, the BISA cells are able to provide decoupling capacitance to some degree [104].
For decap cell, the decoupling capacitance comes entirely from dedicated gate oxide
capacitance sources, but BISA cell utilizes its diffusion capacitance for the decoupling
capacitance. Typically, diffusion capacitance is less than gate capacitance. However,
N. Weste and D. Harris [105] pointed out that the diffusion capacitance Csb and Cdb
of contacted source and drain region was comparable to the gate capacitance. In the
BISA design, BISA cells are connected together to form a combinational circuit, so most
source/drain diffusions are contacted for making connections. Therefore, BISA cells are
able to supply decoupling capacitance to functional cells nearby. To illustrate their
power and ground capacitance, we use the cell characterization function in HSPICE
to report the node capacitance of standard cells. Table 5.3 lists the power (CV DD)
and ground capacitance (CV SS) of functional standard BISA cells and filler cells in two
academic standard cell libraries. Top portion for each library corresponds to the BISA
cells while the bottom portions correspond to the filler and decap cells. The last column
in the table shows the power and ground capacitance per unit area. We observe that
standard cells do not lose much power/ground capacitance, and even some BISA cells
have larger capacitance. For example, in the NANGATE 45nm standard cell library,
NAND2 x1 and NOR2 x1 can offer larger average capacitance than its filler cells. Note
that the source/drain capacitor is operation mode dependent [105]. When the system is
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in functional mode, the BISA circuit will be idle and all BISA cells are in a pre-specified
mode depending on the value in the LFSR. Some cells are in the mode where they can
provide the maximum decaps, while others are may not be. Since different types of
BISA cells are inserted at the BISA placement step, a large number of inserted BISA
cells and their diversity can ensure that average decoupling capacitance is relatively
stable. Analyzing this shall be part of our future research plan.
5.3.3 Potential Attacks
We pointed out earlier that BISA cells are the same as other circuit cells, so it is
extremely difficult for an adversary to identify them. If this were possible, however,
attacks could proceed. BISA, as an authentication circuitry, should be immune to
different attacks that attempt to create space for Trojan gates via removal, redesign,
resizing, or bypassing. Three potential attacks on these two targets, filler cells or original
standard cells, are discussed as follows.
Removal Attack
Removal attack is the most direct and simplest way to create space for Trojan gates.
Simply removing BISA cells will change the functionality of BISA blocks. Test patterns
will test the functionality of BISA blocks, and BISA signatures can tell if the BISA cells
have been tampered with. If some functional standard cells from the original design
are removed by adversaries, the original functionality will be altered. Both functional
and structural tests are able to detect removal attacks. We recommend using as few
unnecessary non-functional standard cells, such as buffers, as possible. Even if some
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Table 5.3: The power and ground capacitance of filler cells and a portion of functional
standard cells in two academic standard cell libraries.
NANGATE 45nm standard cell library
Cell CV DD CV SS Area (CV DD,CV SS)/Area
INV x1 38.5a 348.5a 3800 (0.010,0.092)
NAND2 x1 83.6a 536.4a 5700 (0.015,0.094)
NOR2 x1 86.6a 544.9a 5700 (0.015,0.096)
XOR2 x1 156.6a 1.965f 5700 (0.027,0.345)
AND3 x1 76.5a 1.179f 9500 (0.008,0.124)
FILLCELL x1 25.3a 96.2a 1900 (0.013,0.051)
FILLCELL x2 38.8a 109.8a 3800 (0.010,0.029)
FILLCELL x4 64.8a 135.8a 7600 (0.008,0.018)
FILLCELL x8 123a 254.6a 15200 (0.008,0.017)
FILLCELL x16 234.2a 422.9a 30400 (0.008,0.014)
FILLCELL x32 451.1a 687.8a 60800 (0.007,0.011)
SAED 90nm standard cell library
Cell CV DD CV SS Area (CV DD,CV SS)/Area
INVx0 290.9a 230.9a 1920 (0.152,0.120)
NAND2x0 516.6a 264.4a 1920 (0.269,0.138)
XOR2x1 691.8a 727.9a 4800 (0.144,0.152)
XOR3x1 1.045f 1.188f 7680 (0.136,0.155)
DECAP 317.5a 206.8a 1920 (0.165,0.108)
DHFILLLHL2 175.6a 203.6a 640 (0.274,0.318)
DHFILLHLH2 290.9a 373.7a 640 (0.455,0.584)
SHFILL1 56.44a 50.17a 320 (0.176,0.157)
SHFILL2 201.0a 184.2a 640 (0.314,0.288)
SHFILL64 1.144f 1.159f 20480 (0.056,0.057)
SHFILL128 2.193f 2.215f 40960 (0.054,0.054)
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buffers are deleted and cannot be detected, the limited space left from removing buffers
would still hamper Trojan insertion.
Redesign Attack
If the adversary changes one or more gates that alter the functionality, it will be de-
tected by functional tests regardless in BISA circuit or the original circuit [35,36]. If
the adversary is forced to redesign the layout in order to achieve the same functional-
ity and insert Trojan gates as well, then the chip dimensions will probably alter. In
addition, these alterations could result in changes on placements and routings for some
or all design components and their interconnections. Modifications to original circuitry
would impact the circuit timing that could be detected using side-channel based tech-
niques [39,40]. Therefore, the redesign attack could be more effective on BISA than
original circuit, because BISA is redundant circuit in functional mode and does not
impact circuit performance. However, there are major difficulties making it practically
impossible. First, it is nontrivial for the foundry to differentiate the original circuit from
BISA in order to create the space for hardware Trojan insertion. BISA cells are the
same standard cells as in the original design. BISA cells form combinational circuits
and are connected to scan flip-flops of LFSR/MISR, which look like a standard BIST
design. The foundry would need to analyze the entire layout to identify the BISA cells.
While, this is not necessarily impossible, it does require a significant amount of effort
and expertise on the part of the attacker to insert a Trojan compared to conventional
approaches that do not use BISA. Second, should an adversary actually identify BISA
cells, they must then analyze the BISA circuitry and find a functionally equivalent logic
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with a smaller area. Finding a feasible solution for a tree-structured circuit is another
challenge. For example, two 2-input NAND gate converging in another 2-input NAND
gate can be replaced by a 2-input OR gate and two 2-input AND gate. The area of the
NAND gate implementation is 16.59 (µm2) using the SAED90nm standard cell library,
but the OR gate plus AND gates need a space of 22.12 (µm2). Thus, it cannot be
used to create unused spaces for inserting hardware Trojans. The most possible way is
that some certain gates can be function-equivalently replaced by an available complex
standard cell in standard cell library, such as AO22x1, AOI221x1 and etc. Since these
complex cells are well designed and compacted as much as possible, such as sharing
diffusion areas and sharing connection wires. Usually, the complex cell has a smaller
area than its functionally equivalent circuit comprised of basic cells (like NAND, NOR,
AND, and OR). For instance, the area of an AO22x1 cell (11.98 µm2) is smaller than the
area of a 2-input AND cell plus a 2-input OR cell (14.74 µm2). Therefore, these logics
that complex cells have should be avoided in a tree-structured BISA block. If found, a
new logic can be formed by slightly changing cells order in the BISA block. Moreover,
this attack can also be made more challenging if the BISA cells that are connected are
not directly neighboring. Even if there is an equivalent circuit, the area might be larger
than any unused space created by removing any one of these distributed BISA cells.
Taking the layout in Figure 3 for example, we suppose that a yellow cell can replace two
blue cells without change in functionality and its size is smaller than total size of two
blue cells. Since a yellow cell is larger than one blue cell, the new yellow cell cannot be
inserted into any places where two original blue cells locate without touching original
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circuit. In addition, some techniques can be used to prevent the logic minimization at
the BISA design stage. Synthesis tools have the ability to minimize logic and can be
used to verify if a BISA block is the implementation with the minimum area. If not, one
can reorder the sequence of gates to form a new tree structure BISA block until it can-
not be optimized. This step does not change the placement of BISA cells, but it needs
a longer processing time and modifies routing in the BISA block. Third, if the attacker
cannot simply replace the BISA cells with a functionally equivalent cell with smaller
area, the only alternative is to begin modifying the original design as well. As men-
tioned earlier in the chapter, BISA does not address the issue of redesigning the original
circuit. However, modifications in the original circuit could impact the performance of
the original design and change its side-channel (delay, power, etc.) behavior. While an
attacker could overcome the obstacles above with enough effort, Trojan insertion is still
significantly hampered with BISA compared to other approaches.
Resizing Attack
In BISA, all BISA cells are already of minimum size and cannot shrink any further. If
adversaries continue to reduce the cell size, it will violate design rules and result in a
very low yield. Some standard cells in the original design could be resized to smaller
standard cells; however, the performance will be affected by using smaller cells.
Attack LFSR/MISR
LFSR and MISR are used to generate patterns and signatures respectively, so they are
also possible targets for the adversaries. Fortunately, both TPG and ORA are quite
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secure against different kinds of attacks. Any modification to the register or XOR gate
in TPG or ORA will result in a totally different patterns and signatures. No matter
what change is made, a different signature will indicate that the chip has been tampered
with. Admittedly, attackers may acquire generated test patterns and the corresponding
signature by attacking TPG or ORA. They might store these results, bypass BISA, and
output them pretending BISA is working normally. However, even if they could obtain
all this information, the bypassing attack will be detected. Different seeds in LFSR will
result in different signatures. The seed and its corresponding signature are similar to
a challenge-response pair. Since the seed used for authentication is not fixed and an
arbitrary seed can be shifted in through scan chain, it is nearly impossible for attackers
to speculate the final signatures without knowing the seeds that test engineers will use.
The trustworthiness of BISA can be guaranteed by applying various seeds.
5.3.4 Yield
The discussions above rely on the fact that BISA is genuine and working without man-
ufacturing defects. However, BISA contains LFSR, MISR and many BISA cells which
may also be affected by silicon defects during fabrication. One chip producing a faulty
signature may contain hardware Trojans, but it also could have been caused by defects
in BISA, while the original circuits are working well. Of course, we do not want to
discard good chips with defects only in their BISAs, reducing yield and increasing costs.
Fortunately, it should be possible to reliably tell the difference. Hardware Trojans are
intentionally inserted into all or a portion of chips by adversaries, while defects occur
randomly due to imperfect manufacturing processes. Therefore, the probability of two
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chips with the same defects would be very low, but chips with the same Trojan would
always produce the same faulty signatures–this provides us with opportunities to sepa-
rate chips with random defect from Trojans. Note that masks used for fabrication cost
millions of dollars, so it is infeasible for adversaries to make one mask for each chip in
order to imitate random defects. Chips with the same correct signatures and the same
faulty signatures will therefore be suspected as infected chips. If the faulty signatures
from one chip are completely different from other chips, the faulty signatures probably
result from defects in BISA.
5.4 Results and Analysis
5.4.1 BISA Implementation
In this section, we implement BISA on 15 designs from various benchmark suites. Four
of them (OpenSparc, Leon3mp, Netcard and VGA lcd) are SOCs containing hierarchical
sub-modules and the others are single-module designs. All benchmarks are synthesized
using Synopsys Design Compiler with Synopsys 90nm technology library. Overall, 32
standard cells were selected as BISA cells from the 320 in the library and each cell has
a unique function. Synopsys IC Compiler has been employed for layout design. For our
implementations of BISA, a series of programs have been developed to extract standard
library information, to identify unused spaces, and to generate placing & routing scripts
for the IC Compiler. Figure 5.7 shows the layouts of benchmark DES3 area with the
core utilization of 70%. Before applying BISA, we can see many unused spaces in Figure
5.7(a). In Figure 5.7(b), all these unused spaces are filled with BISA cells, highlighted
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(b)
Fig. 5.7: Implementation of a single module design.
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in red, after BISA insertion. Although there still are some spare spaces left, these
remaining spaces are too small to place a cell. Another benefit of these left spare spaces
is that they can be routing channel for low-layer metals, especially for critical paths.
Figure 5.8 shows the implementation of one Sparc core in OpenSparc T1 bench-
mark [106]. The Opensparc T1 is the first 64-bit open-source microprocessor, released
in 2006 by ORACLE. The Opensparc core is composed of seven sub-modules (hard
macros): exu, ffu, ifu, lsu, mul, spu, and tlu. The layout floorplan and proportion
of every sub-module are depicted in Figure 5.8(a) and (b), respectively. We try to
compact the floorplan as much as possible in the layout, but gaps still inevitably exist
between sub-modules. With the implementation of BISA, BISA circuit can perfectly
fill all these gaps. Since the OpenSparc benchmark has more than half million gates, it
is very difficult to see those inserted BISA cells. To show the BISA circuitry between
sub-modules, three screenshots at different locations in the layout are shown in Figure
5.8(c)-(e). The black parts are cores (sub-modules) and the red components represent
the inserted BISA cells.
Similarly, BISA has been applied to all benchmarks, and their implementation
results are presented in Table 5.4. Compared to single-module designs, SOC designs
need many more BISA cells. Therefore, in these SOC designs, a large dynamic LFSR
and a MISR are generated in these unused spaces to ensure a very high test coverage
without any area overhead. It is worth nothing that the size of the BISA circuit is
not proportional to the original circuit and it is related to the circuit structure and
its timing constraints. For example, the AES core benchmark is half the size of the
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DES perf benchmark, but its BISA circuit is more than twice as large as that in the
DES perf using the same core utilization.
Table 5.4: BISA implementations.
Benchmark
OpenCore Faraday Technology Corp.
DES3 area USB funct AES core Ethernet DES perf VGA lcd DMA DSP RISC
Cell # 1,559 6,445 26,447 29,153 49,517 124,031 6,873 17,895 30,229
BISA cell # 133 440 5,961 1,170 2,092 5,280 1,544 5,212 3,756
Benchmark
ITC’99 SOC
b18 Leon3mp Netcard OpenSparc Core
Cell # 24,300 545,836 317,033 781,321
BISA cell # 2,050 25,405 19,364 30,903
5.4.2 Filling Approach
A filling approach using the dynamic programming algorithm has been developed in
Section 5.2.5. Theoretically, this algorithm can produce an optimal filling solution
with the fewest number of inputs. Four randomly picked unused spaces have been
investigated. The greedy algorithm (one classic heuristic algorithm) used in [75] has
also been employed to fill these four spaces with the same set of BISA cells. Table 5.5
is the comparison results between the two algorithms under the same condition. Rows
5 and 6 show the total input count of inserted BISA cells and the leftover space after
BISA insertion, respectively. In all four cases, the dynamic programming algorithm
(DP) outperforms the greedy algorithm in the total input count and therefore should
obtain lower LFSR overheads and higher test coverage more easily. In all but one case
(case 3), the dynamic programming algorithm leaves the same amount of spare space
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Fig. 5.8: Implementation of the OpenSparc microprocessor core.
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as the greedy algorithm. In case 3, it leaves significantly less space. Therefore, the
dynamic programming algorithm is at least as good as the greedy algorithm in filling
unused spaces, if not better.
Table 5.5: Algorithms performance.
Space 1 Space 2 Space 3 Space 4
Area 15000 20000 30000 48000
Algo. DP Greedy DP Greedy DP Greedy DP Greedy
Cell # 2 2 4 3 5 4 7 7
Input # 7 9 9 10 12 15 19 20
Left Area 1880 1880 160 160 240 1520 0 0
5.4.3 Test Coverage Analysis
As described in Section 5.2.4, two factors can influence the eventual test coverage of a
BISA circuit: the testability of the BISA circuit and test patterns. The testability of
the BISA circuit is determined by the number of redundant gates at the BISA design
phase. As LFSR and MISR become larger, their testing capabilities enhance and the
number of redundant gates goes down. Figure 5.9 shows testability of the BISA circuit in
benchmark USB funct by performing fault simulation in Synopsys TetraMax. Different
sizes of LFSRs, such as 32-bit, 16-bit and 8-bit are investigated. As we expected, the test
coverage goes up gradually as LFSR and MISR become larger. The testable coverage
is a theoretical test coverage that can be achieved, but the actual test coverage also is
dependent on test patterns, i.e. the number of random patterns generated from LFSR.
The test coverage over a different number of test patterns are illustrated in Figure
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Fig. 5.9: Testability of BISA circuit with three types of LFSR/MISR.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 5.10: Test coverage over a different number of test patterns.
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5.10. As more random test patterns have been applied, the test coverage increases and
then gradually goes to saturation in all 12 benchmarks. The top left figure shows the
results of three SOC designs. Although these SOC designs have more BISA cells and
larger BISA circuits, compared to other single-module benchmarks, their test coverage
can be 100% after applying 30,000 random patterns. For other single-module designs
with smaller BISA circuits, their test coverage is lower than the SOCs’, which defies our
intuition. This is because, for the BISA circuits in SOCs, XOR gate is much more than
other types of gates, such as AND, OR, NOR, and NAND. A XOR gate can produce
half of ones and half of zeroes with neutral input values. In other words, XOR is more
controllable and observable than other types of gates. Therefore, these BISA circuits
with much more XORs can have a higher test coverage. Three examples (DMA, DSP
and RISC) are shown in the bottom right figure. Their test coverage is around 98%
after applying 50,000 test patterns–lower than other benchmarks. If we further apply a
number of random patterns, their test coverage still keeps increasing, but very slowly.
We find that the remaining faults can be tested by some specific patterns with a large
portion of deterministic bits that have a very small probability of occurring in random
patterns. However, in order to get the full test coverage in a short time, certain seeds
for LFSR can be shifted in so that these specific patterns can be generated as well.
5.4.4 Dynamic BISA vs. Static BISA
For the static BISA design, the original design must contain LSFR and MISR. The
LFSR and MISR have been designed before layout design, so it is difficult to accurately
predict the size of the BISA circuit at that time. If the pre-designed LFSR and MISR
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are not large enough to effectively test the entire BISA circuit when it is implemented
in layout, the test coverage will not be very high, especially for a low-utilization design
or SOC design. The dynamic BISA design approach described in Section 5.2.5 makes
up the shortcoming of the static BISA design, which is more suitable for designs with
large unused spaces. All designs have been revaluated to demonstrate if the dynamic
BISA design can enhance the testability of BISA circuitry. Figure 5.11 shows the results
of a portion of benchmarks using the static and dynamic BISA design approaches. In
comparison, the dynamic BISA design algorithm can avoid redundant gate in BISA
circuit, so their test coverage is always 100%. The test coverage in fault simulation
for the static BISA design is around 95%, and the AES core is even less than 80%.
We can make an obvious conclusion that the dynamic BISA insertion can enhance the
testability of large BISA circuits significantly.
Fig. 5.11: Test coverage using static and dynamic BISA designs.
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5.4.5 Compaction Ratio
Although the dynamic BISA design can realize a higher test coverage than the static
design, the dynamic method requires more large unused spaces to place sufficient scan
flip-flops. Therefore, the dynamic BISA design is not suitable for very compact designs.
In a layout, the number and size of unused spaces are dependent on the layout com-
paction ratio (core utilization). If the core utilization is very high, standard cells are
placed tightly in each row. This will result in fewer and smaller unused spaces. There
will not be enough scan flip-flops to construct large entough LFSR and MISR, so the
LFSR and MISR cannot fully test the BISA circuits. Table 5.6 shows the results using
various core utilizations in the two largest OpenCore benchmarks.
Table 5.6: Compaction Ratio.
Benchmark AES DES perf
Utilization 65% 68% 70% 67% 70% 75%
Unused Space # 22343 21518 19971 23653 19557 11963
BISA # 12156 10936 10417 7380 5011 2028
LFSR & 149 139 109 107 131 15
MISR 149 140 109 107 132 15
Success Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
According to the results, the dynamic BISA design works very well for SOC de-
signs and single-module designs with a lower compaction ratio. In most cases, designers
want to compact designs as much as possible. Pre-designed LFSR and MISR are a
better choice for these high-compact designs. Since the number of BISA cells in a high-
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compact design is very small, the pre-designed LFSR and MISR should be large enough
to test them. On the other hand, in a large design, the core utilization cannot be very
high due to conservative floorplanning. For example, 93% is the highest core utilization
we can implement for the benchmark AES. If the layout design is not as compact as
designers’ predictions in the netlist design, then there will be too many unused spaces,
requiring that an excessive number of BISA cells be inserted. The inserted BISA cells
will be beyond the test capabilities of pre-designed LFSR and MISR. To solve this prob-
lem, the dynamic BISA technique can be used to insert flip-flops, increase the size of
LFSR/MISR a little bit and, meanwhile, reduce the number of BISA cells. Thus, test
coverage and area overhead could be improved greatly.
5.4.6 Timing Overhead
Although the BISA circuits have no interconnections to the original circuits, there may
still be a concern that the BISA cells will negatively impact timing of the original
design. The additional metal interconnections introduced by BISA circuits will result
in less routing space and more cross-talk. These effects could potentially make critical
paths violate timing constraints that were verified without the BISA circuits. We have
conducted experiments to explore how much extra delay will be introduced by the BISA
circuits. Benchmark b18 has been implemented with and without BISA. 200 critical
paths have been extracted from designs with BISA and without BISA by Synopsys
Primetime, and the HSPICE has been employed to simulate their propagation delays.
To obtain information on path delay changes with and without BISA insertion, the
same paths are used for comparison. Since the BISA circuit size is dependent on the
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core utilization of a design, different core utilizations for one design are investigated
as well. Table 5.7 shows results from the benchmark b18. The third column presents
the average increased delay after BISA insertion across 200 critical paths. The fourth
and fifth columns indicate the average percentage of the increase and largest increase
respectively. As these results show, more unused spaces require more BISA cells as the
core utilization goes down, thus increasing the impact on path delay. We can see that
the impact is much less than the wafer-to-wafer process variation, because the largest
impact is less than 2%. Therefore, the impact on timing is not a critical issue for the
proposed BISA technique.
Table 5.7: Timing analysis on 200 critical paths in designs with and without BISA
circuits.
Benchmark: b18
Utilization BISA cell # Avg. Inc. Delay Avg. Per. Max Per.
78% 299 23.8 ps 0.21% 0.36%
75% 2000 111ps 0.96% 2.17%
72% 3512 191ps 1.66% 2.38%
5.4.7 Attack Detection
In this subsection, we perform ten different attacks to see if the BISA can reflect these
attacks. The benchmark USB funct design is selected, and 440 BISA cells are inserted
to fill unused spaces. LFSR and MISR with a size of 32 are used to form the BISA
structure. 616 ATPG (automatic test pattern generation) patterns can reach 100%
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testable coverage. When 500 random patterns from LFSR are applied, the stuck-at
fault test coverage is only 81%. Five kinds of gates are selected to be removed from
different BISA blocks separately. In addition, another five types of gates are selected to
be changed, separately, to other types of gates in different BISA blocks. Their signatures
are shown in Table 5.8. In this table, we define some terms to represent cells in a tree-
structure block. An “internal cell” is the cell of a tree that has children cells. Similarly,
a “leaf node” is a node that does not have children cells. Five cases are developed for
removal and change respectively. In every case, the signature generated from MISR is
different from the genuine signature, which shows that BISA can detect these attacks
effectively, even if the test coverage is not 100%. Once more test patterns are applied,
a higher test coverage will enhance the BISA’s detection ability for attacks.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present a novel BISA structure to address IC trust issues due to
untrusted GDSII developers and foundries. BISA will fill in all unused spaces in an
IC to prevent or hamper the Trojan insertion process after layout design is complete,
by leaving no space for Trojan gates. BISA cells are inserted in the unused space and
connected to form a functional circuit. We have applied BISA on different designs from
diverse benchmark suites. Different types of attacks can be detected by low-cost logic
self-test in the BISA, which ensures that BISA’s result is trustworthy. By comparing
signatures, a designer would know whether a chip has been tampered with or not, as
demonstrated by the implementations of various benchmarks.
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Table 5.8: Potential attacks.
Case Type Attack Description Signature
0 Genuine None 0712022D
1 Removal Remove a leaf cell 0DA8936E
2 Removal Remove an internal cell 157F4929
3 Removal Remove a leaf cell 0ED740FC
4 Removal Remove an internal cell D5E2706E
5 Removal Remove an internal cell 43D51D83
1 Change
Change a leaf cell
F2308684
OR3X1 to AND3X1
2 Change
Change an internal cell
157F4929
AOI222X1 to OAI222X1
3 Change
Change a root cell
F39C3B1E
AOI222X1 to OAI222X1
4 Change
Change a leaf cell
157F4929
AND3X1 to NAND2X1
5 Change
Change an internal cell
0B17041F
NAND4X1 to NAND3X1
Chapter 6
Design-for-Security Methodology: Obfuscated Built-In
Self-Authentication via Split Manufacturing
The threats of reverse-engineering, IP piracy, and hardware Trojan insertion in the
semiconductor supply chain are greater today than ever before. Split manufacturing
has emerged as a viable approach to protect integrated circuits (ICs) fabricated in
untrusted foundries, but has high cost and/or high performance overhead. Furthermore,
split manufacturing cannot fully prevent untargeted hardware Trojan insertions. In
this paper, we propose to insert additional functional circuitry called obfuscated built-
in self-authentication (OBISA) in the chip layout with split manufacturing process, in
order to prevent reverse-engineering and further prevent hardware Trojan insertion.
Self-tests are performed to authenticate the trustworthiness of the OBISA circuitry.
The OBISA circuit is connected to original design in order to increase the strength of
obfuscation, thereby allowing a higher layer split and lower overall cost. Additional fan-
outs are created in OBISA circuitry to improve obfuscation without losing testability.
Our proposed gating mechanism and net selection method can ensure negligible overhead
in terms of area, timing, and dynamic power. Experimental results demonstrate the
effectiveness of the proposed technique in several benchmark circuits.
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6.1 Introduction
Split manufacturing, or split fabrication (used interchangeably in this paper), has been
proposed recently as an approach to enable use of state-of-the-art semiconductor foundries
while minimizing the risks to IP [107]. Split manufacturing divides a design into Front
End of Line (FEOL) and Back End of Line (BEOL) portions for fabrication by different
foundries. An untrusted foundry performs (higher cost) FEOL manufacturing, then
ships wafers to a trusted foundry for (lower cost) BEOL fabrication.
Two types of split manufacturing have been proposed in prior work: 2D inte-
gration and 3D integration based split fabrication. [108] first proposed the use of 3D
integration of two tiers (the computation plane and the control plane) manufactured in
separate foundries to ensure the performance of the computation plane and the security
of the control plane. One tier is stacked on the top of another tier and conventional 3D
stacked integration techniques are required to merge two tiers with vertical intercon-
nections called through-silicon-vias (TSVs). Unfortunately, the semiconductor industry
has not adopted 3D ICs as quickly as many in the industry expected. Given the bar-
riers to 3D, 2D and 2.5D based split manufacturing are discussed more, such as those
in [109–112,114]. [115] developed a technique that makes FEOL and BEOL fabricated
separately in different foundries and can make connections between them with wafer-
bonding at a fine enough pitch similar to TSVs. [109,110] demonstrated the feasibility
of split fabrication after metal 1 (M1) on test chips and evaluated the chip performance.
Although the split after M1 attempts to hide all inter-cell interconnections and can ob-
fuscate the design effectively, it leads to high manufacturing costs. [111,112] employed
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another integration approach. The back-end layers can be manufactured directly on top
of the front-end layers with mask alignment techniques in a trusted foundry, which was
studied on an FPGA chip fabricated in a split manufacturing process [112]. Finally,
[113] presents a k-security metric to select wires to be lifted to a trusted tier (BEOL)
to ensure the security when split at a higher layer. However, lifting a large number of
wires in the original design will introduce large timing(≥73%) and power(≥54%) over-
head and significantly impact chip performance [113], since delay and power are strong
functions of wire length. In addition, though k similar elements can be created by lifting
sufficient wires, it cannot prevent adversaries from tampering all these similar elements
with untargeted Trojans.
In this chapter, we propose a new design methodology that can effectively pre-
vent reverse engineering of the chip functionality and further prevent hardware Trojan
insertion with split fabrication process. Our technique allows FEOL and BEOL to
be separated at higher layers (≥ M4) to reduce cost. In order to enhance effective-
ness of obfuscation, all unused spaces in layout will be filled with additional functional
cells or circuitry called obfuscated built-in self-authentication (OBISA) instead of non-
functional filler cells during layout design [116]. If any of the OBISA cells are replaced
by a Trojan cell during FEOL, OBISA will be able to detect the modification. We pro-
pose to make connections between OBISA added into unused spaces and the original
circuit, especially in its critical parts that are to be protected. The OBISA circuit not
only makes it extremely difficult for adversary to identify the original design, but also
thwarts hardware Trojan insertion by filling unused spaces in layout. In addition, sev-
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eral design-for-security methods are proposed to minimize timing and power overhead
introduced by OBISA circuit while maintaining a high test coverage for OBISA.
6.2 Low-layer Split vs. High-layer Split
6.2.1 Cost Issues
Reverse engineering requires analysis of local standard-cell types and their intercon-
nections in order to identify structures or some targeted logics within a circuit. Split
fabrication can prevent reverse-engineering the complete design or macro in a layout
design by hiding a portion of wires. However, an adversary still could identify some
sub-circuits, such as adder, decoder, cryptographic logic, etc., based on FEOL mask-
layer information. The strength of obfuscation depends on the split layer, i.e., the layer
that ends at the FEOL, since it determines how much layout information will be ex-
posed to untrusted foundries. Figure 6.1 (a) shows a cross-section of a 14nm Intel chip
[117]. A high-layer split leaks more interconnections while low-layer split leaks much
less. Split after M1 provides exceptional circuit obfuscation, because adversaries at un-
trusted foundry only see unconnected gates in layout and no inter-cell connections at all
[109] [110]. However, such a low-layer split also brings challenges in split manufacturing
process.
First, high metal layers are thicker and have a larger pitch than low metal layers,
as shown in Figure 6.1 (a) and (b). Table 6.1 shows the pitches of different metal
layers for a 45nm technology [114] [93]. The integration process of FEOL and BEOL
wafers requires precise alignment using either electrical, mechanical, or optical alignment
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(a) Intel’s 14nm Chip [117] (b) Metal layers and vias
Fig. 6.1: A cross-section of an IC.
techniques. A via requires a certain amount of space surrounding in order to satisfy
design rules. If alignment is not perfect, the misalignment defects could influence circuit
performance or even produce malfunction. However, the tolerance for misalignment
improves greatly if the split occurs at higher layers. Unfortunately, misalignment has
a higher probability to occur in split fabrication due to different process technologies
or facilities at two different foundries (FEOL and BEOL), the yield for low-layer split
could be relatively low.
Table 6.1: Pitch length of different metal layers in 45nm CMOS technology
Layer Poly M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9
Pitch(nm) 125 130 140 140 280 280 280 800 800 1600
Second, higher layer split leads to fewer and less dense connections between the
trusted and untrusted tiers, and can mitigate the challenges of alignment for a large
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number of connections. Therefore, high-layer splits would reduce complexity of inte-
grating FEOL and BEOL and result in a high integration yield.
Third, lower layer splits also requires a closer technology match between foundries.
One major reason for choosing split fabrication is that trusted foundry (BEOL) has less
advanced technology and cannot meet the specification for a particular design. A split
at a higher level can allow BEOL fabricated with older process technologies, making
split manufacturing more widely acceptable and further reducing its costs.
6.2.2 Security Issues
Split at a higher layer has many pros as described above, but it also results in significant
interconnections for circuit blocks information leakage. Although adversaries cannot
reverse engineer the entire design due to lack of connections in BEOL, it still provides
adversaries opportunities to identify some sub-circuits (such as adder, decoder, and
FSM) and tamper them with hardware Trojans [118]. [109] and [111] proposed to insert
additional “dummy” cells as spare cells for obfuscating the composition of a circuit, but
the inserted cells have no interconnections between themselves or between them and the
main design. Hence, they are easy to identify.
6.3 Split Fabrication with OBISA
6.3.1 Proposed Approach
Based on the previous techniques, there is a tradeoff between cost and security for split
manufacturing. However, our objective is to develop a methodology that allows high-
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layer splits, M3 or higher, while lowering the cost and at the same time providing a high
level of security. We propose to insert functional standard cells into unused spaces of
layout instead of filler cells or dummy cells. The inserted cells are connected together
to form a circuitry, called obfuscated built-in self-authentication (OBISA). Note that
this is different from the previously proposed built-in self-authentication (BISA) [75]
[76] for preventing Trojan insertion both from design and objective standpoints. As
shown in Figure 6.2 and 6.3, OBISA is connected to the original circuit it is trying
to protect, which makes it extremely difficult for adversaries at untrusted foundry to
separate the OBISA design from the original design. However, OBISA circuit would
result in dynamic power and timing overhead when the original circuit is operating.
Therefore, a gating mechanism and a net selection method are proposed to minimize
the negative impact on the original design. Additionally, we attempt to maintain a
high test coverage for OBISA circuit with tree-structure circuits as in [75] [76]. Its
built-in self-test (BIST) like structure can detect potential malicious modifications by
test patterns that target stuck-at faults. However, the tree-structure circuit and test
structure components could become a target for the adversary to identify them. In
this paper, an approach is presented that can create fan-outs to further obfuscate tree-
structure circuit in OBISA without impacting its original high test coverage. Moreover,
lifting critical wires to the trusted tier (BEOL) can prevent identifying the test structure
within OBISA.
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Fig. 6.2: (a) BISA structure and (b) the proposed OBISA structure for split manufac-
turing in this paper.
6.3.2 OBISA Structure
Figure 6.2(b) shows the structure of the proposed OBISA. It consists of a test pattern
generator (TPG), an output response analyzer (ORA) and OBISA blocks under test.
The entire OBISA circuit is implemented in unused spaces of the layout. In this paper,
we use a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) as TPG and multiple input shift reg-
ister (MISR) as ORA. They are used to generate random test patterns and compress
responses to generate a final signature, respectively [99].
Two operating modes are associated with the proposed technique. In functional
mode, the original circuit is operating normally, but clocks for BISA circuits are disabled
and LFSR and MISR are reset to their pre-defined state. A gating mechanism presented
in Section 6.4.3 will block signals from activating original circuits to OBISA circuit.
Therefore, OBISA circuit stays quiet and does not consume any dynamic power. In
addition, these idle OBISA cells can fulfill the role of decap cells [75] [76]. Note that
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OBISA circuitry will, however, consume leakage power. The other mode, authentication
mode, is used to authenticate a fabricated chip in the field. In this mode, LFSR generates
a random test pattern at every clock cycle and the test pattern is shared by all OBISA
blocks. At the same time, MISR collects responses from OBISA blocks and eventually
produces a signature, as shown in Figure 6.2(b). The test phase ends when a sufficient
number of test patterns have been applied. Since inputs to OBISA come from LFSR and
original circuits, thus test patterns for OBISA are generated depending on the LFSR
and the state of the original circuit. We can keep the state of original circuit and run a
large number of clock cycles on LFSR to test the inserted circuit as one iteration. In the
next iteration, we change state of the original circuit and perform the tests once again.
Test coverage will increase as more iterations are performed. Functional simulation at
the OBISA design phase could help us find an efficient combination of the circuit state
and the seed in the LFSR.
Note that clock is provided externally either in normal mode or in authentication
mode. Typically, authentication test clock is much slower than functional clock [99]. The
authentication clock frequency is dependent on the number of gates in an OBISA block
and the gate types. The timing constraint can be obtained using post-layout timing
analysis tool to find the longest path after OBISA inserted circuit. In the authentication
mode, a very slow test clock can be used to ensure no path fails in OBISA circuits.
6.3.3 Security Analysis
Split manufacturing obfuscates the design by preventing an untrusted foundry from
gaining a full view of the layout. Our proposed OBISA structure can improve obfusca-
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Fig. 6.3: Layout after OBISA insertion.
tion through the following features:
• Functional filler cells are inserted into unused spaces during layout design, as
shown in Figure 6.3. Original cells and additional OBISA cells are all standard
cells from the same technology library.
• Additional cells are connected together to construct combinational circuits. There
is no difference in routing between original circuits and inserted OBISA circuits.
While tree-structure circuit (no fan-out) is required for a BISA block in [75] [76]
in order to ensure a high test coverage, fan-out is allowed in this new OBISA
technique. An approach for fan-out creation in OBISA blocks is proposed in
Section 6.4.3.
• Interconnections between OBISA circuits and original circuits (obfuscation con-
nections) are allowed. The additional logics can further obfuscate the original
design, especially for the security-critical parts. For example, Figure 6.4(a) shows
a design. Split fabrication can hide some wires in FEOL, but some sub-circuits
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Fig. 6.4: Circuit graphs: OBISA circuit is used to obfuscate the original design.
(cell 3, 4, 5 and 6) could be identified. In Figure 6.4(c), the proposed technique
can add OBISA cells to protect this sub-circuit from reverse-engineering.
• The inserted OBISA includes LFSR and MISR. We understand that LFSR and
MISR have a unique structure and are controlled by mode select port, so they
could be a target by an adversary to identify the additional OBISA circuit. Split
manufacturing can hide critical wires in LFSR and MISR and effectively obfuscate
LFSR and MISR.
• Additional local/global connections and various gates introduced by OBISA cir-
cuits can hinder neighbor connectedness analysis and standard-cell composition
bias analysis [111]. OBISA blocks have not only local connections to connect cells
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nearby, but also long connections to other OBISA blocks, LFSR and MISR. A
measure of spatial connectedness will be influenced by OBISA circuits. Similarly,
additional cells with different types can change the types and proportions of cells
of design presented in a small region in layout. OBISA cells can obfuscate the cell
composition analysis.
• The proximity attack is based on the heuristic that floorplanning and placement
(F&P) tools place the partitions close by and orient the partitions so as to reduce
the wiring (delay) between the pins to be connected. [114] shows that the proximity
attack could be a threat of connecting the missing nets correctly. However, OBISA
circuit is able to produce additional tier-to-tier connections which can mitigate the
threats of proximity attacks.
6.4 Implementation Strategy
6.4.1 Implementation Flow
Figure 6.5 presents our proposed OBISA implementation flow. The flow fits within
the conventional ASIC design flow and is computable with current commercial physical
design tools. OBISA insertion procedure begins after clock tree synthesis. At that point,
the whole original circuit has been placed and no more cells will be added in conventional
flow (the most left column in Figure 6.5). The unused spaces would be identified in DEF
file and various standard cells are inserted depending on size of each unused space. More
information regarding OBISA cell insertion will be described in Section 6.4.2. Once all
unused spaces are filled with OBISA cells, we will begin to connect all OBISA cells in
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a region to construct a number of tree-structure combinational circuits (referred to as
OBISA blocks). These steps as shown in the middle column were developed in [75] [76].
The steps in the third column are proposed to strengthen obfuscation, including fanout
creation in tree-structure OBISA blocks, adding obfuscation connections, and lifting
secure-critical paths within OBISA. Detailed connection strategies for each of them will
be presented in Section 6.4.3. After the OBISA process, the flow resumes the procedure
in conventional design flow. The physical design tool will perform routing for the entire
design including original circuit and OBISA circuit. All constraints for the original
design can be taken care of by the physical design tool during routing process. Once
the timing and sign-off of the design are successful, the last step involves the generation
of a GDSII format of the design for final tape-out.
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Unused Space 
Identification
OBISA Cell 
Placement
OBISA Cell 
Connection
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Obfuscation 
Connection
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Fig. 6.5: The OBISA implementation flow.
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6.4.2 OBISA Cell Insertion Strategy
Several filling algorithms are proposed to fill every unused space as much as possible and
no more cells could be added without changing the layout [75] [76]. Cells with different
types and sizes are inserted to ensure a variety of OBISA cells due to the following
reasons:
• A greater variety of OBISA cells can effectively thwart the cell composition anal-
ysis [111]. This is analogous to “dummy” cells in prior work.
• Our OBISA also supports either pre-mask or post-mask Engineering Change Order
(ECO). Unused spaces are filled with a variety of standard cells and all these cells
can be treated as spare logic gates. When an OBISA cell is selected for ECO, a
few modifications are needed to bypass this cell in OBISA block. Since OBISA
circuits do not have a certain timing constraint, routing for OBISA could be very
flexible.
6.4.3 OBISA Cell Connection Strategy
The OBISA structure allows adding fan-out and obfuscation connections. There are two
points we focus on: testability of the OBISA circuit and effect on obfuscation strength.
Our connection strategies are presented as follows:
Preprocessing
Two pieces of information are required to collect for each net in OBISA blocks: idle
state (IS) and related inputs (RI) in LFSR. As we described earlier, OBISA circuits
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Fig. 6.6: Additional connections for improving obfuscation.
are working in authentication mode only, so LFSR will be set to a specific state if the
chip is in the other mode. We propose to set the state of LFSR to a vector that has
alternative ‘1’ and ‘0’ to avoid biasing values in OBISA circuit. If an input is connected
to the original design because of the obfuscation connection, its IS is undetermined
(‘X’). Therefore, the IS for each net can be ‘1’, ‘0’, or ‘X’, based on input values and
their interconnections. IS can determine if a cell could be a gated cell (see Section
6.4.3). Another required information is the RI for each net. Taking the OBISA circuit
in Figure 6.6(a) for example, the RI for the net N7 are A2 (N2) and A3 (N3), because
nets N2 and N3 determine the value on net N7, while the related inputs for net N5 are
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A1, A2, and A3. Information regarding RI can help us decide how to create fan-out
without losing any test coverage (more in Section 6.4.3). In this paper, we use a symbol,
[x, {A,B,C}], to represent IS (x) and RI (A,B,C) of a net. One can see the IS and RI
for the nets in OBISA circuits are labeled in Figure 6.6.
Fan-out Creation
Adding fan-out could potentially produce redundant gates and thereby lower controlla-
bility of gates. Fan-outs can be created by following the rules:
• The fan-out is created between a net in one block i and an input pin of another
block j (i 6= j).
• The net in one block i and the root output in block j have no common RIs.
If these two conditions are satisfied, the net and the input pin can be a candidate
pair for a fan-out. During the fan-out creation, the original connection on the input pin
in block j from LFSR should be removed, so the pin is available for the new fan-out
connection. These two tree-structure OBISA blocks i and j share a sub-tree circuit so
that they are still tree-structure blocks in nature. Therefore, the added fan-out will not
result in any extra redundant gates in OBISA blocks. Each net is still controllable, so
a high test coverage of OBISA circuit will be achieved. Figure 6.6(a) shows an example
of the fan-out creation. The net N14 in OBISA block i has completely different RI from
the root output N10 in OBISA block j, so N14 can have a fan-out to connect any input
in OBISA block j. In Figure 6.6(a), the pin for the net N7 is selected. Note that a
fan-out cannot be made on the net N13, because the net N13 and N10 have shared RIs,
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A1 and A2.
Gated Cells
For logic gates, the dominant value on one input can result in a deterministic output
regardless of logic values on other inputs, so those gates are gated by their dominant
values. For example, ‘1’ and ‘0’ are used to gate OR and AND cells, respectively. We
will take advantage of this for preventing dynamic power consumption within OBISA
circuitry. An obfuscation connection must connect to a gated cell in OBISA circuit.
For a gated cell that acts as an interface, at least one input’s IS should be its dominant
value during the normal operation. Other inputs of the gated cell can connect any net
in the original circuit. In order to minimize modifications caused by the obfuscation
connections, we prefer to choose a leaf cell for gated cell, because its input connections
from LFSR can be removed without changing existing OBISA blocks. In Figure 6.6(b),
cells BC1 and BC2 are both gated in idle state. BC1 is selected since it is a leaf cell in
the tree-structure OBISA block. All gated cells will be identified at this step, and they
could be selected for obfuscation connections, as described in the next subsection.
Obfuscation Connection
Obfuscation connection also introduces additional interconnections between OBISA cir-
cuits and original circuits. Figure 6.6(b) shows an example of an obfuscation connection.
It will cause inevitable increased capacitance on connected nets. Although we do not
worry about the timing in OBISA circuits because of the slower frequency used dur-
ing the authentication for OBISA, the added capacitance could potentially fail paths
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in the original design. Thus, we must select connection nets very carefully to avoid
timing violations. Here, we propose an approach to select nets in the original circuit for
obfuscation connection based on delay estimation by the static timing analysis (STA)
tool.
• We define a parameter C0, which is a threshold for dividing paths into critical
paths and non-critical paths, as shown in Figure 6.7.
• Given the C0, the STA is able to find all critical paths in original design. All nets
on critical paths will be excluded from obfuscation connection. All remaining nets
will be assigned a virtual path delay C0. We call it virtual path delay, because it
is not a real delay. Many non-critical paths have much smaller delay than C0, but
we treat them as the same length to simplify the problem.
• Another parameter C1 is defined as a threshold to select net for obfuscation con-
nection. The C1 should be smaller than functional clock period C2. The difference
of C1 and C2 is a safe margin that ensures no timing violation is produced due to
our rough estimation.
• If an obfuscation connection is made on a net, its virtual path delay will add an
increased delay D. The increased value D will vary depending on the technology
libraries. It can be estimated by averaging some samples in simulations. A large
enough safe margin (C2 − C1) can tolerate such a rough calculation.
• A net can be considered for an obfuscation connection if its virtual path delay
plus D is still smaller than the threshold value C1. For example, in Figure 6.7,
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Fig. 6.7: Net selection for obfuscation connection.
path P0s added D is still smaller than C1. In the example of Figure 6.6(b), the
net N4 is selected for the obfuscation connection at this step.
• If there is an available gated cell nearby (BC1 in Figure 6.6(b)), an obfuscation
connection can be made from the net (N4) in original design to one input (N14)
of the gated cell.
• The increased capacitance not only influences one net, but also affects all nets on
paths that pass this net. Therefore, the virtual delay of these relevent nets will be
updated by adding D. For the circuit in Figure 6.6(b), the net N1, N2, N3, N5,
and N10 need to be updated. For the net in Figure 6.7, there are two obfuscation
connections that push its virtual delay from P0 to P2.
The value of increased delay D depends on the length of added wire. [38] shows
that adding a short connection can bring about 30ps increased delay with 90nm tech-
nology. Since the obfuscation connection is made between nets not far away from each
other, the increased delay D will not be very large. We can obtain a conservative D
value in simulations.
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Hide LFSR/MISR with Lifted Wires
Since there is one primary input that selects either function mode or test mode, an ad-
versary could trace from this port to identify LFSR/MISR and further find OBISA cells.
In order to avoid this threat, the mode select net, the feedback nets in LFSR/MISR,
and some nets connecting flip-flops in LFSR/MISR should be lifted to trust tier, so
attackers cannot have any opportunity to identify them.
6.5 Experimental Results
6.5.1 OBISA Implementation
The OBISA technique was evaluated using Opencore benchmark circuits. Each cir-
cuit was synthesized with 90nm CMOS technology using Synopsys Design Compiler.
Physical design, including floorplanning, placement, and routing, were conducted using
Synopsys IC Compiler. Scripts were developed to analyze unused spaces in layout, insert
OBISA cells, and connect them using our proposed methodologies, including fan-outs
and obfuscation connections.
Table 6.2 shows the implementation results of five Opencore benchmark circuits
with various scales. The number of OBISA cells for each circuit is listed in the third row
of the table. Those OBISA cells do not introduce any area overhead because they are
placed in the unused spaces in layout. Fan-outs and obfuscation connections are created
between OBISA blocks to obfuscate their tree structures and increase the difficulty for
adversaries to identify them in layout. An average 5% of nets go through trusted tier
that is above M3 layer, as shown in the seventh row of the table. However, a small
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number of obfuscation connections are sufficient to make the inserted OBISA circuits
look like a part of original design, to enhance obfuscation in FEOL. Since the test
vector from LFSR has alternative ‘1’ and ‘0’, almost all leaf cells could be a gated cell.
In our implementations, we use percentage to quantify how many inputs are altered for
obfuscation connection in an OBISA circuit. Table 6.2 shows results with around 5%
obfuscation connections (OCs). Thus, for an OBISA block with 80 inputs, there are 4
inputs connected to original circuit as obfuscation connections. Since all the OCs are
made on short paths in the original circuit, no timing violations are introduced by OCs.
Table 6.2: Implementation results on different benchmark circuits.
Benchmark DES3 USB AES Ethernet DES perf
Total Cell # 1,559 6,445 26,447 29,153 49,517
OBISA Cell # 158 439 2,950 1,169 2,090
OBISA Cell Pct (%) 10.1% 5.8% 11.1% 4% 4%
Total Net # 1,799 7,709 28,505 29,981 49,951
Secure Net # (≥M4) 137 306 2,138 705 1,353
Secure Net Pct (%) 7.6% 4% 9.5% 2.4% 2.7%
Fan-out # 30 52 134 84 106
5% OC # 15 40 256 106 189
6.5.2 Authentication Test Coverage Analysis
The authentication test coverage is a metric to assess the security level of the circuit.
A higher stuck-at test coverage for OBISA circuits indicates that more OBISA cells
could be verified by structural test patterns. The target coverage is 100%. According
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to our proposed flow in Section 6.4.1, all inserted OBISA cells will be connected in
a tree-structure manner first. Then fan-outs and obfuscation connections are added
based on the existed OBISA blocks. We take the OBISA circuitry in the Ethernet
benchmark circuit as a running example to compare the test coverage across different
test patterns in five scenarios: only tree-structure OBISA blocks, OBISA blocks with fan-
out, BISA blocks with fan-out and three different proportions (5%, 15%, and 25%) of
obfuscation connections. For each scenario, four kinds of test patterns, 50,000, 100,000,
10,000 random patterns with different iterations, and ATPG (automatic test pattern
generation) patterns, are applied to the OBISA circuits separately, and the results are
shown in Figure 6.8. From the two left columns, we can see tree-structure OBISA circuit
with and without fan-outs have the same test coverage using either random patterns or
ATPG patterns. It demonstrates that the proposed fan-out creation method will not
affect test coverage. The ATPG patterns can achieve almost 100% test coverage. For
the random patterns from LFSR, the test coverage goes up as more patterns are applied.
Their test coverage for 50,000 and 100,000 random patterns are 99.81% and 99.97%,
respectively. The remaining three columns illustrate that test coverage will be impacted
by obfuscation connections. This is because signals on obfuscation connections are tied
to a constant value in one iteration and thus result in the controllability loss of gated
cells. The last column shows an extreme scenario that 25% of inputs in OBISA blocks are
connected to original design. The test coverage within 1-iteration are not high enough
for the authentication test. However, as we described in Section 6.3.2, if we change
the status of original circuits with multiple iterations, i.e. the values on obfuscation
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connections could change, the controllability of gated cells can be compensated to some
degree depending on how many iterations can perform. Results in Figure 6.8 show that
multiple iteration offers much better test coverage than the 1-iteration with the same
number of test patterns, while using 10-iteration test leads to a higher test coverage
than that with 5-iteration tests. The test coverage can improve further if more random
patterns are applied or more iterations are performed.
Fig. 6.8: Authentication test coverage for an OBISA circuit.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present a low-cost and secure OBISA technique. Split fabrication and
OBISA circuit can effectively protect layout design from reverse engineering, IP piracy,
and tampering. The OBISA technique fills unused spaces in layout with functional
circuitry while it is also connected to the original design, in order to make the FEOL
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extremely difficult for an untrusted foundry to identify the added cells. The dynamic
power and timing overhead is small because of net selection and gated cell selection for
the obfuscation connections. The OBISA circuit can be tested in the field for hardware
Trojan detection. A fan-out creation approach is proposed to obfuscate OBISA blocks
further and will not affect its original high test coverage.
Chapter 7
Security Primitive Enhancement: Bit Selection Algorithm Suitable for
High-Volume Production of SRAM-PUF
With the rapid development of information technology, electronic devices (smart phone,
GPS, etc.) are playing a larger role in our daily lives. Physical Unclonable Functions
(PUFs) have been proposed as a more secure alternative to conventional ID storage
because of their unclonability and built-in tamper evidence [28]. These different PUFs
have various pros and cons, but among them, SRAM PUFs [119] [120] [121] [122] are
quite popular for several reasons: (i) SRAM is a standard component available in many
technology nodes; (ii) SRAM is already utilized in many systems as a volatile memory
so designers do not need to add more dedicated hardware for the PUF; (iii) Typical
SRAMs have large amount of space and can easily provide sufficient PUF outputs to
generate ID/keys long enough for devices produced at high-volume.
Despite its advantages, however, the stability of SRAM PUF output is heavily
impacted by environmental variations and aging effects. To ensure the reliability of the
SRAM PUF response, the output needs to either be error corrected in post-processing
or analyzed in such a way that only stable cells are used [123]. ECC uses special-
ized encoding and decoding processes to ameliorate data instability. However, such
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processes create considerable overhead for implementation. For example, [133] shows
ECC requires additional ∼ 87k gates for 128-bit reliable key. In addition, ECC leaks
information and results in high design costs that ultimately limit the use of PUFs in
resource-constrained products. To reduce the overheads, an alternative is to reduce
sensitivity to temporal variations. For instance, a reliability enhancement [121] was
developed to reinforce the preferred value of SRAM cell by inducing accelerated aging.
But performing burn-in stress for 120 hours for one SRAM PUF is prohibitively ex-
pensive, time-consuming, and in turn degrades the SRAM. Another proposed approach
modifies the VDD ramp-up time to make cells more reliable [120], but this approach
requires special circuitry not present in standard SRAM.
In this chapter, we take a new approach that selects the most stable bits for PUF
IDs/keys with the goal of reducing or possibly removing the need for ECC altogether. A
random approach might use exhaustive testing at all environmental conditions/corners
and after aging to choose the bits that are stable, but this is ill-suited for mass-produced
devices where test time and cost are major concerns [131]. We make the following
contributions in this Chapter:
• We conduct preliminary experiments to gather large amounts of real data from an
SRAM. We analyze the impact of environmental variations, temporal variations
(aging by burn-in), and spatial correlation (neighborhood analysis) on the stability
of PUF bits. Our neighborhood analysis reveals that the most stable bits from
enrollment depend on the stability of their neighbors, i.e. those surrounded by
other stable bits flip less over time.
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• Based on our observations, we develop low-cost enrollment tests that only require
two corner conditions (high-temperature low-voltage and low-temperature low-
voltage) and no burn-in tests. It is more efficient for stable cell selection and is
relatively low-cost comparing to exhaustive tests at all conditions.
• We compare the uniqueness, reliability, etc. of our PUF IDs/keys for fresh and
aged SRAM chips with IDs/keys from typical approaches. Our results show that
our IDs have less bit errors over time, thereby requiring much less ECC overheads.
7.1 Background and Preliminaries
7.1.1 A Typical Protocol for Systems with Intrinsic SRAM PUFs
Figure 1 illustrates a typical authentication protocol for devices with SRAM PUF. The
protocol consists of two phases: (a) enrollment and (b) reconstruction [124]. An SRAM
chip is integrated in the device (on-board or in package). Before the device is delivered
to market, the device is “enrolled”. Specifically, the SRAM PUF output (or a portion
of it) is read by the system owner and then stored in a database. If only a portion of it
is stored, then the database will also store the SRAM addresses corresponding to that
portion.
In the reconstruction phase, the device starts the protocol by sending its static ID
(publicly available) to the database. The database then searches for the corresponding
challenges (addresses) associated with the static ID and sends them back to the device.
The device collects the SRAM outputs (which may be noisy) and sends them to the
database for authentication/identification. The database compares them with the gen-
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uine output stored in its database. Compared to the conventional approaches that use
bar-codes or embedded IDs/keys into a device, the PUF approach is much more secure
[28] [129] [130]. As long as each PUF generates a unique ID/key, each device will be
authenticated properly.
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Fig. 7.1: SRAM PUF (a) enrollment and (b) reconstruction
7.1.2 Operation and Salient Features of SRAM PUF
For a standard six-transistor SRAM, every memory cell is composed of six transistors
that are two cross-coupled CMOS inverters and two access transistors [94]. Each of the
inverters drives one of the two state nodes, labeled “A” and “B” in Figure 7.2. When
the circuit is unpowered, both state nodes are discharged low (AB=00). When power
is applied, this unstable state will transition to one of the two stable states, either “0”
(AB=01) or “1” (AB=10); the AB=11 state is unstable and unreachable [119]. The
tendency to transition to one state or the other depends on the threshold voltages of
transistors and noise. Those two transistors are designed to be symmetric, match in
size, etc., but random variations incurred during manufacturing will result in random
mismatches. SRAM PUFs exploit the parameter mismatch which results in each SRAM
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cell being biased (or skewed) toward a zero or one at power-up. It has been observed
that certain cells have a strong “preference” to power-up to a ‘1’ or ‘0’ state. Cells that
have no “preference” are deemed neutral and power-up at random depending upon the
influences of environmental noise [132]. The more useful cells for PUF output are the
ones that strongly prefer ‘0’ or ‘1’.
Fig. 7.2: A Six-transistor SRAM cell with relevant process variation and noise.
In addition to process variations, the power-up value can also be influenced by
temporal variations, such as voltage supply variation, operating temperature, aging
effects (such as negative bias temperature instability (NBTI) and hot-carrier injection
(HCI)), etc. The temporal variations can cause cells to start-up in a different state,
causing the ID generated by the SRAM PUF to change over time. For illustrative
purposes, both process variation and noise are considered as impacting the skew of a
cell. The skew of a cell is a continuous quantity used to represent the power-up tendency
of that cell. Skew at a given power-up is influenced by noise, so the skew of each cell
across many power-ups can be described by a probability distribution function, as shown
in Figure 7.3.
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Fig. 7.3: The influence of process variation and noise on cell’s skew.
Ideally, the SRAM PUF output would be stable and unique if only process varia-
tion exists. However, in reality, the ID/keys will change over time because of temporal
noise and aging degradation over time. Therefore, if the magnitude of process variation
of one cell is large enough to safely offset temporal noise, this cell would be able to
produce a reliable power-up value despite environmental noise and even degradation
due to aging, like the fully-skewed cell shown in Figure 7.3. Since SRAM has a large
number of memory cells to use as PUF, there exist sufficient fully-biased cells (large
process variation) that could potentially produce a very stable key bit. Our objective
then becomes development of techniques that are low-cost in terms of design and test
overhead for identifying the most stable SRAM PUF bits.
7.2 Preliminary Experimentation and Observations
In this section, we will explore the impact of supply voltage, ambient temperature
and aging effects on power-up values (i.e., reliability of the ID/key) using real SRAM
measurements. We also analyze the dependence of location on the stability of SRAM
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cell power-up values. From the observations we make from this data, we will develop
low-cost techniques in latter sections for choosing the most stable bits for PUF ID/key.
Experiments are performed on a Xilinx Spartan-3 FPGA board with a 1MB on-
board ISSI SRAM. Here, we focus on 6KB of the SRAM, because a small portion of
SRAM can provide enough bits to construct a PUF. Additionally, since every SRAM
cell is designed to be completely identical, the characteristics of a portion of SRAM cells
can be extended to other memory cells in this SRAM as well as others.
7.2.1 Stability Under Power Voltage Variation
First, the PUF output is collected under supply voltage variations. Since the operation
voltage range of the on-board SRAM is ±10% of the nominal voltage 3.3 volt, many
measurements are taken at different core voltages from 3.0v to 3.6v. In order to illustrate
the changes of power-up values under voltage variations, 20 measurements at low voltage
(3.0v) and high voltage (3.6v) are taken (10 from each voltage). For every memory cell,
the frequency of producing a ‘1’ is calculated based on 10 measurements at the same
voltage. A frequency of 1 (0) indicates these cells are producing stable ‘1’ (‘0’) in all
ten measurements, while other values between 0 and 1 indicate that cells produce some
ones and some zeroes in the 10 measurements (i.e., were not stable). Then, we analyzed
the change of distribution of cell skew as voltage varied from low to high.
Table 7.1 depicts the distribution. The first row (column) in Table 7.1 indicate the
frequency of producing ‘1’ at high (low) voltage. The fractions in the table represent the
percentage of the cells that have a particular combination of frequencies producing ‘1’
at low and high voltages. For example, the number in the fourth row and third column
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says that about 0.31% cells produced a ‘1’ at HV and LV with frequencies between
0-0.2 and 0.4-0.6 respectively. The table shows that 66.40% (34.06% + 32.34%) of cells
generate either a stable ‘0’ or ‘1’ across the measurements. The top right and bottom
left elements in Table 7.1 are both 0 which indicates that none of the bits that were
stable ‘0’ (‘1’) at HV became stable one (zero) at LV and vice versa.
Table 7.1: Distribution of cell skew at high and low voltages.
LV/HV 0 0∼0.2 0.2∼0.4 0.4∼0.6 0.6∼0.8 0.8∼1.0 1
0 34.06 2.57 0.17 0.02 0 0 0
0∼0.2 1.96 3.93 1.49 0.27 0.04 0.01 0
0.2∼0.4 0.16 1.36 2.09 1.15 0.29 0.01 0.01
0.4∼0.6 0.01 0.31 1.12 1.79 1.08 0.17 0.04
0.6∼0.8 0 0.05 0.30 1.37 2.68 0.90 0.50
0.8∼1.0 0 0 0.03 0.21 1.52 0.41 1.42
1 0 0 0 0.03 0.65 2.46 32.34
7.2.2 Stability Under Temperature Variation
Similar experiments were conducted by sweeping temperature from 0◦C to 80◦C using
our Themostream system. We use the same approach as above to analyze the distribu-
tion changes introduced by temperature variations (see Table 7.2). Our data indicates
that 60.33% (30.79%+29.54%) of cells are stable regardless of temperature, and 14.06%
of memory cells change to the opposite skew state due to temperature change. Among
them, 4.79% (2.24%+2.55%) memory cells change from stable zero to stable one or sta-
ble one to stable zero). Our experiments demonstrate that temperature variations have
much greater impact on bit stability than supply voltage variations for SRAM PUF.
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Table 7.2: Distribution of cell skew across temperature.
LT/HT 0 0∼0.2 0.2∼0.4 0.4∼0.6 0.6∼0.8 0.8∼1.0 1
0 30.79 1.12 0.65 0.47 0.55 0.39 2.24
0∼0.2 4.22 0.53 0.36 0.28 0.35 0.23 2.03
0.2∼0.4 2.30 0.29 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.15 1.56
0.4∼0.6 1.77 0.30 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.20 1.75
0.6∼0.8 2.06 0.34 0.22 0.23 0.27 0.27 2.43
0.8∼1.0 1.46 0.34 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.19 2.43
1 2.55 0.67 0.55 0.59 0.81 0.80 29.54
7.2.3 Stability Under Aging Effects
In this section, we look at the stability of cells as the SRAM ages. To accelerate the
aging, we perform burn-in of the SRAM using Thermostream burn-in system. Specif-
ically, we execute write ‘0’, write ‘1’ ,and read operations alternately to/from every
memory cell under high temperature (80◦C) and high power voltage (3.6) conditions.
In Table 7.3, we compare two measurements performed under nominal conditions (room
temperature + nominal voltage) on the fresh SRAM and the SRAM after 2 hours of
accelerated aging. Table 7.3 shows that 59.26% (29.82%+29.44%) of the bits are stable
and approximately 1.89% (0.88%+1.01%) of cells change from one stable state to the
opposite stable state because of aging effects.
7.2.4 Stability of Neighboring Cells
Prior work has shown that neighboring chips on the same wafer undergo similar pro-
cesses and correlate to each other. Hence, chips have the same fault-free (or conversely
faulty) properties as their neighbors in the same wafer [125]. The spatial correlation of
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Table 7.3: Distribution of cell skew for fresh and aged SRAM.
A/F 0 0∼0.2 0.2∼0.4 0.4∼0.6 0.6∼0.8 0.8∼1.0 1
0 29.82 2.14 0.84 0.63 0.62 0.38 0.88
0∼0.2 3.94 1.27 0.622 0.56 0.58 0.40 1.03
0.2∼0.4 1.80 0.72 0.50 0.40 0.47 0.35 1.08
0.4∼0.6 1.18 0.62 0.41 0.42 0.49 0.37 1.24
0.6∼0.8 1.08 0.66 0.47 0.49 0.64 0.51 2.05
0.8∼1.0 0.55 0.37 0.26 0.34 0.54 0.48 2.37
1 1.01 0.80 0.64 0.81 1.28 1.52 29.44
parameters among cells within a wafer has been investigated in [127] [128].
In this section, we investigate whether the same relationship holds for predicting
the reliability of SRAM cells for PUFs by performing the following test. We took
10 measurements at random environmental conditions for the entire SRAM. Based on
the output, we labeled the cells as “stable” if they produced the same value for all 10
measurements or as “unstable” otherwise. For each stable and unstable cell, we looked at
a 20 cell “window” around the cells (the 9 cells before and 9 cells after it) and counted the
number of unstable cells in the window. Figure 7.4 shows the distribution of the count
for stable and unstable cell cases fitted with Gaussian distributions. The distribution
for stable cells is closer to zero meaning they have less unstable bits surrounding them.
This test shows that the stability of each cell/bit is correlated with its neighborhood:
the more stable cells/bits in the neighborhood, the more stable/reliable the cell will be
as a PUF.
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Fig. 7.4: Stable neighbors provides better reliability than random selection.
7.3 Proposed Enrollment and Bit Selection Techniques
There are two primary observations we have obtained from Section 7.2: (i) temperature
variation can introduce more flipped bits than voltage variation and aging; (ii) the
power-up stability of a cell is related to its neighboring cells. We take advantage of
these characteristics to identify very reliable cells with a reduced set of enrollment tests
and a neighborhood-based bit selection.
7.3.1 Critical Test Conditions for Enrollment
Due to instability of power-up values under environment variations, we want to identify
stable cells and exclude two types of unstable cells, partial-skewed cells and neutral-
skewed cells. Partial-skewed cells are stable in most of power-up operations and have
a small possibility to flip. By changing environment condition to make the probability
distribution shift to neutral location, some partial-skewed cells will be much easier to
flip. Power voltage and temperature are two major environmental factors we can change
in the enrollment tests with relatively low cost. According to the experiment results in
Section 7.2, we know that temperature can contribute more to the change of cell’s skew.
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The impact of temperature on MOSFET devices is well studied in literature. An
increase in temperature decreases device threshold voltages:
Vth(T ) = Vth(T0)− κ∆T
Therefore, Vth has a linear relationship to temperature. Additionally, an increase in
temperature increases the magnitude of thermal noise as well [119]:
σ2NOISE(T ) =
2KBT
C
which could lead to more random power-up values. In order to let both 0-skew and
1-skew cells move closer to the neutral location, we select the maximum and mini-
mum temperatures. Moreover, low supply voltage leave a cell susceptible to noise-
induced state changes, while higher voltage makes a cell stable and immune to noise
[119]. Thus, for the PUF enrollment tests, high-temperature/low voltage (HTLV) and
low-temperature/low voltage (LTLV) are the best condition combination for low cost
enrollment tests, which can find unstable bits more efficiently. Additionally, for neutral-
skewed cells, the high and low temperature conditions can shift their neutral position
left and right, so the added environmental noises make them much easier to flip in
a small number of tests. Changing temperature during enrollment is a much slower
process than changing power supply voltage; thus using HTLV and LTLV makes the
enrollment process fast and low-cost. We will evaluate the effectiveness of using HTLV
and LTLV for enrollment in Section 7.4.
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7.3.2 Neighborhood-based Bit Selection
In this section, we propose a heuristic bit selection algorithm that takes the spatial
correlation we discovered in Section 7.2.4 into account. By doing so, we expect to
reduce the errors due to environmental and temporal noise (aging) in the SRAM PUF.
Since aging has not been covered by the above critical enrollment tests, this bit selection
is quite important.
The details of our algorithm are as follows. We develop a metric to assign value
(weight) to the stability of SRAM cells. Basically, we have observed that the cells that
are “most stable” across environmental conditions are surrounded by more stable cells
during enrollment. A stable cell surrounded by more stable cells has a tendency to
become more stable because its neighboring cells are likely to experience similar aging
stress and operating conditions. In our metric, we give such cells a higher weight. After
determining the weight of each cell, we use a heuristic algorithm that greedily chooses
cells for the PUF ID/key with weight greater than a threshold.
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Fig. 7.5: Weight assignment in the bit selection algorithm.
Since we do not know the physical locations of memory cells, the heuristic bit
selection algorithms have been proposed under the assumption that a cell is affected
by adjacent cells only (however, we expect better results if the physical 2D structure
is known, i.e. vertical and adjacent neighbors of each cell). Every word (16 bits) from
each memory address is concatenated in a line, as shown in Figure 7.5. The cells
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have been weighted based on the adjacent cells along the line. First, all stable and
unstable cells are marked as “stable” or “unstable” according to the enrollment tests,
as shown in Figure 7.5. Then all unstable cells are replaced with zeroes, and they will
not be selected as ID/key. Next, we focus on some stable blocks which are composed
of continuous stable cells. For example, a stable block with 2p− 1 cells, the middle cell
is weighted to p. Then, the closest two neighbors, one from each side, are weighted to
p− 1 and so on. Finally, the last two cells, from both sides are weighted to 1, because
one of its neighbors is unstable bit too. The pseudo-code of the bit selection algorithm
is shown as Algorithm 1. An array W (i) is used to record the weight of each bit in the
bit selection algorithm, and a k-bit ID/key will be generated in an array FinalCells.
Taking the 15th to 21st bits in Figure 7.5 as another example, in a stable block with
length of 7, the middle cell is weighted to 4 as that cell is surrounded by six stable cells,
three on each side. The other six cells are weighted according to distance to unstable
neighbor(s).
Our algorithm uses a threshold to choose the most stable bits for use as the PUF
ID/key. The higher the threshold, the larger number of stable cells a cell must have
to be selected for the ID/key. However, by increasing the threshold, the number of
qualified bits reduces exponentially. Hence, an appropriate threshold should be decided
based on key size, number of stable cells, neighborhood characteristics, etc. A lower
threshold is required for a higher-sized key from the same number of stable cells.
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Algorithm 2 Neighborhood-based Bit Selection
1: procedure BitSelection (M,T, k)
2: M ← Total number of bits
3: T ← Threshold
4: k ← A k-bit ID/key needs to be generated
5: for i = 1 to M do
6: if (The cell i is unstable during enrollment) then
7: W (i) = 0
8: else
9: Weighting the cell i
10: if (W (i) ≥ T ) then
11: The cell i is a qualified bit
12: end if
13: end if
14: end for
15: Q← Sort weight of qualified bits in descending order
16: FinalCells← Q[1 : k] First k bits are selected
17: return FinalCells[1...k]
18: end procedure
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7.4 Experimental Results and Discussion
7.4.1 Experiment Setup
In this section, our proposed approaches are evaluated on an experiment platform, the
Xilinx Spartan-3 FPGA board. Its 1MB on-board SRAM is explored as the SRAM
PUF. The whole platform is an intrinsic SRAM PUF system. The FPGA chip acts
a microcontroller, which reads the SRAM data and sends it to a PC via UART port.
A power supply and Themostream system are employed to adjust the power voltage
(±10%) and temperature (0◦C-80◦C) respectively. The experiment setup is shown in
Figure 7.6.
We collected 100 measurements of the entire SRAM memory for fresh and aged
SRAMs under different environment conditions: 20 at nominal conditions, 10 at each of
following conditions: low voltage (LV), high voltage (HV), low temperature (LT), high
temperature (HT), and four corner conditions (LTLV, LTHV, HTLV, and HTHV). Each
measurement has 1MB (8,388,608 bits) power-up values of the SRAM. Two phases of
accelerated aging sessions were performed on the same SRAM. Two phases of 5-hour
aging have been applied to the SRAM chip. After every burn-in, another 100 mea-
surements were performed from the aged SRAM at the same environmental conditions
mentioned above.
7.4.2 Effectiveness of Critical Enrollment Tests
In this section, we compare enrollment using the typical nominal conditions (case 1)
with our proposed approach from Section 7.3 that uses HTLV and LTLV conditions
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Fig. 7.6: Experiment setup.
(referred to as case 2). Note that case 1 would be the typical approach in prior work.
In both approaches, we determine stable bits as those that do not change for all the
corresponding enrollment measurements. Then we calculate how many of these bits
change at the other measurement conditions (those not used during enrollment).
The results are shown in Figure 7.7 where (a) and (b) correspond to case 1 and
2 respectively. From left to right, each new condition is applied resulting in more of
the original stable bits determined by enrollment flipping. In Figure 7.7(a), the original
stable bits reduce by about 19.43% as the key is constructed at corner conditions. In
Figure 7.7(b), our proposed approach does a better job of determining the stable bits by
focusing on measurements only at critical conditions. The percentage of flipped bits is
only 4.5%. By using the stable bits from enrollment using case 2, there will lesser need
to correct errors in the ID/key in the reconstruction phase with lesser tests. Therefore,
the above experiments illustrate that the choice of conditions used at PUF enrollment
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is quite significant and the proposed approach is more appropriate than the typical
approach.
(a) Case 1 (b) Case 2
Fig. 7.7: (a) Case 1: nominal conditions and (b) Case 2: corner conditions for the
enrollment tests.
7.4.3 Reliability of SRAM cells
In this experiment, we investigated the whole SRAM using critical condition tests for
enrollment as discussed in the previous section. From the reliable bits determined by
enrollment, we chose stable bits for analysis according to two approaches: (i) a naive ap-
proach that randomly selects the desired number of bits from stable bits obtained during
enrollment (called “random” in this chapter); (ii) the proposed bit selection approach
discussed in Section 7.3. For the proposed approach, we also varied the threshold to de-
termine its impact. 80 measurements from various environmental conditions (nominal,
HTLV, etc.) for each chip state (fresh and aged 10 hours) were used to determine which
approach produced fewer bit flips during reconstruction. We calculated the percentage
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of bits in the 1MB that changed from enrollment in each of the 80 measurements we
collected.
The distributions containing all 80 measurements are shown in Figure 7.8. Figure
7.8 (a) and (b) correspond to fresh and 10 hours aging respectively. The first, second,
and third columns in Figure 7.8 compare the distribution for threshold equal to 20 to
those with threshold equal to 1, 8, and 18. Note that threshold equal to 1 corresponds
to the random approach. Looking at the top left plot, one can see that the bit selec-
tion approach with threshold equal 20 has more occurrences of 100% than the random
approach. As we increase the threshold (more reliable neighbors required for selection
as key bit), the occurrences of 100% also tend to improve. For the fresh SRAM, the bit
selection algorithm with threshold of 20 has an improvement of 38% than the random
selection (Threshold=1). Note that there are some outliers (low values of percentage)
for threshold at 20, but these would probably be less significant if we gathered more
measurements. The trends clearly show that there is better stability with bit selection
and higher threshold values.
Examining the impact of aging (Figure 7.8 (b)), we see that the stability of the
keys are lower than the fresh chips. This is because the enrollment conditions do not
contain aging measurements. Without these measurements, we cannot determine which
bits will flip as the chip ages. Comparing the two algorithms (leftmost column of Figure
7.8), we can see that the percentage of stable measurements at or near 100% is still more
for the proposed bit selection algorithm than the random approach. The same trend of
improvement as we increase the threshold also still holds for the aged chips. Although
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the percentage of correct bit reconstruction goes down due to the aging effects, the
improvement of bit selection algorithm (at threshold equal 20) compared to the random
approach increases to 45%. To some degree, one also can say that the bit selection
algorithms compensate well for the lack of aging measurements used in enrollment. This
is important because it removes the need for burn-in tests which would have significant
costs and device reliability issues for high volume production.
7.4.4 Reliability and Uniqueness of PUF Key
In these experiments, we evaluate the reliability and uniqueness of keys generated by
the proposed bit selection algorithm. We divided the whole 1MB SRAM into 8 PUFs.
Each PUF has 128KB and used to generate a 128-bit key. This 128-bit key can uniquely
identify 3.4e38 devices, so it can apply to most current applications in the market. 20
critical condition tests (HTLV and LTLV) and 20 nominal condition tests were used for
enrollment. Another 80 measurements from various environmental conditions for each
chip state (fresh and aged 10 hours) were used to reconstruct the key. The proposed bit
selection approach and the random bit selection approach that was used in the previous
section are investigated and compared in this section.
Bit Error
To analyze the impact on error correction code (ECC) overheads, we also look at the
maximum number of bit flips in each of the 80 measurements for fresh and aged chips
for random and neighborhood-based bit selection (threshold equal 18). The number of
bits that flip will determine the number of bits we need to correct via ECC and thus is
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Table 7.4: Bit flips in the two bit selection methods.
Reconstruction Fresh
Enroll Error Bits 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
NC Random Selection 338 154 78 39 25 9 5 1 0 0
CC
Random Selection 550 82 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
Proposed Selection 559 72 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reconstruction 10 hours burn-in
Enroll Error Bits 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
NC Random Selection 118 214 148 91 39 13 11 5 1 2
CC
Random Selection 347 198 63 24 6 0 1 1 0 0
Proposed Selection 438 162 34 5 1 0 0 0 0 0
NC: Nominal condition enrollment tests; CC: Critical condition enrollment tests;
directly related to the ECC overheads. The results are shown in Table 7.4. Note that for
random selection, we consider two different enrollment conditions: nominal conditions
(NC) and corner conditions (CC).
Table 7.4 clearly shows that critical enrollment tests (CC) is more effective than
nominal condition tests (NC) for selecting stable bits in the enrollment phase. For the
fresh chip, NC case has up to 7 simultaneous bit errors. For critical enrollment tests,
the maximum number of error bits is 3 for both algorithms so there is improvement in
ECC overhead. For fresh chips, we also observe that the average number of errors is
also similar between random selection (CC case) and the bit selection algorithm. As
the chips age, however, the maximum number of error bits increases at a faster rate
for the random selection (CC case) compared to the bit selection algorithm. For 10
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hours burn-in, the maximum number of error bits is 9 for the random approach (NC
case), 7 for random approach (CC case) but only 4 for bit selection approach. There is
about a 22% and 55% decrease in bit flips for the proposed approaches compared to the
typical approach (random selection at NC). These improvements represent a nontrivial
decrease in overhead since the cost of ECC increases significantly with each bit error.
Uniqueness
The bit selection algorithm would be less useful if it resulted in lower uniqueness of
keys/IDs in the population. In this section, we calculated the PUF uniqueness for
the random (CC case) and bit selection techniques based on the Hamming distance
(HD) between the IDs of different PUFs. For the bit selection, different thresholds are
investigated as well (specifically 5, 8, and 12). The occurrence rate of each of 2016
(
(
64
2
)
) HDs across the 128 PUF outputs is shown in Table 7.5. Table 7.5 contains the
mean and variance of the HD for each approach (note that the HD distributions were
Gaussian). The average inter-die HD using random bit selection is about 63.78 bits out
of 128 or 49.8%. The average inter-die HD of different thresholds are 63.99 (49.99%),
64.03 (50.02%), 63.81(49.85%), which are closer to ideal value 64 out of 128 or 50%
than the random bit selection. We conclude that the uniqueness of IDs/keys from our
bit selection algorithms is at least as good as the random approach, if not better.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented our discovery that critical conditions for enrollment
tests can more efficiently identify unreliable bits. We have also developed an effective bit
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Table 7.5: HD in 128-bit outputs from 64 PUFs.
Random
Neigborhood-based Bit Selection
T=5 T=8 T=12
Mean 63.78 63.99 64.03 63.81
Variance 31.96 31.35 31.94 32.07
selection algorithm that can assist with key selection (i.e., determine “most stable bits)
from the reliable bits obtained from enrollment tests. Our experiments demonstrate
the effectiveness of our approaches to reduce ECC overhead with low test cost, thereby
making SRAM PUFs more suitable for high-volume production. One limitation in the
current paper was that without knowledge of the full physical SRAM structure, we could
not develop a neighborhood-based metric/algorithm that includes 2D information. We
shall investigate this in future work.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 7.8: Distributions of percentage of correct bits using different thresholds for
SRAM (a) without aging, (b) with 5 hours aging, and (c) with 10 hours
aging.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
Today’s integrated circuit (IC) development demands a large capital investment. Many
third-parties are involved in IC design and manufacturing process, in order to reduce
costs. Therefore, the semiconductor supply chain becomes more vulnerable to a wide
range of attacks than ever before. To improve security and trustworthiness of ICs,
we presented a series of design and test methodologies to deal with four challenging
hardware security problems. The major contributions of the thesis will be presented in
this chapter.
8.1 Hardware Trojan Detection and Prevention
Hardware Trojan is one of the biggest concerns since they can be inserted into a circuit
at any stage of development and manufacturing, and could be very difficult (if not
impossible) to detect. Hardware Trojans can be inserted at any phase from circuit
design to fabrication. However, nowadays since almost all design houses have become
“fabless” – their parts are fabricated in third-party foundries offshore to lower costs –
one of the best opportunities to introduce malicious inclusions and make alterations
occurs at the fabrication stage of the supply chain. Therefore, we focus on hardware
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Trojans injected at fabrication stage in this thesis. A post-silicon test method (chapter
2) and a design-for-trust approach (chapter 5) have been developed to effectively detect
Trojan-inserted ICs and prevent Trojan insertion, respectively.
8.1.1 Post Silicon Test Method for Trojan Detection
Chapter 2 proposes a delay-based hardware Trojan detection methodology. A clock
sweeping technique is used to obtain path delay information without any additional
hardware. Conventional transition and path delay fault (TDF and PDF) patterns can
be used to achieve high coverage on the nodes of critical and non-critical paths. Once
the data has been collected by clock sweeping, we generate a series of delay signatures
for ICs, and analyze whether ICs contain Trojans or not. Statistical analysis, such as
MDS, is used to distinguish the effects of hardware Trojans from process variations. In
addition, the proposed post-silicon detection technique has been evaluated in simulations
with s38417 benchmark circuit and FPGAs. Different types and sizes of hardware
Trojans were inserted. Both simulation and silicon results demonstrate that even in
the presence of uncontrollable process variations, measurement noise, and environment
variation, Trojan-inserted ICs could still be identified using our proposed technique.
8.1.2 Design-for-Trust Method for Trojan Prevention
Chapter 5 proposes the first design-for-trust technique that prevents the insertion of
additional Trojan gates in design layout and mask. The proposed BISA technique is able
to fill all unused spaces with functional standard cells instead of non-functional filler cells
during layout design. The inserted standard cells are then connected to form a circuitry
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called built-in self-authentication (BISA) circuit, which is independent of the original
circuit. The BISA structure can be used to test the functionality of its inserted cells.
If any of the inserted cells are replaced or otherwise modified, the BISA test procedure
will be able to detect it. The main advantage of BISA is that it has no golden chip
requirement. In contrast, most detection approaches need golden chips either fabricated
by a trusted foundry or verified to be Trojan-free through reverse-engineering, both of
which are prohibitively expensive. Since BISA relies on logic testing, process variation
is not a factor either, as compared to Trojan detection techniques based on side-channel
analysis. As an additional advantage, BISA has a negligible impact on original design
in terms of area and power.
In Chapter 5, we also present a new procedure that automatically inserts the
entire BISA circuitry (including linear feedback shift register (LFSR), multiple-input
signature register (MISR) and BISA cells) and can guarantee 100% test coverage, even
for SOCs with large unused spaces. We propose a new filling algorithm based on dy-
namic programming that can produce an optimal solution. Results show that it fills
unused spaces more efficiently and obtains higher test coverage than the greedy algo-
rithm in [75]. To demonstrate the feasibility of BISA, the proposed technique has been
implemented on 15 benchmarks from different benchmark suites including SOCs and
single-module designs. We demonstrate that the proposed BISA structure is compat-
ible to any hierarchical design. In addition, we analyze potential impacts introduced
by BISA. We compare timing (critical path delays) for designs with and without BISA.
We also analyze decoupling capacitance in BISA cells and regular filler cells from two
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standard cell libraries. We find that the added BISA circuits have very small impact on
the timing and decoupling capacitors of the original design without BISA. Ten different
attacks were performed on BISA circuitry and the results show that BISA can detect
every one of them with a high level of confidence.
8.2 Recycled IC Detection
In this thesis, we discussed the recycled IC problem and proposed a path-delay finger-
printing flow to detect recycled ICs. Because of silicon aging, the path delay would be
larger and thus change its original path-delay fingerprint. With no additional hardware
circuitry required, the post-silicon test method provides no overhead in term of area
and power consumption. The simulation results of different benchmarks with a variety
of workload and operating environment demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed
technique.
8.3 Design Obfuscation for Anti-Reverse Engineering
The Chapter 6 proposes a new design methodology that can effectively prevent reverse
engineering of the chip functionality and further prevent hardware Trojan insertion with
split fabrication process. Our technique allows FEOL and BEOL to be separated at
higher layers (≥ M4) to reduce cost. In order to enhance effectiveness of obfuscation,
all unused spaces in layout will be filled with additional functional cells or circuitry
called obfuscated built-in self-authentication (OBISA) instead of non-functional filler
cells during layout design. If any of the OBISA cells are replaced by a Trojan cell during
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FEOL, OBISA will be able to detect the modification. We propose to make connections
between OBISA added into unused spaces and the original circuit, especially in its
critical parts that are to be protected. The OBISA circuit not only makes it extremely
difficult for adversary to identify the original design, but also thwarts hardware Trojan
insertion by filling unused spaces in layout. In addition, several optimization approaches
are proposed to minimize timing and power overhead introduced by OBISA circuit while
maintaining a high test coverage for OBISA.
8.4 Reliable On-Chip ID Generation
Secure and reliable on-chip ID/key generation becomes crucial for Internet of Things
(IoT) devices. Physical unclonable function is an emerging security block for gener-
ating volatile secret ID/key for different applications in authentication, identification,
counterfeit detection and cryptographic. In this thesis, a post-silicon test technique and
a bit selection method for SRAM-PUF are proposed to generate more reliable on-chip
ID/key.
8.4.1 Post-Silicon Test Method for ID Generation
We will use our proposed clock sweeping technique to uniquely identify ICs. We develop
a methodology to use the path delay information to create a unique binary identifier
for each IC. In addition, we will analyze our ability to accurately identify ICs under
measurement and environmental noise. Simulation results from 90nm technology and
experimental results from 90nm FPGAs demonstrate the effectiveness of our technique.
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8.4.2 Security Primitive Design for ID Generation
A current challenge in SRAM PUFs is their sensitivity to temperature and voltage
variations as well as aging. Chapter 7 has identified that neighboring SRAM cells can
used to determine the more reliable SRAM PUF cells. Based on this observation, we
found the most critical enrollment conditions and developed a low-cost bit selection
algorithm for identifying the most reliable bits which is suitable for massive production
of SRAM PUFs. The experiment results from SRAM chips show that the SRAM-PUF
reliability improves dramtically compared to random bit selection.
8.5 Summary of Conclusions
This thesis is devoted to developing a series of design and test methodologies to tackle
four major malicious activities, including hardware Trojan insertion, recycled IC coun-
terfeiting, reverse engineering, and on-chip ID/key stolen, in order to improve the secu-
rity and trustworthiness of ICs. Three post-silicon test methodologies, two design-for-
security methodologies, and one hardware security primitive enhancement technique are
proposed to target these four security problems in this thesis. However, there are still fu-
ture research directions to improve the security and trustworthiness of ICs. Researchers
can bring IC security to the next level by developing new solutions.
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